corps commander to restore order in this large unit where whole regiments retreated without fighting. The left division of the VI. Corps, while attempting to cross the Chiers at Cons-La- grandville, was soon drawn into the retreating movement of the V. Corps. The centre division, which knew nothing of the enemy, engaged badly and was unable to progress farther than Ville-au-Montoir. The right division, stationed on the Fillieres- Mercy-le-Haut front, facing Audun-le-Roman, and badly served by the reconnaissance service of the yth Cav. Div., which forgot it was not alone, was attacked towards noon by the three divi- sions of the German XVI. Corps. But Gen. Hache, an able tactician, was there, and although both the cavalry division and the reserve division which should have protected his right and rear abandoned their post, he managed to make head against forces three times stronger than his own.
A lack of cooperation and of understanding had made itself felt between the Ruffey and Maunoury armies, due perhaps to a faulty transmission of orders. By the evening of the 22nd the III. Army had retreated on the Virton-Spincourt front.
In the IV. Army, the leading division of the II. Corps, warned by the corps cavalry regiment which had spent the night in a state of readiness near Bellefontaine in touch with the German positions and had identified their forces, deployed and got into touch with the enemy by its patrols. It expected its artillery to debouch N. of the woods. At about 9 A.M. the enemy attacked the French advanced guards, whose artillery had not yet appeared; but thanks to the woods and the preparations for defence of the village of Bellefontaine these first attacks were not successful. After 10 o'clock the advanced guard was ree'n- forced by two groups of 75-mm. guns, and from that time was mistress of the situation; attacked at nightfall by a whole German army corps, it had lost no ground whatever at the end of the day; it had fought " like a lion."
Owing to the reverse of the IV. Corps at Virton, a gap had formed between the IV. and III. Armies at Villcrs-la-Loue. But fortunately, on the preceding day, Gen. de Langlc had with- drawn the 3rd Div. from the front and disposed it in second line, behind his right. A division of the IV. Army, actuated by Gen. Gerard, the commander of the II. Corps, was thus at hand to ensure the liaison between the two armies. This saved the day. On Aug. 22 the II. Corps took part in two battles, separated by the large forest of Virton, at Bellefontaine and at Villers-la-Loue; both battles resulted in the defeat of the V. and VI. German Army Corps, and prisoners belonging to five different German divisions were taken. On the left of the II. Corps the Colonial Corps advanced on Rossignol in two columns; one mixed brigade on the left and one division on the right. The Ravenez Div., in column without advanced guard or flank guard, was crushed under the German projectiles to which it served as an extensive target. Its commander collected some remnants of his troops and rushed upon the enemy, gun in hand. He was killed, and " all was lost, save honour."
It is difficult, in that forest district, to make the most of a success; the Germans did not pursue their attack; so, by the evening, the Colonial Corps still held the Semoy and its outlet N. of Florcnville. An army reserve colonial division arrived in the night to form the connecting link between the II. Corps and the XII. The XVII. Corps also had let itself be surprised, so that the XII. Corps, flanked on the right by the Colonials and on the left by the XVII. Corps, was in a critical position. Farther westward, the XI. Corps attacked Offagne without success, and the IX. gained ground on the left, being kept informed by the cavalry corps. In sum, there were tactical reverses nearly everywhere; nevertheless, the general command- ing gave orders to resume the attack next day (Aug. 23).
It was now a recognized fact that, contrary to Joffre's belief, there was no gap in the Ardennes; the Duke of Wiirttemberg's corps were being identified one by one, as well as those of the Crown Prince's right wing; and, near the extreme left, the IV. Army was in touch with cavalry of the German III. Army.
On Aug. 22 the French III. Army had given way badly in the centre and on the right; and the IV. Army had lost its offensive
power. On Aug . 23 the attacks contemplated had to be given up and a retreat was made, during which the XII. Corps suffered a severe reverse.
Meanwhile the I. Army at Sarrebourg, the II. at Morhange, the V. at Charleroi, suffered tactical reverses at least as great as those experienced by the III. and IV. Armies, between Longwy and Dinant. The tactical instruction of the French army, badly given owing to a lack of training camps, and for various other reasons, was the real cause of the reverses at the beginning of the campaign. If, in addition to this, one notes the splendid conduct of the I. Corps of the V. Army, the II. Corps of the IV. Army, the VI. Corps of the III. Army, the XX. Corps of the II. Army; if, in contrast, it is stated that at Dinant the Boutegourd Res. Div. was seized by panic and announced the presence of a German army whereas there was only some cavalry supported by a few infantrymen; that to the left of the IV. Army two reserve divisions were doing nothing, and to the right of the III. Army were others which were of no help to the 4oth Active Div., one begins to realize that the frontier army corps, which included hardly any reservists, the I., II., VI., and XX., were splendid; that the army corps stationed in the interior had much to learn and were receiving hard lessons; finally, that the reserve divisions were as yet useless. An army requires an acclimatization more or less long in proportion as it contains inexperienced and older men. A still more important deduction may be made: since the lesson was needed to teach the French army the same lesson would have resulted in defeat anywhere else. The French army was bound to lose the first battle, whether it took place in plain or forest, in the offensive or in the defensive. Joffre's strategy could not make up for the tactical insufficiency of Joffre's army. The German armies beyond the Moselle and the Meuse were effecting their strategic deployment. The first ready were to wait for the entire com- pletion of the plan established by the Berlin staff. A battle accepted before all the armies were placed would be a strategic reverse. The much-criticised French offensive inflicted this reverse upon German strategy. The German III. Army was not at the battle; the German I. Army only arrived after Lan- rezac had escaped, and although the English army was in great danger, on Aug. 23, it was nevertheless able to avoid the destruc- tion reckoned on by the enemy. The German V. and IV. Armies, obliged to wait until the deployment of the ensemble was completed, merely engaged a defensive battle, to which, it is true, fierce counter-attacks were added; but the counter- offensive which the Crown Prince of Germany and the Duke of Wiirttemberg ought to have led, and which might have had incalculable consequences, was not forthcoming.
Jpffre, Ruffey, de Langle de Gary, had a powerful influence over their subordinates. There were blunders of appreciation on their part in this " battle of the two blind men," but a determination to manoeuvre. This determination to manoeuvre was to be found again at the Marne, and this time Joffre's eyes were opened. The German commanders kept to their book knowledge, merely carry- ing out what was written ; they allowed their troops to act ; their troops, not they, won the battle. The lesson of Charleroi instructed the French army; time, and subsequent battles, accustomed the active and reserve units to war. At the Marne German tactical superiority existed no longer ; Joffre's strategy defeated the strategy of the German Supreme Command.
The French general-in-chief was still blind on the morning of Aug. 23; during that day he received the reports; on the evening of Aug. 24 " the veil was torn "; he saw his strategic mistakes, saw into the enemy's game, and understood the causes of most of the tactical reverses met with. He determined to carry the centre of gravity of his forces westwards; to recall to the minds of all that the true French fighting doctrine is based on protection and the cooperation of arms; to take their command from those chiefs who gave way. These were the results of the battle of the Ardennes, results unfortunately obtained at far too high a price. The Germans learnt nothing at the battle of the Ardennes. Their self-confidence was increased. At the battle of the Ardennes, we may say, there were two blind men: at the battle of the Marne, Joffre had been operated on for cataract, while the Kaiser had allowed the film on his eyes to grow thicker.
Battle of the Meuse. By the evening of Aug. 23 1914 the intention of the French general-in-chief had not met with suc- cess at any point. Gen. Ruffey showed a desire to take up the
