THE DEPARTMENT'S WORK IN THE WORLD WAR
Sanitary Achievements. The value of a medical service in war should be measured, first, by the degree to which it preserves the effective strength of the army by sanitary methods, and, second, by its success in evacuating and caring for the sick and wounded. In both respects the Medical Department of the American army attained notable results. The success in preventing infectious dis- eases and losses from them, as compared with the Civil and Spanish- American Wars, is shown by the fact that only 6,445 fatalities occurred as a result of typhoid fever, malaria, dysentery, smallpox, scarlet fever, diphtheria and other miscellaneous communicable diseases (excluding tuberculosis and pneumonia), whereas if the Spanish War rates had prevailed there would have been 101,439 deaths, and if the Civil War rate had prevailed there would have been 170,997 deaths from these causes.
Care of Sick and Wounded. In the succour of the sick and wounded great advances were made both in the theatre of operations and in the service of the interior. Personnel directly attached to com- batant organizations was greatly increased. Mobile surgical hos- pitals were organized and operated close to the front ; X-ray examina- tions were everywhere available; splints for use in transporting fracture cases were enormously improved. Motorization of ambu- lance service was carried to an extent hitherto undreamed of. Base hospitals were enlarged to accommodate 1,000 patients or more, and were frequently grouped in centres, sometimes aggregating 20,000 beds, including the crisis expansion under canvas. In such centres the individual hospitals specialized, one treating gassed cases, another head cases and others chest wounds, fractures, abdominal injuriesand medical patients respectively. Laboratory service both at the front and on the lines of communication was expanded beyond all precedent. Professional services were more carefully coordinated and supervised than ever before; the most expert personnel was divided into groups, such as operating teams, gas teams, shock teams, etc., for quick transport by automobile or train to points where need was greatest. Veterinary units were augmented in size and number, caring promptly for sick and wounded animals. In the zone of the interior hospital service was brought to the highest standard, the best professional talent of the country was mobilized, and notable progress was made in the treatment of the sick and injured, particularly in the direction of physical reconstruction of the wounded, with a view to returning the individual to the community as a self-sustaining citizen.
Physical Examinations. Nearly 4,000,000 officers and men were given a careful physical examination by the Medical Department before admission to the military service and approximately the same number were again examined before demobilization ; careful records thereof protect the interests of both the individual and the Govern- ment. Valuable data as to the physical status of the nation were obtained from an analysis of these examinations.
Personnel. On April 6 1917, the Medical Department personnel was not even sufficient for the peace-time needs of the small regular army. The increase is shown in the following table :
 | A table should appear at this position in the text. See Help:Table for formatting instructions. |
November 30 1918
A P nl 6 '917 (Approximate)
Medical Corps . . 491 Medical Reserve Corps,
on active duty . . 342 Medical Corps . . 30,500
Dental Corps ... 86 Dental Corps . . 4,600
Veterinary Corps . . 62 Veterinary Corps . . 2,000
Contract Surgeons . . 181 Contract Surgeons . 940
Civilian employees . 450 Civilian employees . 10,700
Sanitary Corps . . 2,900 U.S.A. Amb. Service . 206
Nurse Corps . . . 233 Reserve Nurse Corps on
active duty . . . 170 Nurse Corps . . . 21,480
Enlisted Personnel . . 6,900 Enlisted Personnel . 264,000
Hospitals. When war was declared the army possessed four general and 113 small station hospitals with a total capacity of 6,665 beds. At the height of military activities there were in the United States 47 general hospitals, about 40 large base hospitals (ranging in size from 800 to 3,000 beds each) and a great number of smaller hospitals; the total capacity was over 130,000 patients. In the A.E.F. at the time of the Armistice, Nov. II 1918, there were in operation 153 base, 66 camp and 12 convalescent hospitals with a bed capacity of 283,553. By Dec. 5 this capacity had increased to 296,865 and with buildings already leased, under construction or authorized, would in due course have reached 423,722, with crisis expansion to 541,000. (\y. P. C.)
