Vaudois, the reconstruction of which had just been undertaken,
were half demolished and transformed into enormous building
yards so that they were quite incapable for the moment of
playing any part in the defence. As in all the French fortresses,
there was not enough heavy artillery; the guns were good, but
their mountings were out of date; and as these could only be
fired from platforms which took a long time to erect, they had
not the necessary mobility; the 1,000 rounds apiece which was
allowed them was totally insufficient, and the method of firing,
as then practised, did not allow them to make full use of their
range. Altogether, the defence of Belfort in 1914 presented grave
deficiencies, and the command had no illusions as to its incon-
veniences or dangers, but there existed no means of remedying
them save by hasty makeshifts and by special alertness. Never-
theless, confidence reigned in the fortress, everyone there
knowing that will, energy, and moral courage are the first
essentials for the defence of a besieged fortress.
Despite this confidence, the days which passed between July 26 and Aug. 2 1914 appeared painfully long to the Belfort garrison, helpless as it was in face of the German raids, owing to the order to remain at a distance of 10 km. from the frontier, which prevented them from taking even elementary measures of precaution. As elsewhere, mobilization at Belfort was only commenced on the morning of Sunday Aug. 2, and it was extremely complicated, involving as it did the mobilization of both reservists and territorials and their incorporation into their units, requisitioning, transport, supply of provisions, and placing of the fortress in a state of defence.
The mobilization had been well prepared and was carried out with singular regularity; but the fact of troops being diverted from Belfort for the operations which were immediately under- taken in Alsace rendered difficult the normal organization of the garrison. This was to have been composed of an actual brigade of infantry with five battalions of the 57th Res. Div. (12 battalions of infantry, three groups of field artillery, and a company of engineers, and two squadrons of dragoons), 19 battalions of territorial infantry, 15,000 artillery, and 3,000 sappers, together with detachments of custom-house officers, foresters, telegraphic and postal operators, hospital orderlies, clerks, and depot personnel of the various arms, altogether about 75,000 men. As a matter of fact, a half-mobilized brigade of the 57th Div. was called away as early as the 6th, to take part in the first offensive on Mulhouse, then the other brigade of the division was sent forward when barely completed, and it was to the 57th Div., thus formed in the face of the enemy, under the command of Gen. Bernard, that there fell the honour of check- ing the Germans at Montreux on Aug. 13, after the retreat of the VII. Corps. Without a moment's respite the division then took part in the operations of the Army of Alsace, and it was only on the 26th, after this army was broken up, that it returned to the vicinity of Foursemagne under the cannon of Belfort. While the reserve division was thus engaged, the active brigade took part in front of the fortress at Felon and Lagrange. The rest of the garrison had been assembled, and as soon as its various units were formed they were set to work, in conjunction with all the men from 15 to 60 years of age not subject to military service, to push on with the works laid down in the scheme of defence.
The completion of this task was necessarily impeded by the fighting in which a part of the garrison was engaged during August; but thanks to the willingness of all the workers, the enormous undertaking was achieved by the time that the Army of Alsace was dissolved. The armament of the forts had been com- pleted, numerous batteries had been constructed and armed, and munition depots had been organized. Centres of resistance, united by continuous lines of trenches, which were again covered by accessory defences, had been erected around Roppe fort, the fort and the village of Bessancourt, Fort Meroux, the spur of Oye Wood, the work of the Bambois, and Salbert hill. Finally the organization of the principal zone of defence had been strengthened by large inundations on part of the front.
In front of this zone other works had been undertaken with a view to strengthening the fortress, and towards Frais, Chevre-
ment and Bourogne. The works of Mont Vaudois were pushed forward, and in the fortress of Chaux itself, the dismantling of which had left the road from Montreux to Monbbelrard open to attack, the parapets were rebuilt, concrete shelters constructed and every device utilized which could render the dilapidated work capable of effective action.
All this might have been reassuring, if the experience of a few weeks of warfare had not confirmed the insufficiency of French heavy artillery material, and the power of the German heavy artillery which had crushed the resistance of Liege, Namur and Longwy. On Aug. 25, there could be no possible doubt that if the enemy could approach near enough to Belfort to establish his guns 8 km. from the forts, the heart of the place would be bombarded and the forts themselves smashed before the artillery of the defence could fire a shot. Under the circumstances, at the very moment that the generalissimo was recommending a defensive based on the fortresses, it was manifestly unwise to uncover the most useful of them all by rapidly evacuating the Sundgau and breaking up the Army of Alsace instead of using a part of it to prepare, occupy, and defend strong defensive positions at important points. G.H.Q. might have need else- where of the VII. Corps, the 44th and 6$rd Divs. and part of the cavalry, but it did not remove either the 57th Div. or the s8th or the 66th Divs., or the i4th Dragoon Bde., so that these forma- tions together were in effective strength superior to the enemy, who had left in front of the Armv of Alsace only Ersatz and Landwehr troops.
Instead of these troops being withdrawn, and dispersed over the area of Montbeliard-Foursemagne-Wesserling, they might well have been ordered to stand fast in the Sundgau. Even if Mulhouse appeared to be too distant, or too exposed a position to hold, a judicious use of field fortifications would at least have enabled them to cover Thann, and to establish between Altkirch and Heidwiller a strongly fortified centre, from which it would have been possible to control the road to Basle, the valley of the Ille, the railway and the canal, while the i4th Dragoon Bde. watched all the country in the direction of Ferrette, the Harth, Mulhouse and the Nonnenbruch.
Nothing of this kind was done, and von Gaede was thus able to reoccupy the Sundgau at his leisure. It was now to be feared the bad news coming in from all sides appeared to justify all manner of fears that the Germans would make a vigorous attack on Belfort, in order to destroy the pivot of the extensive withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops, which was now being carried out along the whole Swiss frontier to Belgium.
Under these conditions, knowing he had only his own resources to count upon for the defence of the gap, Gen. Thevenet, governor of Belfort, decided not to await the enemy's attack, but at once to assume the offensive, based on the fortress, so as to clear the immediate outskirts of the place and to maintain the initiative. His original plan was to push forward the active brigade and the 57th Res. Div. in front of the fortress, to carry out offensive reconnaissances on an increasing scale, to gain ground by infiltration, to organize the positions gained, and thus to establish, little by little, an effective barrier across the gap. To his mind, the advance should be sufficient to place Belfort beyond the range of the enemy's artillery, and to reduce the line to be held as much as possible by establishing it at the point where the Swiss frontier salient of Porrentuy reduced to a minimum breadth the practicable part of the gap 30 km. between the Vosges and Switzerland. While this brigade and division were advancing, the governor proposed to employ the rest of the garrison on completing the defences of the fortress and the extension of its perimeter. He also proposed, while making the territorials cooperate with the available civilian labour in constructing these works, to carry on with their train- ing so that they could be employed on the front when the occa- sion arose. This plan was immediately put into operation. The offensive reconnaissances in front of the fortress began as from Aug. 28 and from that date were pursued without interruption. The 57th Div., moving forward from its position between Montreux and Fontaine, performed the role assigned to it with
