impossible to carry out regrouping with the smooth regularity of March 1915; the measures taken, therefore, extend over the whole period. They were as follows: (a) The constitution of new divisions (201-204 and 12th Bav.) out of odd units existing in various theatres and of "combings" obtained in the lines of communication, the Ersatz battalions and other military establishments in Germany. The infantry regiments of these divisions were numbered 401-416 and 26-28 Bavarian, (b) The regrouping of all old divisions still remaining on the 4-regiment basis as 3-regiment formations of the new standard type—i.e. the completion of the process which had been half carried out in March 1915. This yielded the divisions 205-226, the 5th Guard Div., the 3rd Marine Div., and the Bavarian divisions 14th, 16th, and 19th Reserve—in all 27, apart from some additional Landwehr divisions obtained in the same way. Certain divisions, which lost not one but two regiments in this regrouping process, were compensated by new regiments numbered 389-400, 417-441 and 477, these being formed by grouping experienced companies taken from existing regiments of every kind. Somewhat later, on the verge of the offensive of Caporetto, the Jäger battalions still available and unallotted were grouped in a "Jäger Division," the last high-quality formation created in the war. (c) The creation of a series of new divisions, in somewhat the same way as the old first and second new reserves, at training camps in Germany. The quality of these was, however, far below that of the new armies of 1914. Although 50% were returned wounded men and men drafted back from the fronts, the remainder were of the class 1918, called up nearly two years in advance. (d) The numbers of these divisions were 231-242 and 15th Bav. (regiments 442-476, and 30-32 Bav.). At the time of the creation of these, the old 8th Ersatz Div. took the number 243. The creation of a series of divisions for home defences and garrison duty, which in effect were only groupings of existing Landsturm (in some cases Landwehr) resources. Of these only the 25151, 252nd, and 253rd were actually formed as such. The Metz mobile reserve which had existed since Aug. 1914, was numbered into this series; later it was freed from all connexion with the fortress, and a new Metz mobile reserve was formed in the last months of the war.
These measures, in their ensemble, increased the number of divisions or "equivalents" (the last being by now very few) from 172 to 213 in Jan. 1917, and 223 in May 1917, the final total reached being 238 in Oct. 1917. The 1917 class, the combed men of March 1916, and the soldiers who could be claimed from back areas, by no means sufficed to cover the needs of these new formations, at the same time as they made good the losses of Verdun, the Somme, Rumania and Russia, not to mention Arras and the Aisne. Already in Aug. 1916 there began the examination muster of the 1918 class, and by mid-November it began to join for training, though not one of its members had reached the age of 19. By now, too, the effective value of a "class" had sunk considerably, because of the percentage which had to be rejected not only for immaturity but for malnutrition as well.
The ration strength of the army, taken on the same basis as the previous figures, had grown by March 31 1917 to 7,630,456, but the loss of 311,034 killed, 26,016 dead of disease, 192,380 missing and about 250,000 disabled (of 875,107 wounded), in all about 775,000, had compelled the recruiting authorities to find some 1,643,000 recruits in the 12 months. And it was precisely at this period (Oct. 1916) that, under the energetic pressure of Hindenburg and Ludendorff who had succeeded Falkenhayn at the moment of the Rumanian crisis a great munition produc- tion campaign was started in Germany, which necessitated the recall to the factories of a large number (125,000 men in the armies '16-17) f mobilized workmen and a check to the process of combing-out. On the eve of the battle of the Somme, the strength of the German army in combatants only was 2,260,000 in the W. and 590,000 in the E., or (neglecting the small forces in the Balkans and Turkey) 2,850,000 on all fronts.
In spite of the fact that the line had held both in the W. and in the E., and that Rumania, with its material resources, had been conquered into the bargain, the outlook for rcjr/ was dark. The Russian Revolution came, with its enigmas; unrestricted submarine warfare was proclaimed with the foreseen result of bringing America into the war on the side of the Entente; and the British and French offensive was planned in a hope, almost amounting to certainty, that the defence would break down. Skilful defence, and sins of omission and commission on the side of the Entente, weathered this crisis for Germany, with a lower figure of losses than in any previous year; and Hindenburg and Ludendorff were able to collect such free reserves as allowed them to check the last Russian offensive, inflict two defeats which ended the war in the E., and to carry through the Caporetto offensive that so nearly ruined Italy.
This they were enabled to achieve—so far as the factors were under their own control—by using up the class of 1918, by creating as many manoeuvre units as possible, by employing every means that presented itself to stiffen the sinking moral of the war-weary army, and by new tactical methods, of which the most characteristic element was the light machine-gun. These guns were already in the spring of 1917 available on the scale of three per company. By the close of the year most companies had six, and during 1918 the issue of both light and heavy machine-guns for defence against low-flying aeroplanes was extended to batteries and to transport columns of every sort. Heavy machine-guns, too, had risen in number to one company of 1012 guns per infantry battalion, besides those of the divisional "M.G. Sharpshooter detachment" which numbered 36.
The characteristic of the army of 1917-8 therefore became economy of man-power, through constant augmentation of machine-gun power. Whereas in 1914 a i2-battalion active division possessed 24 machine-guns, in the winter of 1917-8 a 9-battalion division possessed 216 light and 142 heavy, or 358 in all. The rifle strength of the standard battle unit had been halved, and the machine-gun strength multiplied 15 times in about three and a half years, even without taking, anti-aircraft machine-guns into account. The ratio of fire-power to men exposed had very nearly trebled.
At this point, when the stage was being set for the final act, it is desirable to summarize in tabular form the number and distribution of German divisions (and "equivalents") during the first three years in which manoeuvre on interior lines was constant. Table D forms, rightly understood, a summary of the history of the World War, so far as Europe is concerned. Directly or indirectly, it reflects all its vicissitudes,
Amongst these divisions a certain classification in respect of quality had been set up. In 1914 Landwehr and Ersatz and new reserve formations had been differentiated from active and re- serve and from each other in composition and role, but with the constant and, till 1917, somewhat haphazard replacements of casualties, differences based on provenance had disappeared. Instead, differences based on battle experience had come into force, and though largely accidental at the outset, they had be- come effective through the machinery of replacements. Divisions recognized as "shock-troops" (a legacy of the trench-warfare period) were dignified by the name of Grosskampfdivisionen in their offensive aspect and Eingreifsdimsionen ("Intervention" or counter-attack divisions) on their defensive; and they received the pick of the recruits and returned wounded. The rest, formations fit to hold the line merely, were currently called "sector" divisions, and received, in the main, less battle-worthy elements in their drafts. A real, though admittedly undesirable, distinction was thus established. The Entente intelligence staff rated the 203 divisions of the western front with which it was concerned in 1918 thus: 61 "very good," 103 "average," 22 "poor."
The difference was not reflected in organization, except in the sense that "shock" divisions were the first to be equipped to any new scale that had been decided upon. Thus, such divisions were the first to receive their complement of six light machine-guns per company. In 1918 they received a fuller allowance of transport, and also, as part of their "organic" artillery, a group of medium guns (two batteries is-cm. howitzers and one battery 10-cm. long guns) in addition to their field artillery.
