northward for a time. The "Nottingham" struggling home
was hit by a third torpedo at 7 A.M. and sunk. Meanwhile
the Harwich forces had sighted the enemy at 6:30 A.M. and
proceeded northeast to get in touch with him. But the German forces were too strong for Tyrwhitt's flotillas to attack, and Scheer held steadily across, receiving a succession of reports from his Zeppelins, submarines and the German intercept station at Neuminster, which enabled him to locate exactly the position of the British forces. By 10:30 A.M. Adml. Jellicoe had ample information of Scheer's movements and decided to make for a
position off Newcastle to cover the coast. At noon he was some
95 m. east of the Fame Is. steering S.S.E. down the coast, with
Beatty's battle-cruisers ahead of him, and the German fleet
about 90 m. east of Whitby steering to the westward on a con-
verging course. By 12:30 P.M. Beatty's squadrons were level
with Newcastle and only 42 m. from the German fleet, when
Scheer turned to the southward, made a push against the Har-
wich forces and turned home at 2:35 P.M. Adml. Jellicoe, think-
ing it unwise to follow on account of the danger of submarines,
ordered Beatty to turn back at 4 P.M. and directed Comm.
Tyrwhitt to proceed to a position off Terschelling to deliver a
night attack. At 3:20 P.M. the commander-in-chief received
the report of a submarine and ordered Beatty to turn back at
once. At 4:52 P.M. while returning, the " Falmouth " of the
3rd L.C.S. was hit by two torpedoes from U66, though going
23 knots at the time. She managed to reach Flamborough
Head, where she sank, and U66, though heavily depth-charged
by the destroyer " Pelican," got safely away. The Harwich
flotillas kept in touch with the enemy fleet till 7:30 P.M., but
unsupported by the Grand Fleet dared not press home an attack,
and as conditions were unfavourable for a night attack abandoned
the pursuit. This was one of the most successful of Scheer's
operations, and he intended to repeat it, but in Oct. orders were
received to resume the submarine warfare against commerce
(under conditions of visit and search), and U boats were no
longer available for fleet purposes.
The resumption of the submarine campaign called for a clear passage down Channel, and the 3rd and gth Torpedo-boat Flotillas were dispatched to Zeebrugge under Comm. Michelsen, the Commodore of Torpedo Flotillas, to raid the Dover Straits barrage. A line of mines and nets had been laid off Zeebrugge in April 1916, and a similar line had been begun across the Straits from South Goodwin towards Snouw Bank and Dunkirk. This was the first serious attempt to attack patrols off Dover, and merits special attention. The barrage in course of construction at Dover consisted of a line of nets fitted with mines, divided into sections marked by light buoys and patrolled by a force of 23 drifters, supported by an armed yacht, an armed trawler, and an old destroyer, the " Flirt." Information of the arrival of the flotillas in Flanders had been received, and the vice- admiral at Dover, expecting an attack either on the Downs or Belgian coast, distributed his destroyer forces to meet it, four in the Downs, eight at Dunkirk and six tribals at Dover. The night of October 26-27 was dark and favourable to the enemy. The Germans attacked in two divisions of five and six boats each. One attacked the centre of the patrol about 10 P.M. and sank three drifters. The " Flirt " had seen them about 9:30 P.M. but took them for the British destroyers from Dunkirk. Hearing the gunfire she thought a submarine was being chased, hurried to the spot, found a blazing drifter, and sent a whaler to save the crew when a heavy fire was opened on her and she sank at once, about n P.M. The yacht " Ombra " heard the firing, guessed the cause and gave the alarm, but before the patrols could be withdrawn another division of drifters ran into the enemy and two more were sunk. The destroyers at Dover and Dunkirk were now ordered out, and those in the Downs got under way.
