officials, with their troops, were compelled to return to China, the Living Buddha was proclaimed ruler, and a Mongol Government of five ministers was formed at Urga. From the outset, however, differences of policy were manifested amongst the Mongol chieftains, one party being in favour of complete severance from China under Russian auspices, the other advocating a policy of reasonable compromise and conciliation towards the Government at Peking. These differences were frequently manifested in the subsequent course of events.
In May 1912 the Barguts threw off their allegiance to China, and Barga became part of the new dominion of the Urga Hutukhtu, who appointed a leading Bargut as his Amban at Hailar. Later in the year, the authority of the Urga Govern- ment was extended to Uliasutai and Kobdo. At this stage some fighting took place between the Mongols and the Chinese forces in the Altai district, where Prince Palta remained faithful to China; thereafter Peking was frequently alarmed by rumours that the Russian-trained Khalkas were planning an expedition in force from Urga southwards. In Aug. the first outbreak of rebellion occurred in Inner Mongolia (where most of the native princes had declared their adherence to the Chinese republic), but it was quickly suppressed by Chinese forces despatched from Chihli. Desultory fighting, accompanied by brigandage on both sides, continued thereafter in many parts of the country, generally to the advantage of the Mongols. Meanwhile Russia proceeded to recognize the de facto Government at Urga and to strengthen the independence movement, by concluding a con- vention with the Hutukhtu Lama direct (Nov. 3 1912), wherein (he latter was recognized as sovereign of Mongolia and promised assistance in refusing to allow Chinese troops or colonists in Mongolian territory. Russia, on her side, was guaranteed full enjoyment of her former trade rights and privileges.
Several communications passed in 1912 between Peking and Urga, the Chinese Government endeavouring to restore amicable relations on the old footing, but without result. At this juncture the Russian representative at Peking intervened, endeavouring to persuade President Yuan Shih-K'ai's Government to recognize the fait accompli of Outer Mongolian autonomy in return for recognition of Chinese suzerainty over the whole country and a free hand in Inner Mongolia. Mutatis mutandis, the position of affairs created by the Chinese revolution in Mongolia was very similar to that produced in Tibet, it being manifest in both cases that the meaning of the words " suzerainty " and " autonomy " must eventually be determined by the forces behind them.
After protracted negotiations, the Chinese Government, making a virtue of necessity, signed an agreement with the Russian repre- sentative at Peking on Nov. 5 1913. By the Declaration and Notes of this agreement, Russia recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of Chinese territory under the suzerainty of China, whilst China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. Autonomous Outer Mongolia was denned as the districts heretofore known under Chinese administration as those of Urga, Kobdo, and Uliasutai. Russia undertook to use her influence with the Hutukhtu, to secure his acceptance of autonomy in lieu of the independence promised by the Russo-Mongolian agreement of Nov. 1912. In Sept. 1914, representatives of Russia, China and the Hutukhtu met at Kiakhta, where, after nine months of negotiations, a tripartite agreement was concluded on the lines proposed by Russia. A Chinese Resident- General was appointed to represent China as suzerain at Urga, with deputies at Kiakhta, Kobdo, and Uliasutai. Russian activities in Mongolia from 1912 to 1917 manifested a forward policy very similar to that displayed in Manchuria and Korea before the Russo- Japanese War, including in their scope arrangements whereby the railways, finance, communications and currency of Outer Mongolia would gradually be made subservient to Russian interests.