ARRIAGA BRUN DA SILVEIRA E PEYRELONGUE, MANOEL JOSE D' (1830-1917), Portuguese politician, was born at Horta, in the Azores, in 1839. He was educated at the university of
Coimbra, where he took his degree in law in 1866. He became
known as a strong Republican, and in 1882 was elected deputy
for Funchal, in 1890 becoming deputy for Lisbon. His Repub-
lican principles caused him to be a figure of much importance at the time of the revolution of 1910, and on Aug. 24 1911 he
was elected first president of the Portuguese Republic (see POR-
TUGAL). He resigned office in 1915, and died March 5 1917.
ARROL, SIR WILLIAM (1839-1913), British engineer, was born at Houston, Renfrewshire, Feb. 13 1839. In his boyhood
he was apprenticed to a smith at Paisley, and worked through
several engineering shops until, in 1868, he was able to set up
as a boiler-maker. In 1872 he took up construction in steel
and started the Dalmarnock ironworks, becoming an expert in
bridge-building. The Caledonian Railway bridge at Glasgow,
the reconstructed Tay bridge (1882-7), Forth bridge (1882-9),
the Tower bridge, London, and the Nile bridge at Cairo were
amongst his principal achievements. He was knighted in 1890.
He sat in the House of Commons for Ayrshire (S.) as a Unionist
member from 1895-1906. He died at Ayr Feb. 20 1913.
See Sir Robert Purvis, Sir William Arrol (1913).
ARTILLERY (see 2.685). Before the World War, the general military ideas of artillery procedure and purposes were somewhat the same in all countries.
It is proposed here to consider the lessons of the World War in the order in which they were learnt. As the war progressed, fresh problems presented themselves, fresh necessities arose, and artillery methods, equipment, and organization had to be modified to meet them.
The war on the western European front may be divided into four phases: a dash by the invader into the enemy's country; a long period of immobile warfare, both sides entrenched; and the breaking of the line, followed either by retreat and re- construction or else by the full exploitation of victory.
The first, or mobile, phase of a modern war is of the greatest importance; it decides whether the campaign is to be fought in the defender's country or in the invader's. When one country attacks another, it is the object both of her statesman and her soldiers to make the initial dash as rapid and effective as possible, so as to finish the campaign in the first stage, and to avoid the long war of attrition which results when two nearly equal armies are entrenched. Similarly, the defender endeavours to crush the invading force at the outset, or to drive it back into its own territory. Therefore, in pre-war preparation, the re- quirements of trench warfare must be subordinated to those of mobile warfare.
In the World War, at least four-fifths of the main Western campaign was fought in the trenches; and the only seriously contested campaign in which the first phase was carried through to a finish was the invasion of Rumania by the Germans. Even in Allenby's brilliant Palestine campaign there was a long pause after the taking of Jerusalem. It seems highly probable that the longest, though not the most important, period of a future war will consist of trench warfare. Speculation as to the effect of new weapons, such as tanks, aircraft, and gas, in changing the nature of war, may be as misleading as regards the future as it has been in the past, and, at the least, it is necessary, at the present time, to provide for trench warfare as well as for mobile warfare in the training and equipment of an army.
I. MOBILE WARFARE
Mobility. The initial phase of a war requires a high degree of mobility. Once the invader has left his own railways behind, he must, at first, depend almost entirely on roads. He desires to advance at the rate of 50 miles a day, which is a very different matter from covering 10 m. an hour over short distances. The defender requires an equal degree of mobility to counter the attack. Motor transport for guns and infantry is the only means of attaining this marching pace. As regards the artillery, with which we are here concerned, the gradual disappearance of the civilian " van horse " will, in course of time, make it difficult to keep up horsed guns in peace time, and impossible in war. There is therefore a general agreement that the artillery must become motor artillery. It is obviously impossible to make such a change all at once; the question is, which natures and formations should be converted first. Before dealing with this point we may consider the types of artillery motor required.
