authorities, an almost indispensable preliminary to the under- taking of warlike operations against Constantinople and the Bosporus by fighting forces coming from the west. The question of the mastering of this all-important lower waterway in the event of a contest with the Turks had indeed engaged the close attention of British naval and military experts some years earlier. The conclusion arrived at on that occasion had, however, been that, whether the campaign were to take the form of a purely naval operation or whether the task were to be performed by an amphibious expeditionary force, the enterprise was bound to prove most difficult. In 1914 the channel was known to be defended by a number of batteries, some of them armed with very heavy guns. Most of these works were planted about the slender reach situated about 10 m. above the outlet into the Aegean, and known as the " Narrows." If the batteries and their artillery were somewhat out of date, the fact remained that warships steaming up the defile would be compelled to pass these fortifications at very close quarters, when the lack of range of their guns would cease to tell. The Ottoman authorities were moreover known to have given much attention to the problem of mine-fields especially adapted to the peculiar condi- tions existing within the Dardanelles; and the development which had taken place in this particular form of defence was such as to render the task of a fleet which should try to force the passage a more difficult one than it would have been a few years earlier. The fact that along the whole of its course this remarkable waterway is only separated from the Aegean by the attenuated Gallipoli Peninsula, did, on the other hand, suggest that the most promising method of attack upon the maritime defile from without would be to occupy that significant tongue of land.
An appeal reached the British Government from Russia on Jan. 2 1915 for help to relieve the existing situation in Armenia, and an operation directed against the Dardanelles was judged to be the best means of complying with the request; but there were no large bodies of troops available that could be used for such a purpose. The consequence was that the feasibility of forcing a way from the Mediterranean up into the Sea of Mar- mora as a purely naval undertaking came to be examined afresh in London. When asked for his views, Vice-Adml. Sir Sackville Garden, the British commander-in-chief in those waters, proposed that a fleet should try to destroy the Ottoman forts in the Straits and to clear away the mine-fields sown in the chan- nel, by adopting a process of methodical advance. This plan possessed the merit of novelty. It had always been assumed during previous discussions on the question that warships adventuring the passage would try a rush, that they would endeavour to steam by the batteries and drive the defending gunners from their guns by concentrated fire. Although the professional chiefs at the Admiralty were not enthusiastic supporters of Adml. Garden's project, the Government decided to adopt it. 1 French concurrence was obtained, French support was promised, and measures were at once set on foot to con- centrate such naval forces in the Aegean as appeared to be required for the execution of the plan.
A considerable armada was got together, although its as- sembling took several weeks and although the Russians had as a matter of fact heavily defeated the Turks in Armenia (battle of Sarikamish) even before orders for the assembling were issued. As regards large craft, the fleet consisted in the main of semi-obsolete battleships looked upon as unfit to take part in a fleet action. Of such ships the British contributed fourteen 2 and the French four. 3 But the fleet also included two semi- dreadnoughts ("Lord Nelson," "Agamemnon"), the battle- cruiser " Inflexible " and the newly completed " Queen Elizabeth,"
1 On the naval operations, see also the article NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WAR.
" Queen," " London," " Prince of Wales,"** " Implacable " and " Irresistible "; " Majestic " and " Prince George "; " Corn- wallis " (Duncan class); " Swiftsure " and "Triumph"; "Ven- geance," " Albion," " Goliath " and " Ocean " (Canopus class). For the characteristics of these ships and of the " Lord Nelson " and " Inflexible " see 24.897.
3 " Bouvet," " Suffren," " Charlemagne," " Gaulois."
armed with is-in. guns. The battleships were to be aided by several cruisers and destroyers and a flotilla of mine-sweepers was also organized. The conveniently situated islands of Tenedos and Lemnos 4 (the latter offering the immense land- locked haven of Mudros as an anchorage) were occupied to serve as naval bases, and on Feb. 19 the venture opened with an attack upon the weakly Ottoman batteries that guarded the outlet of the channel. The batteries were silenced for the time being; but bad weather interrupted the proceedings and the batteries had to be silenced afresh a week later (Feb. 25) effectually on this occasion. That night the mine-fields at the mouth of the Dardanelles were cleared away, and battleships were in consequence enabled to penetrate into the lowest reaches of the defile on the morrow.
Stormy weather caused some delays in continuing the pro- gramme, but heavily armed vessels made their way a short distance up channel on several days early in March and engaged some of the enemy works that were sited about the Narrows. 5 The sweepers continued their labours night after night, gradually extending the fairway up which heavy craft could safely venture. Long-range fire on the forts directed from outside the Straits over the Gallipoli Peninsula was also tried, but the results proved disappointing. In reality, a very liberal expenditure of artillery ammunition on the part of the fleet was doing consider- ably less damage to the Ottoman defences than the Allied sailors imagined to be the case. Any Turkish battery that was chosen for target generally ceased firing before long; and the assailants were disposed to assume that the work was definitely put out of action, whereas all that had happened in reality was that the hostile gunners had been driven from their guns. Moreover, promising as the situation may have appeared to be from the attacking side in so far as neutralization of the Ottoman batteries was concerned, it was plain that the mine-sweepers were making disappointing progress. The enemy's light guns, aided by effective searchlights, were offering a strenuous opposi- tion to the small craft engaged on the all-important duty of clearing the channel of submerged defences. At last Vice-Adml. Sir John Michael De Robeck, who had succeeded Adml. Garden, decided, under some pressure from home, to undertake an onset in full force upon the defences of the Narrows by day, although mine-fields still forbade a close attack on the forts on the part of battleships.
This operation took place on March 18, and it proved unsuc- cessful. Sixteen battleships entered the Straits to participate in the encounter, the manoeuvring of so large a number of great vessels in this narrow space was a matter of some dif- ficulty and also gave excellent targets for the Turkish artillery, which replied to their fire with unexpected spirit. The contest lasted for several hours, but towards evening the fleet was obliged to retire, three of the battleships having been sunk and four others having been put out of action. The three vessels lost, the " Irresistible," " Ocean " and " Bouvet," were out of date; but of those put out of action the " Inflexible " was a modern ship, and she and another very nearly foundered before they could be got to a place of safety. The defenders employed mines drifting down with the current with striking success on this occasion, and the damage caused by them contributed largely to bring about the defeat of the naval force. The events of the day indeed clearly indicated that the enemy's under- water devices were an even more serious obstacle to the forcing of the Dardanelles than were the Ottoman batteries. Nor had the Allies grounds for supposing that drift-mines would not be met with, were the attack renewed.
After this experience Vice-Adml. De Robeck felt himself obliged to inform the Admiralty that the offensive against the Straits ought not to be continued as a purely naval opera- tion of war. This necessitated a complete recasting of the Entente plans. The Turkish authorities, it may be mentioned,
4 Lemnos was a Greek possession having been ceded to Greece as the result of the Balkan War of 1912-3. Imbros, Samothrace and Tenedos had remained Turkish.
5 On March 10 Bulair was also bombarded from the Gulf of Saros.
