The Barrage. This breakdown of communications obliged
the contending armies to adopt a simpler means of cooperation,
and led to the general introduction of the " creeping barrage "
(French barrage roulant, German Feuerwalze). Briefly, it is a
screen of shells bursting on and close to the ground, which is
moved forward across the country by short leaps according
to a pre-determined time-table. It is " halted " on each suc-
cessive objective for some 10 minutes before the infantry assaults
it, in order to intensify the effect. It is then moved forward
again to screen their further progress, and, when the last ob-
jective has been reached, it becomes a " standing " barrage
to screen and protect the troops while they " consolidate "
the ground which has been gained.
The infantry follow behind the barrage, keeping just clear of
the zone of bursting shell. They are screened from aimed fire
by the smoke and the dust thrown up, and the barrage is in-
tended to destroy any opposition as it passes on. If it succeeds in
doing this, communication between infantry units and the sup-
porting artillery becomes superfluous. It has proved practically
impossible to control or check the pace of the barrage when it
has once started, although the Germans attempted to do so
by light signals. This is on account of the difficulty of passing
the information from the particular infantry unit which wants a
modification of programme to the particular battery or bat-
teries concerned with that part of the barrage, through a " chain
of command." For at least one gun per 20 yd. of barrage front
is used, and the batteries whose concentrated fire forms the bar-
rage may themselves be widely dispersed.
Similar creeping barrages are used to screen retreating troops,
though the problem is then more difficult, since the enemy dic-
tates the pace of retirement. Such barrages are therefore made
as simple as possible in plan and in execution. Other forms of
barrage are used. " Flank " barrages are used to screen the
flanks of troops, either halted or in motion. " Standing," as
opposed to " creeping," barrages are used for many purposes,
such as to prevent the enemy from reinforcing a portion of his
line which is being attacked. A form of standing barrage often
used for this purpose is the " box " barrage, consisting of one
barrage parallel to the front attacked and two at right angles to
it, forming three sides of a rectangle. A " preventive " barrage
is put down over the enemy's lines when he is supposed to be
about to attack. A " counter barrage " is one put down when
the enemy is actually attacking, so managed as to take effect
on his troops as they follow up their own barrage. In some
instances a sham barrage, with no troops behind it, was used to
divert attention from the real attack.
Important as the barrage is, it cannot be considered a satis-
factory substitute for aimed fire; it is an expedient which has to
be resorted to when fire of precision cannot be carried out. Mar-
shal Foch had occasion to warn the French artillery against
trusting too much to it. In a circular issued in the summer of
1918, he writes:
" The rolling barrage adopted by the Germans no longer meets
the conception of the present war. The artillery cannot pretend to
overwhelm the entire terrain of the attack with a rolling barrage,
even if redoubled. Its object is not gained by unloosing a brutal fire
over a given zone and searching progressively at random with a
fire directed straight to its front, without regard as to whether it is
followed by the infantry. It is better to attack definite points
and intensify the interdiction, the counter-battery, or the crushing
fire on certain points, reserving a part of the field batteries for accom-
panying the infantry in intimate cooperation with it."
In other words, it is unsound to abandon at the outset all
fire of precision on important targets, and every endeavour to
work in cooperation with the infantry, and, instead, to attempt
to mow down all opposition with a machine.
The Barrage in Mobile Warfare. Although the creeping bar-
rage is primarily used in the deliberate attack on an entrenched
position, even in mobile warfare troops are frequently checked
by an enemy holding an improvised position, and it may then be
necessary to bring up all available artillery at once, and to form
a creeping barrage to cover the attack. When an attack is led
by tanks, it is necessary to have a barrage to conceal them, other-
wise a great many are hit.
Wireless telegraphy may possibly be so developed as to be-
come both directive and selective, so that a hundred stations
may talk at once without mutual interference, or risk of being
" jammed " by the enemy. Some progress in this direction
has already been made. If this or other reliable means of sending
and receiving messages becomes a practical fact, it will solve
the problem of communication between infantry and artillery,
and the crude method of barrage will fall into disuse.
Guns of Accompaniment. As the creeping barrage advances
it is intended to destroy all opposition. But it was found in
practice that enemy detachments provided with good cover,
such as machine-gun sections with overhead protection, got
underground while the barrage was passing over them, and then
reappeared, causing very heavy losses to the attacking troops.
The French ascribe the majority of their losses in the last phase
of the war to this cause. Now it would be extremely dangerous,
even if it were possible, to bring the barrage back to " pound "
such a danger spot. By the time this had been done, the ad-
vancing troops might very possibly have disposed of the ma-
chmc-guns by bombing, and have resumed their advance, in
which case they would come under their own barrage fire. It
is manifestly impossible to get the fire of distant guns on to a
machine-gun nest in time, though something might be done by
an aeroplane dropping a light-ball on it to attract the attention
of the guns. The result of the failure of artillery support in this
matter has been a general outcry for guns of accompaniment;
that is to say light guns, either pack, motor, or hand-drawn,
capable of advancing with the infantry, and of dealing with
machine-gun nests and strong points that have survived the
barrage, and with tanks.
The matured German opinion is expressed in the following
quotation from a document issued scarcely 10 weeks before the
Armistice:
" The guns of accompaniment must engage at short range the
enemy with whom the infantry is fighting at close quarters. By rea-
son of their proximity to the infantry they can be fired at the right
moment, and on the right target, more easily than the artillery in
rear. Also, being at close range, they can fire on objectives which
cannot be observed from the rear."
A light g-pounder, firing H.E. shell only, to an effective
range of about 2,000 yd., is the type of weapon required. The
British used their 3'7-in. mountain howitzer, firing a 2o-lb.
shell, when available; but the ammunition was considered too
heavy, and troops who possessed captured German light trench
mortars, firing a i4-lb. shell, found this a better weapon for
the purpose. The latest type of gun is the U.S. " infantry
howitzer," which is carried so far forward as possible by a small
cross-country motor vehicle, and thence wheeled or carried by
hand. It fires a 6-lb. shell for direct fire, and a Q-lb. shell for
high-angle fire.
These guns are required at the rate of about one per 100 yd.
of the front of the advance, or from 12 to 16 per division. The
French have decided that a gun of accompaniment is to be intro-
duced, and it is understood that it will be motor-drawn or motor-
carried, but no further details are available. The Germans, in
and 1918, used a variety of light guns styled " infantry
guns " in addition to their infantry trench mortars, which were fitted for direct as well as for high-angle fire. But in the great
battles their invariable practice was to detail one, two or
more batteries of the divisional field artillery, fully horsed, and with their own ammunition carriages, to support the divisional infantry attack by direct accompaniment (sometimes reenforced). After trying other methods, they finally adopted the practice of allotting sections, or even single guns, to the battalions engaged. These single guns or sections followed up the leading lines of infantry, running up by hand when the horses could not get forward. 1
The relation of the artillery commander to the infantry com-
mander, both being on the spot, was a difficult question which was never definitely solved. In practice, indication of task was as a rule the duty of the infantry commander, and choice of position and method that of the gunner. But the latter remained free to engage any favourable target without waiting for orders. (C. F. A.)
