miners from leaving their tasks for other war industries, such as munitions and shipbuilding, where higher wages prevailed.
Conditions in the latter part of Aug. 1918 were about as follows: That part of the United States lying roughly be- tween the Rocky and Allegheny mountains appeared to be fairly well supplied with fuel, though Michigan was complaining of a shortage of domestic coal. The scarcity of coal seemed to be worst along either coast. New England, while admitting that coal was coming forward in adequate volume for immediate needs, nevertheless was apprehensive as to the future. On the Pacific coast, industries were somewhat short of fuel; although little anxiety was felt, it was anticipated that wood and other fuels would have to be used there during the winter. By the middle of Oct. even the most carping critic was forced to admit that Federal control of the coal industry was beneficial. In charge of all production and distribution facilities, the Fuel Administration had carried out many of the plans which it had formulated early in the year. In the face of apparently insur- mountable obstacles and of bitter criticism from many quar- ters, Dr. Garfield and his assistants had laboured steadily until disorder had given way to order. New England and a number of other important industrial centres had ample reserve stocks of fuel against the uncertainties of mining and shipping con- ditions in winter, a complete reversal of the conditions that obtained in the autumn of 1917, a year earlier.
The need for quantity production of soft coal being less urgent, the Fuel Administration again turned its attention to quality. During the week ended Oct. 28 1918, orders were issued to a number of bituminous coal miners prohibiting them from mining or shipping their product, as it was of an inferior quality. The Fuel Administration closed down 99 mines in its campaign for clean coal. Early in Nov. 1918 a surplus of soft coal was reported from practically every mine west of the Mississippi river, this unusual condition being attributable largely to the expectation of an early peace which led manufacturers of war goods to stop buying coal, and partly to exceptionally mild weather throughout the country. On Nov. n 1918 the signing of the Armistice practically ended the activities of the Federal Fuel Administration. Government control of prices and other regulatory measures of the Fuel Administration were suspended Feb. i 1919, but control of the coal industry was again estab- lished Oct. 30 1919, when all regulations were restored, in order to deal with the results of a strike in the soft-coal fields. These regulations continued in force until April i 1920, when the coal industry was returned to its owners.
Apart from the phases of the conservation work carried on by the Fuel Administration as already described, other fuel- saving plans and recommendations were either discussed or put under way. These activities may be classified as follows:
Interconnexion of power plant. This meant that municipal electric plants should connect with central stations; that isolated office-building plants, as well as industrial plants, should shut down and take power from central stations; and the interconnexion of hydro-electric plants with steam electric plants.
" Skip-stop." Many street-railway companies of the United States adopted the " skip-stop " system for the saving of fuel by passing many streets without a stop; steps were taken to decrease coal consumption by automatic control of heat on cars and by the elimination of unnecessary street-railway service.
Industrial gas. -The managers of foundries and other industrial plants in sections of the country where artificial or natural gas was available, were induced to substitute this form of fuel for hard coal or coke. Many restaurant proprietors and bakers were persuaded to abandon solid fuel for gas.
Domestic heating. Although domestic heating consumed only a small portion of the total coal output, methods of burning fuel in domestic heating equipments were improved, and faulty installa- tions were corrected.
Wood fuel. Various local Fuel Administrators devoted themselves to ascertaining where dead timber was obtainable and, through women's organizations, boy scouts, and other volunteers, this fuel was savyed and distributed, taking the place of coal.
Lighting restrictions. The use of electric illumination for display purposes was curtailed.
Efforts in the direction of conservation ran from the smallest consumer, who carried his coal home in a pail, to the huge coal-consuming corporations in the large industrial cities. What the Federal Fuel Administration accomplished cannot be ac- curately measured in terms of coal saved, though it may be stated that it amounted to many millions of tons. (F. W. P.)
COAST DEFENCE (see 6.599). Broadly, the term, "coast defence " might be said to include all military and naval meas-
ures taken to defend the sea-margin of a count rv against any
attack by an enemy conveyed by vessels on or under the surface
of the water. But the usual military meaning is a much nar-
rower one, and may be taken to denote only the fixed defences
of a coast and their various accessories. Even this requires
qualification. Unless the sea-margin be a very short one it is not
practicable to defend it efficiently by any defences tied down to
the coast-line concerned. The cost in men and material would
be very great, and the whole, being rendered immobile, would be
incapable of use in any other part of the theatre of war. So far
as these forces were concerned initiative would always rest with
the enemy who could attack or not as he liked. Victory lies
with the attack and not with the mere parrying of a blow.
Therefore, any country desiring victory must be prepared to
strike, and for this reason must limit purely passive defence to
its minimum; and defences tied to a coast arc purely passive.
It is true that a country with very weak naval forces often tends to increase its coast defences as compared with another power possessing a strong navy. But even here this tendency should be carefully limited. The hostile navy will hardly ever be able to compel victory by itself; land operations will be neces- sary, and every effort should be made to conserve energy to combat these. The real defence of a coast, in the plain English of the words, lies in beating the enemy. The numerous coast guns on the east coast of the United States of America never fired a shot in the Spanish- American War; that coast was de- fended at the naval battle outside Santiago de Cuba. Practically then it may be said that coast defence, in the present mili- tary acceptation of the words, refers to the fixed defences at certain limited portions of a coast which, as will be seen later, arc vital to the whole general fighting scheme of the country.
This view in its entirety has not always prevailed either in England or in other countries, and it may be said that the modern British scheme of coast defence has only been accepted since about 1885. Some years earlier the so-called Palmerston Commission, which commenced its sittings in 1859, had carried out a very large scheme of coast fortification which, although it concentrated the defences at certain important harbours, still was so far imbued with the ideas of the past that it caused its works to be much too heavily gunned, and so locked up too many men and too much material.
Starting with the experience gained at the bombardment of Alexandria in 1881 the British school of thought on coast defence, as it existed before the World War, gradually took shape, and its ideas were crystallized largely owing to the influ- ence of Sir George Clarke (Lord Sydenham).
The World War has naturally caused changes in this as in every branch of the military art. Opinions are expressed to the effect that the whole scheme of coast defence must be radically changed, owing to the theory that surface craft are practically doomed and that the weight of a future attack will come from the air or under the water. This is almost certainly to anticipate the future too rapidly. The use of aircraft and the expansion of the use of the submarine boat have undoubtedly caused great changes. But they are changes and not revolutions. History shows that no inventions in the past have ever caused sudden revolution in the art of war. It will be found that the new arm or the fresh invention take their places in the armoury of war alongside of, but at first not in place of, what has gone before. In time the old weapon may be discarded altogether, but some- times this does not happen. In the matter under consideration surface craft must always be used for ordinary commercial purposes, as less energy is required to move a given mass floating on the water to what is necessary to move it in the air or com- pletely submerged in the sea. These surface craft being in existence will certainly have to be used in warfare. Also, the
