maining 27,000,000 tons came from by-product ovens. The maxi-
mum capacity of the by-product plants of the United States has
been estimated at 27,000,000 net tons of coke at the beginning of
1908, 33,700,000 at the beginning of 1919, and 39,500,000 at the
beginning of 1920. These estimates were based on 100% operation.
In actual practice, however, an average operation above 9% cannot
be assumed; and for the country as a whole 85% is a safer figure.
This would show the capacity for 1920 to be 33,575. tons.
Estimated according to the quantity of by-product coke produced in 1919, 25,171,000 tons, by-products recovered during that year were 668,200,000 Ib. of ammonium sulphate or equivalent, 251,000,- ooo gal. of tar, 84,800,000 gal. of crude light oil, and 367,700,000 cub. ft. of gas. The largest by-product coke plant in the world in 1920 was that of Clairton, Pa., owned by the Carnegie Steel Co. This plant carbonized 12,500 tons of high volatile coals daily, pro- ducing 8,000 tons of metallurgical coke, 150 gal. of coal tar, 75,000- ooo cub. ft. of gas, 40,000 gal. of light oil and 174 tons of am- monium sulphate each 24 hours. The comparative production of these resultants varies in different parts of the country.
In contrast with the reserves of coal in the United States and the annual production, the exports in 1913 (a normal year) were only about 12% of the exports of coal from all other countries; and a large part of the American exports went to Canada by rail. Of sea-borne coal, the United States sent out only about 4 %. This small proportion of over-seas trade was due to the distance of American coal from seaports, the lack of organization among operators and among related shipping organizations, and further, to the relative independence of the United States, which could utilize only a small amount of imports from most countries as a return cargo for coal- exporting ships. Most of the American coal was used at home, but the advantage of exporting a considerable quantity of coal, for its effect in increasing trade relationships with other countries, was becoming more manifest. During a part of the autumn of 1919 the United States exported coal at the rate of 65,000,000 tons a year. This was practically every pound of coal that could at the moment be loaded into ships at the Atlantic ports. The total coal-loading capacity of all the Atlantic coast export docks was about 31,000 tons per lo-hour day. It was this limited coal-handling facility which militated to a large extent against the United States gaining a per- manent position as the world's leading coal export nation.
The war opened several foreign markets, especially in South America, to U.S. coal. The United States had coaling stations as far away as the Samoa Is. and Manila, but little coal reached them from America. American coal supplied the Government coaling stations in Alaska, Hawaii, the home ports both Atlantic and Pacific, Cuba, Porto Rico, Nicaraguan ports, Panama Canal ports, Mazatlan (Mexico) and South American ports.
U.S. Government Control, 1017-20. On April 6 1917 the United States entered the World War, and centralized war- time control over the coal industry was delegated by President Wilson, in May 1917, to an officially constituted Fuel Board, with Francis S. Peabody, a practical coal operator, as chairman. Soon after the formation of the Board, plans were announced for the stabilizing of coal prices, the collecting of production statistics, and the efficient distribution of coal.
The Fuel Board acted as a kind of clearing-house, collating and digesting the vast mass of information needed. In June 1917 labour was given representation on the board, and the way thus smoothed for more efficient cooperation between the board and the mine workers. Keenly desirous of efficiently handling the coal situation, the Federal Trade Commission, through the Fuel Board, made recommendations which created surprise, as no such drastic measures had been expected. In essence, the most important of these recommendations were: First, the institution of a pooling arrangement, to be placed in the hands of a Government agency, to control the production and distribution of coal and coke. The producers were to be paid their full cost of production plus a uniform profit per ton, with due allowance for quality of product and efficiency of service. Second, all agencies of transportation, by both rail and water, were to be similarly pooled and operated on Government account, as a unit, under direction of the President. The owning cor- porations were to be paid a fair compensation, which would cover normal net profit, upkeep and betterments.
In the latter part of June 1917, after conferences with the coal operators, the Fuel Board (then known as the Committee on Coal Production) made sweeping reductions in the current prices of bituminous coal, which had been showing a tendency to rise to unheard-of levels. Early in these conferences it be-
came apparent that a national organization of coal operators would be necessary to carry into effect the price-fixing and other plans of the Government. A tentative organization was formed, composed of the secretaries of the 25 coal-trade associations which were represented at the sessions. C. P. White, of Cleve- land, was chairman of this new body, and C. E. Lesher, statis- tician of the U.S. Geological Survey, was secretary. The asso- ciation was to work in conjunction with Mr. Peabody's com- mittee, and to be supported by an assessment not to exceed one-quartet mill per ton, levied on all operating coal companies in the United States. By Aug. i 1917 the pooling arrangement suggested by the Federal Trade Commission was in full operation. All shippers of tidewater bituminous coal had agreed to pool their output at the ports of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Hampton Roads. The regulations fixing maximum prices for coal, announced by the Committee on Coal Production, were carefully observed by the coal operators, although the new fig- ures had been characterized as " unjust " in some quarters and as " exorbitant and oppresive " by Secretary of War Baker, who wanted cheap fuel for the navy.
The prices set by the Committee on Coal Production were short-lived, for on Aug. 21 1917 President Wilson took price- fixing into his own hands and prescribed provisional prices to cover all the bituminous-coal-producing districts of the country. The new figures were one-third lower than those agreed upon voluntarily by the operators in concert with Mr. Peabody. The announcement of the new prices stated that they were based upon actual cost of production and were deemed to be not only fair, but liberah Provision was made, however, for a reconsideration " when the whole method of administering the fuel supplies of the country shall have been satisfactorily organized and put into operation." All the coal operators in the United States were called upon by the Board of Directors of the National Association of Coal Operators to meet Aug. 29 191 7 at Pittsburg, to discuss the latest ruling.
Soon after the President's announcement fixing the prices of soft coal, came the setting of prices of anthracite coal, the specification of the margin of profit that could be charged by a jobber and the naming of a coal controller. In a fifty-word statement, President Wilson announced that, in accordance with an Act of Congress approved Aug. 19 1917, he had ap- pointed Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, as his fully empowered representative on control of fuel.
The new schedule of coal prices had no appreciable effect on anthracite, though it threw the bituminous trade into con- fusion. Practically all coal disappeared from the market, and delegations from all parts of the country rushed to Washington in an endeavour to have the prices on bituminous coal increased. Dealers who had purchased stocks of coal at prices considerably above the latest Government figures were in a quandary. On Sept. 8 1917 Mr. Garfield made pubh'c his plans for controlling retail prices of coal by the formation of local fuel administrators in every coal-consuming section of the country. Soon after, in- timations came from Washington that the President's pro- visional prices for bituminous coal would be increased, as the original schedule had tended to decrease production. In the autumn of 1917 the educational department of the Fuel Ad- ministration, in the daily press and in circulars, posters and pamphlets, began to preach economy to both domestic and industrial coal consumers. Industries that were not strictly necessary to the winning of the war became apprehensive as to their future coal supplies. Through the fall of 1917 the demand for both anthracite and bituminous coal was urgent, and many sections of the country were in dire straits for want of soft coal. The price of bituminous had been increased 45 cents mean- time, the advance being made to cover the increase in the miners' wage scale that, had gone into effect.
By Dec. 1917 it became evident to those in the coal industry that the Fuel Administration would brook no interference with its plans. The personnel of the Administration had been growing since its inception, and there were organizations in most of the states of the Union. With the coming of the exceptionally cold
