the tale of prisoners, but made no real progress; the 8th could
do no more, but until the right of the 8th Div. could come
forward to cover it the Indian Corps could not tackle the
Bois de Biez.
On the next morning (March 12) violent counter-attacks against several points made it obvious that strong German reinforcements had come up. Advancing in mass against the Bareilly Bde. along the Rue du Bois and against the rest of the Meerut Div. N. of Port Arthur, the Germans were mown down in numbers without ever reaching the British line. Opposite the Moulin du Pietre another determined attack broke through the 24th Bde., to be thrown back by a prompt counter-stroke by the ist Worcesters; and in this quarter also very heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans. Further N. again the 21st Bde. lost some advanced trenches, but successfully main- tained its main position and lent effective aid to the 2nd Scots Guards and 2nd Borderers of the 2oth Bde., who carried a strong redoubt N.E. of the Moated Grange and took 300 prisoners of the VII. Corps. But still the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road barred any advance, and the machine-guns in the fortified houses held up all attempts to get forward. Thus, though the 25th Bde. repulsed several attacks they could not carry the line forward from Neuve Chapelle; the Sirhind Bde. (Lahore Div.) made a little ground and took prisoners but could not cross the Riviere des Layes; and now that all advantages of surprise had gone Sir John French saw that little was to be gained by pressing the attack. March 13 therefore saw the fighting much diminished in intensity; gains were consolidated and the troops reorganized, but the attack was suspended.
The battle of Neuve Chapelle ended therefore somewhat disappointingly. The substantial advance which had at one moment seemed within reach had not been realized: the delay in pushing the British reserves had allowed the Germans to rush to the danger spot reinforcements sufficient to bar the road to the high ground of the Aubers ridge. Thus while the tactical position round Neuve Chapelle was much improved the strategical situation was unchanged. The losses, over 4,200 in the Indian Corps, nearly double that in the IV., had been heavy, while of three minor operations undertaken as diversions those at Givenchy (I. Corps) and Wytschaete (II. Corps) failed, only the III. Corps proving successful against 1'Epinette (S.E. of Armentieres). Still, it would be wrong to class Neuve Chapelle among British defeats. The troops were undoubtedly encouraged by seeing that German positions could be stormed and the captured ground held against powerful counter-attacks. Nearly 1,700 prisoners had been taken and the German losses had exceeded the British. Rifles, artillery and machine-guns had found splendid targets, and the German battalions who had shown themselves in the open had been shot down in masses. It was felt that another attack in which the lessons of the battle could be turned to good effect might lead to far-reaching results.
(D) Aubers Ridge and Festubert.—The part assigned to the British in the Allied offensive of May 1015 gave them as their immediate objective the S.W. end of the Aubers ridge. The IV. Corps was to attack at Rougebancs, N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, using the 8th Div. in the first assault and supporting it with the 7th, while S.W. of Neuve Chapelle the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) and the ist Div. (I. Qorps) attacked from the line of the Rue du Bois which joins the Estaires-La Bassee road at the " Port Arthur " cross-roads. It was hoped that these divisions pushing forward in an easterly direction would establish touch behind the Bois de Biez with the IV. Corps advancing southward past Aubers. But whether successful or not in their immediate tasks, the British would materially assist the Allied operations if their attack diverted German guns and men from the crucial point N. of Arras where the French were attacking.
It was with the greatest confidence that the British forces looked forward to this attack. Neuve Chapelle had whetted their hopes; it was believed that at this second attempt the lessons of Neuve Chapelle would be turned to good effect, that the causes which had robbed that attack of greater success
would be avoided, that the increased artillery and ammunition available would allow of a far more effective bombardment. Unfortunately, the delays in renewing the attack, due partly to weather conditions but even more to the insufficient ammunition supply, had given the Germans time to so strengthen their positions that only the heaviest artillery could produce any substantial effect upon them. Parapets, many feet in thickness and backed up by concrete, were proof against i8-pounders, and afforded complete protection against anything short of a direct hit to the machine-guns placed in pits sited at the ground level which swept the " no-man's-land " with a grazing fire. It was only the bitter experiences of May 9 which revealed how very formidable the German defences had become and what an increase in battering-power would be needed to reduce them.
The actual attack delivered early on May 9 met with modified success at Rougebancs, but with complete failure at Rue du Bois. Here the infantry found the enemy's trenches strongly manned; the machine-guns from their pits at the base of the parapets maintained a deadly fire; scarcely any of the assailants managed to reach the enemy's parapets, and the few who did get into the German lines were promptly overwhelmed. More- over, the German artillery at once opened a heavy counter- bombardment, and the British supports and reserves, packed into crowded communication and assembly trenches, suffered severely, while the task of evacuating wounded and reorganizing the troops for a second attempt proved extremely difficult. A second effort was, however, made by both the ist and Meerut Divs. about 7 A.M., though without success; and when in the course of the afternoon the Bareilly Bde. of the Meerut Div. and the ist Bde. of the ist Div. were put in, the same result followed. A handful of the ist Black Watch made a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but so small a party was powerless and was speedily overwhelmed.
At Rougebancs the right brigade of the 8th Div., the 24th, failed except at one point to reach the enemy's trenches, and suffered very severe losses. On its left, however, the 2nd Rifle Bde. and ist Royal Irish Rifles of the 25th Bde. captured a considerable frontage, and lodgments were also made by the 2nd Lincolnshires and the I3th (Kensington) London Regiment. However, consolidation proved exceedingly difficult. Machine- guns on the flanks, which could not be located or silenced, prevented the advance of reinforcements; efforts to dig communi- cation trenches came under heavy shelling, and could not be completed before German counter-attacks, vigorously pressed and well supplied with bombs, drove back those assailants who had penetrated beyond the front trenches and gradually forced the survivors out of the positions they had captured. The Rifle Bde. held on longest, keeping the Germans at bay till after midnight, but before the 7th Div. could push a battalion across to relieve them a renewed counter-attack ousted them from the German trenches. The division's losses came to over 4,500, about the same as at Neuve Chapelle, but without the satisfaction of retaining any of the ground won at the first assault. The ist Div. lost nearly 4,000 men, the Indian Corps had over 2,000 casualties, and the completeness of the failure was the more felt because of the high hopes so generally enter- tained.
However, though the French attacks had also fallen short of the success anticipated, they had gained some ground and were being continued. Sir John French therefore determined to renew his efforts to assist his allies, though on a less ambitious scale. North-east of the village of Festubert the German lines running northward from Givenchy turned N.E. at a sharp angle towards the Bois de Biez, making a salient which it was proposed to attack on two sides. On the night of May 15-16, therefore, the I. and Indian Corps renewed their attempt to advance from the Rue du Bois, using the Meerut and 2nd Divs., while the 7th Div. which had been transferred from the IV. to the I. Corps, attacked eastwardly from Festubert. The attack was preceded by an intermittent bombardment extending over several days, instead of the short but intensive bombardment employed on March 10 and May 9. Over a large part of the
