numerical superiority disappeared with the accelerated arrival of
American divisions in France. By July i the rifle strength of the
Germans was 100,000 below that of the Allies. Two Austrian
divisions, and converted cavalry divisions, which were brought
into action during the summer, were hardly more than a drop in
the bucket. Company strengths could no longer be maintained.
More and more the army became an army of machine-gunners,
practising the infiltration method in attack and the elastic method
in defence, but in its growing disillusionment becoming less and
less apt for either form, since both demanded a high moral in
the isolated squad which formed the fighting unit.
As early as May it was decided to break up certain formations and to use their personnel as drafts for others. This process was carried out on a large scale from the end of July; 13 divisions disappeared by the end of Aug., 10 more in Sept. and 3 more in the first days of Oct. The 1920 class, called up and trained, reached the field depots from Aug. onwards, but for political reasons sanction was refused for its employment in the front line. This was the last resource, for unless a winter's respite could be obtained, the most complete combing-out of home in- dustries and agriculture now in any case impossible owing to the political situation would not have yielded a sufficient sup- ply of trained combatants.
The sinking of moral in the army manifested itself in the " black day " of Aug. 8. During that month and Sept., in spite of the stout resistance of many formations, the sentiment of defeat spread. At the last a final effort of propaganda convinced the army that by fighting hard, and only so, it might obtain honourable terms of peace. But it was too late. The end had come in Germany.
With the evacuation of occupied territory and the march home to demobilization in most cases self-demobilization the his- tory of the Prussian and German army system built up by Frederick the Great, Scharnhorst and Moltke, came to an end.
The losses in the concluding year, from April i 1918 to March 31 1919, are stated at 303,923 killed, 48,751 died of disease, 334,- 802 missing, and 823,498 wounded, representing a " definitive " loss of about 940,000.
In the whole war, the losses amounted to 1,531,048 killed, 155,013 died of disease, 991,340 missing, 4,211,469 wounded; or a total of 6,888,870 for recorded military casualties.
(C. F. A.)
IX. THE AusxRO-HuNGARiAN ARMY
Till a few years before the World War it could be said that no great state took as little care for its army as the Dual Monarchy. National differences and constant party conflict prevented any- thing more than the barest necessities of maintenance being provided for, and stagnation and even retrogression ruled in the army itself in consequence. This was especially true during the period 1903-6, in which the constitutional conflicts in Hungary focussed themselves principally upon the question of the Com- mon Army and led to difficulties of which the consequences were serious indeed. There were, however, in the last few years two causes at work which led to important developments. The first of these was the eternal Balkan question, which on two occasions the Annexation Crisis of the spring of 1909 and the Balkan War of 1912-3 brought Austria-Hungary to the verge of war. Each time Austria-Hungary was unready for war. But the long-deferred modernization of the military system was, under the pressure of circumstances, taken in hand, at any rate so far as patching up the more obvious defects was concerned.
The greatest sins of omission in the past had been those affecting the artillery; the danger of war in the south-east led to these being repaired, at any rate so far as the limited means allocated allowed of it, and also to machine-guns being pro- vided. The latter had been under experiment with cavalry and mounted troops since 1903, and it was not until 1908 that their employment became general.
The second important influence was that of the two-years'- service scheme introduced in July 1912. This was only brought into effect after a prolonged parliamentary conflict, for the Hun-
garian opposition had used the opportunity to try to obtain, by tactics of obstruction,' the separation of the Common Army into two parts, and, at the least, the acceptance of Hungarian as a language of command. In these struggles the ministerial party finally had its way, but the reforms it sought to bring about were shorn in the process of most of their efficacy. Indeed, so low was the agreed peace effective of the units that the army, compared with those of the other military powers, might fairly be regarded as having a militia character. The two-years'-service principle was, however, made law and applied to all parts of the armed forces of the Dual Monarchy.