The second section of attackers had proceeded westward, stopped the empty transport " Queen " off Gris Nez and set her on fire. The news of this incident came in at 12:30 A.M. The six destroyers at Dover (" Viking," " Amazon," " Nubian," " Cossack," " Tartar," and " Mohawk ") had put to sea at
11:15 P.M., but leaving by different entrances got separated. The " Nubian " sighted destroyers at 12:40 A.M., took them for the Downs division, challenged them and received in reply a heavy fire and a torpedo which blew off her bows and left her blazing. A few minutes later the enemy met the " Amazon " and sent a shell into her boilers. At 12:50 A.M. he met the " Viking " and two destroyers, was challenged, and after giving the usual reply of a broadside disappeared in the night. The Downs division had got to sea at 12:30 A.M. and the Dunkirk division by 11:30 P.M., but neither saw the enemy though the latter heard the gunfire of the " Viking's" action. The Germans got back to Zeebrugge safely, after sinking seven drifters and two destroyers. This was the first of a series of attacks on Dover intended to assist the pass'age of submarines.
In the north the " Moewe " had got safely to sea again in the winter nights Nov. 23-25, and was followed by another raider, the " Wolfe " (Capt. Karl Nerger), on Nov. 30.
Submarines were again at work, and on Nov. 5 U3o and U2o (which had sunk the " Lusitania ") ran ashore off Bovsbjerg (Denmark) in a fog, and Scheer sent a half flotilla of destroyers supported by the " Moltke " and the 3rd Squadron to get them off. Ji (Comm. Lawrence) got there too, and torpedoed the battleships " Grosser Kurfiirst " and " Kronprinz," driving them both back into harbour. The Kaiser remonstrated with Scheer for risking two valuable battleships in this work, but Scheer main- tained that sooner or later German naval strategy must resolve itself into a guerre de course, leaving only one task for the fleet to perform to get submarines safely out and safely home again.
Unrestricted warfare (that is, sinking at sight without warning) was now being urged by the general staffs of both navy and army in Germany, but at a council of war held on Oct. 16 it was decided to postpone it till a last effort had been made to negotiate for peace. On Dec. 12, after the capture of Bucharest, a note went out to the Allied Powers inviting them to enter into negotiations to avoid further bloodshed. It was the first symp- tom of Germany's defeat, but it was based on the conception of her indestructible strength and was rejected by the Allies. The peril of the submarine was growing more and more acute, and on Nov. 29 1916 Adml. Sir John Jellicoe was summoned to the Admiralty to take the post of First Sea Lord, and his command passed to Adml. Sir David Beatty.
Operations in 1917. The new year of 1917 saw the con- troversy which had so long raged in Germany decided in favour of the submarine. In her growing need she was forced to have recourse to unrestricted warfare, and on Jan. 9 an Imperial Order went out to commence it on Feb. i. The war at sea had now to adjust itself to the new conditions; but though the High Sea Fleet had only to ensure a safe entry and exit to its submarines, it continued indirectly to exercise a potent influence on the campaign, for as a " fleet in being " it compelled the Grand Fleet to remain concentrated and ready for action, and prevented its units and flotillas being dispersed to escort con- voys and hunt the submarine.
The activity of the destroyer flotillas did not diminish. In the Hoofden, a short sharp destroyer action took place in the early morning of Jan. 23, when a Harwich force of three light cruisers and some 14 destroyers met the German 6th Flotilla of eight destroyers on its way from Zeebrugge to the Bight. It was a cold dark night and a general melee at short range ensued, which developed into two encounters. In the first, V6g, the flotilla leader's boat, was badly hit and driven into Ymuiden, and 850 had to put back. In the second, which took place off Schouwen Bank, a British destroyer, the "Simoon," was. hit in the bow by a torpedo and sunk. Feb. i saw the beginning of the momentous campaign followed by the rupture of diplo- matic relations between Germany and the United States. The operations of the German fleet were now directed towards supporting their submarines, and with this in view a succession of raids was made on Dover Straits.
The first took place on the night of Feb. 25 and accomplished nothing. The barrage patrol at the time consisted of five L- class boats, patrolling on courses S.W. and N.E. about 2 m.
