signal, and the light-cruiser squadrons cruising to southward of the route knew nothing of the action, a clear instance of the necessity of an escort being within range of a convoy and not out of sight. The enemy went off at 8:20 A.M. after sinking nine of the merchant ships. The armed trawler " Elise " stood gallantly by the " Strongbow," and saved most of the survivors. The losses of the " Mary Rose " and " Strongbow " were 86 and 46, and as the armed trawlers " Elise " and " P. Fannon " had no wireless, it was not till 7 P.M., when they arrived at Ler- wick, that any report of the action was received. This led to a general revision of the arrangements for convoy in the North Sea, but was also closely related to the general strategy of the war. There was a distinct disinclination both at the Admiralty and at sea to use the Grand Fleet to cover the convoys. But this was clearly their business. War is an endeavour to bring such pressure to bear on an enemy as to force him to submit to your will. In 1917 a grinding pressure was being brought to bear on Germany by the blockade. The enemy replied with a vigorous and effective attack on British maritime trade, not with surface craft, for these were held in check by the Grand Fleet, but with submarines. The British replied with convoy, and the German riposte was sudden and swift cruiser raids. The British answer to this was not to abolish convoys but to escort them in such strength as to force the Germans to bring their whole fleet out to attack, as actually happened in April 1918. This was the normal way of bringing about a battle at sea, but the use of wireless directionals had induced what may be called a policy of immediacy, in which the main fleet had to be held ready for immediate excursion and attack, and 1 was jealous of any other use of its craft. But the opportunity of a great and decisive battle had been lost. The German opera- tions in the Baltic in the autumn of 1917 clearly showed that they were not prepared to risk another fleet action in the North Sea, and in these circumstances the escort of convoys became one of the most important functions of the British fleet.
November was marked by light-cruiser raids both in the Cattegat and Bight. The Cattegat, a sort of " No Man's Sea" at the beginning of the war, had become more and more a sphere of German activity. The German-Swedish convention assuring free passage through the Sound had been denounced; minefields and guardships guarded the southern end of the Sound; ships proceeding to hostile ports were refused passage, and decoy ships cruised in the Cattegat to take the offensive against British submarines. One of these was the " Kronprinz Wilhelm " under command of Capt. Lauterbach, which was cruising off Kullen Light on Nov. 2 at 7 A.M. when several British destroyers swept down on her and opened a devastating fire. Her stern was blown off by the explosion of the after magazine, and in a few minutes she was burning fiercely fore and aft. This incident, small enough in itself, had a consider- able effect in checking German activity in the Cattegat, and seems to have led them once again to confine their cruises to the Baltic and the Bight. In the Bight the British minelaying, which started in earnest in the last quarter of 1917, called for an immense expansion in the organization of German outpost and minesweeping forces, and necessitated constant trips by groups of minesweepers and barrier breakers (ships specially constructed with bows filled with concrete) along the swept channels. As the area of the minefields grew, the channels grew longer and longer, and the minesweepers became more and more exposed to attack, and had to be supported by light cruisers and battleships. These were the circumstances leading to an engagement on Nov. 17,1917 which affords an interesting illustration of the important part played by German battleships and battle-cruisers in keeping the Bight open for submarines.
Three German minesweeping half flotillas were making a test trip that morning, escorted by the I4th Half T.B. Flotilla and covered by the light cruisers of the 2nd and 4th Scouting Groups, supported by the " Kaiser " and " Kaiserin " lying off Heligoland. The group was on the point of starting when they were attacked at 7 A.M. by a force consisting of the " Courageous" (R.A. T. D. W. Napier) and " Glorious " (now forming the ist
C.S.), two battle-cruisers, the " Renown " and " Repulse," several light cruisers including the ist and 6th L.C.S. with the " Caledon " and " Calypso," and a number of destroyers. The two former ships had been built by Lord Fisher for use in the Baltic, and were of special design, 786 ft. long over all, 22 ft. draught, 30 knots seagoing speed, with four is-in. guns and a 3-in. belt. The horizon was misty and an action developed with the German light cruisers at about 12,000 yd. running to the south-east. The fight began to approach the minesweepers, which had made off at full speed to the S.E., while the " Niirn- berg," " Pillau " and the German destroyers tried to screen them with a smoke cloud. At 8:50 A.M. a destroyer attack was made by the British on the 2nd Scouting Group without success and a counter-attack was made by the enemy in which the " Kb'nigsberg " and " Frankfurt " fired torpedoes without hitting. The former was hit by a heavy shell, which went through all three funnels, and landing in a coal-bunker started a fire. At 9:30 the "Kaiserin" and "Kaiser" came in sight, and Rear-Adml. von Reuter tried to draw the British down to them. The " Kaiserin " got within range and scored a hit, but on the arrival of the battleships the British withdrew before the " Moltke " and " Hindenburg," which were coming up, could reach the scene. Several hits were scored on both sides, and on the German side 21 were killed and 10 severely wounded, but only one outpost vessel was lost. On the British side the " Calypso " was hit and her captain (Capt. H. L. Edwards) killed. The cooperation of the German battleships in support- ing their minesweepers, and the difficulty of joining battle on the edge of a minefield, were the principal features.
British attack on the German minesweepers was answered by another German thrust at the Scandinavian convoys made by the German 2nd Flotilla on Dec. 12. The 3rd Half Flotilla proceeded to the Tyne, and after going up the coast and attack- ing two or three steamers returned about 6 A.M. The 4th Half Flotilla under Lt.-Comm. Hans Holbe proceeded to the north- ward, and at 7 A.M. on Dec. 12 was in sight of Udsire on the Norwegian coast. Proceeding to the northward he sighted at 11:30 P.M. a British convoy of six steamers escorted by two destroyers and four trawlers, approaching Norway on an easterly course and about 35 m. from the coast. The destroyers were the " Pellew " and " Partridge," who left the convoy and engaged the German destroyers at ai>out 5,000 yards. The four armed trawlers with the convoy were sunk. The " Partridge " received a shot in her main steam-pipe, which brought her to a stop. She fired her torpedoes, but one stuck in the tube and another which hit Vioo did not explode. The " Pellew," pursued by three destroyers, managed to escape in a squall of rain. All was over in three-quarters of an hour, and the flotilla returned to Kiel with four officers, 48 men and 23 of the merchant crews as prisoners. Two armoured cruisers, the " Shannon " and " Minotaur," were at sea as a covering force, and receiving a signal from the " Partridge " for assistance steamed at full speed to the spot. But again it was too late. The 3rd L.C.S. was also at sea and actually 85 m. to the S.E., but it also failed to intercept the enemy another illustration of the weakness of covering forces being out of sight of the forces they are intended to cover. The fact is that Grand Fleet cruiser forces were disinclined to be merely escorts. They preferred to be " cover- ing " forces some way off, and the enemy eluded them. The raid led to the provision of stronger covering forces and to con- siderable changes in the Scandinavian convoy system, which had almost broken down under these successive blows.
The Dutch convoy in the S. suffered a little later an equally severe blow of a different kind. It was one of the principal duties of the Harwich Flotilla to escort the Dutch convoys, and on Dec. 23 at 3 A.M. four of its destroyers were steaming to the southward at 15 knots a few miles N. of the Maas Light buoy when they stumbled into a German minefield in that vicinity. The " Torrent," " Surprise," and " Valkyrie " all struck mines in rapid succession and sank before they could reach the shore.
The year was now drawing to a close, but before it closed Adml. Sir John Jellicoe had left the Admiralty, and his place