These parts were five in number: (a) the Common or Imperial and Royal (K.u.K.) Army; (b) the Imperial Royal (K.K.) Austrian Landwehr; (c) the Royal Hungarian Landwehr (Hon- ved); (d) the Austrian (K.K.), and (e) the Royal Hungarian Landsturms. The basic principle of this partition was that the Common Army would form the first line in an external war, the two Landwehrs the second, and the two Landsturms the third. An especial function of the last named was the garrisoning of for- tresses and duty on lines of communication and in the interior. But in the last 20 years before 1914 the two Landwehrs had been brought on to the same organic and tactical level as that of the Common Army, excepting only that their peace effective within the unit was considerably lower. They were therefore in 1914 fit to be put into the first line at the outset, like the Common Army as indeed it was essential that they should be, in view of the enormous numerical superiority that had to be faced. As it turned out, even the Landsturm, which had no peace-time exis- tence at all, was sent into action at once, newly formed and ill equipped, on many parts of the front. The enthusiasm of the younger and the quiet resolution of the older Landsturm men, however, showed their worthiness in spite of all defects. But the experiment was a costly one in lives.
At the outbreak of war in 1914 the constitution of these forces was as follows: under the Supreme Command of the Emperor, and the direction of the War Ministry for the Common Army (and the Navy), the Austrian Ministry of Defence for the K.K. Landwehr and Landsturm, and the Hungarian " Honved Minis- try " for the Honved and Hungarian Landsturm. There were six general inspectorates, and 16 corps commands each with its own territorial region.
Common Army. Infantry: 32 Inf. Troops Divs. (I.T.D.), each of 12-16 battalions and 7-8 batteries with 74 inf. or mountain bdes. Cavalry: 8 Cav. Troops Divs. (K.T.D.), each of 24 squadrons and 3 batteries; 19 cav. bdes. Artillery: 14 field and 3 mountain bdes., 42 field-gun regts. (each 5-6 batteries and a depot cadre), 14 field- howitzer regts. (each 4 batteries and a depot cadre), 14 heavy-how- itzer divs. (each of 2 batteries), 10 horse-artillery divs. (each of 3 batteries), 10 mountain-artillery regts. (each of 4 batteries of guns or howitzers, and depot cadre). Fortress artillery: 5 bdes.; 6 regts. (each of 2-3 battalions, and depot cadre) ; 8 independent battalions. Technical troops: 14 sapper battalions, 8 pioneer battalions; one railway and one telegraph regt. ; bridging battalion ; flying depot cadre. Train: 16 battalions and mechanical transport cadres.
K.K. Landwehr. Infantry: 8 Landwehr divs.; 16 bdes.; 40 Schiitzen (Landesschiitzen) regts. (as in Common Army but of 3 battalions each). Cavalry: one cav. div. ; 2 bdes. ; 6 regts. mounted Schiitzen (organized as Common Army cav. regts.) detachments each of 3 squadrons in Tirol and Dalmatia. Artillery: 8 divs. field how- itzers (each of 2 batteries).
Honved. Infantry : 7 district divs., and one non-territorial div. ; 1 6 bdes.; 28 regts. (each of 3 battalions). Cavalry: 2 cav. divs.; 4 cav. bdes. ; 10 cav. regts. (organized as in Common Army). Artillery: 2 field-gun regts. (each of 8 batteries and depot cadre).
The infantry was armed with the 1895 8-mm. magazine rifle, except in the case of third-line units which were largely armed with rifles of the 86, 86/88, and 90/91 patterns. The field gun was an 8-cm. Q.F., the field howitzer a io-cm., of old model (as were also the heavy howitzers), but of good power. All these guns were of steel-bronze and therefore inferior, especially in range, to those of other powers. The siege artillery included i2-cm. guns, 24-cm. mortars, and 3O-5-cm. tractor-drawn mor- tars the last-named remarkable weapons which found employ- ment in field as well as in siege warfare. There were, further, the fortress armaments. The cavalry was uniformly equipped (sword and carbine), and well horsed. Theoretical training was