The collapse of Russia under Bolshevik rule necessarily entailed a complete change in the situation in Mongolia. On the one hand, it deprived the disaffected Mongol chieftains of the support of their powerful protector; on the other, it exposed Outer Mongolia to serious dangers of invasion by Germans and Bolsheviks from the Baikal region. The Chinese were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity thus created to restore their ascendency, and at the same time to take measures against "Red" incursions from the Russian border. The increasing disorders in Siberia and the retreat of the Czechs eastwards from Baikal in the autumn of 1918, led to a considerable increase of the Chinese garrisons at Urga and else- where. In June 1919 the Government of Outer Mongolia invoked the assistance of the Chinese officials to check the increasing activi- ties of the Buriat and other marauders; a considerable Chinese force was therefore despatched from Chihli and Moukden. The northern Chinese Tuchuns assumed the task of protecting Mongolia from the Bolshevik invasion and also from Gen. Semenoff, the
Ataman of the Transbaikal Cossacks, who was recruiting a large force of Russian refugees and Buriats at Kiakhta, ostensibly in support of the Pan-Mongol movement, but actually with the object of establishing an anti-Bolshevik Russian province and a new base of military operations. At the beginning of Nov. 1919, there were 4,000 Chinese troops in Outer Mongolia. On Nov. 15, the Chinese resident at Urga presented an ultimatum to the Mongolian Govern- ment, requiring them to renounce their claim to independence, failing which the Living Buddha and the prime minister would be conveyed in custody to Peking. The Hutukhtu was opposed to compliance and several of the leading princes were inclined to support his resistance; but the Council of Ministers, finding itself between the deep sea of Chinese domination and the devil of Semenoff's invasion, decided, against the Hutukhtu's wishes, to sign the memorial required of them. On Nov. 22 a Presidential Mandate was issued at Peking, announcing the receipt of this memorial, and approving its proposals. Mongolian autonomy was therefore cancelled and all agreements and treaties, concluded by or with the Government at Urga since the declaration of Mongolian independence, were de- clared null and void. On the 24th the Russian representative at Peking filed a protest against this mandate, reserving on behalf of Russia all her treaty rights in Mongolia, to be reasserted hereafter.
It is probable that if the Chinese had displayed a reasonable and conciliatory spirit at this juncture, the Mongols might have been content with a position of partnership in the Chinese republic ; but the arrogance and brutality displayed by the Chinese military com- mander, Hsu Shu tseng (commonly known at Peking as " little Hsu") drove them to make common cause with the Russian ref- ugees, and their Buriat and Japanese allies, against the Chinese. Matters reached a crisis in Oct. 1920, when Urga was attacked by Baron Ungern with a small body of Russians (originally belonging to Ataman Semenoff's force), a few Japanese officers and several thousand Buriats and Mongols. The Chinese retaliated by making the Living Buddha a hostage; for the next few months the Chinese garrison so looted and maltreated the civilian population of Urga that, after the escape of the Hutukhtu in Jan., every man's hand was turned against them. On Feb. 19 1921 the city was captured by Baron Ungern's forces and only a remnant of the garrison escaped.
On Feb. 25 the Hutukhtu was proclaimed as sovereign of the independent kingdom of Mongolia. Baron Ungern was appointed to the chief command of the Mongolian forces, and orders were issued by the Hutukhtu for the organization of a national army with compulsory military service. Mongolian troops subsequently occupied Ude, in the Gobi desert, and were threatening Kalgan. The helplessness of the Peking Government was plainly manifest; nevertheless, it declined the help of a Russian " Red " army, proffered by the Soviet Government's representative at Peking (M. Yourin) and in subsequent pourparlers with Mongolia, expressed its willingness to revert to the terms of the Kiakhta agreement. The leading Mongol princes, however, refused these overtures and declared their intention to maintain the complete independence of their country, at least until the restoration of the monarchy in China.
(J. O. P. B.)
MONOD, GABRIEL (1844-1912), French historian (see 18.730), published in 1903 his Souvenirs d'adolescence, and in 1905 Etudes sur Michelet, sa vie et ses Œuvres. He died in Paris April 10 1912.
MONRO, SIR CHARLES CARMICHAEL (1860- ), British general, was born June 15 1860 and joined the army in 1879. In 1897-8 he saw service at Malakand, in the Mohmand country, in Bajaurandin Tirah, and he was on the staff in S. Africa during the war, for which he was promoted brevet lieutenant-colonel. He was afterwards commandant of the School of Musketry, and he commanded a brigade from 1907 to 1911. Promoted major- general in 1910, he had charge of a Territorial division in 1912-3 and was then transferred from this to the II. Div. of the Expeditionary Force, which he commanded in the first campaign in France in 1914. On the splitting up of General French's forces into two armies at the end of 1914, Monro was placed in command of the I. Army Corps, and he was shortly afterwards given the K.C.B. Then, on a III. Army being organized in July 1915, having acquitted himself admirably as a divisional and as a corps commander in the field, he was given charge of this. He, however, occupied the position for only three months, as he was chosen in October to take over command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and to decide whether the campaign in the Gallipoli Peninsula was to be continued; he was at the same time promoted lieutenant-general for distinguished service. Monro now acted with rare decision under most difficult circumstances. Although the Government was disposed to cling to the peninsula he insisted upon its abandonment, and he was after some delay allowed to have his way,
