tional importance, and to the increasing efforts of the Georgian Government to use them for exerting political pressure.
In Georgia, as in the other Trans-Caucasian republics, dis- putes upon frontiers and territorial claims became acute as soon as Russian control had ceased. One such dispute with regard to the district of Borchalinsk led to Georgia declaring war on Erivan in Jan. 1919. After long negotiations with the British general commanding in Trans-Caucasia serious hostilities were averted, and a neutral zone established; but the matter showed that unless the whole country were controlled by a dominant power there would be no settlement of such disputes except by warfare between the three republics.
At the Paris Peace Conference which opened on Jan. 18 1919 Georgian interests were represented by a delegation. For some time it seemed that the Conference would include Trans-Cau- casia within the scope of its settlements; but gradually this good intention disappeared. Various ideas were considered, such as placing the whole area under a mandatory Power; but no Power willing to undertake such an onerous and thankless task could be found. The question of Batum, in particular, received much attention. The international importance of the position was realized, and a scheme embodied in a draft of the Treaty of Sevres making the port and district a free state under the League of Nations, and giving Erivan and Azerbaijan definite rights in the port and of access by rail. But this apparently reasonable proposal was also abandoned on further consideration. The future of Trans-Caucasia, in fact, was dominated too much by Russia for any practical settlement to be attempted. Nothing would be permanent to which Russia was not a party, and for the time being no definite Russia capable of expressing herself existed. Yet whenever a reconstituted Russia emerged she would hold Trans-Caucasia in the hollow of her hand, and any settlement against her interests would be worse than wasted effort. The Peace Conference confined itself to granting de facto recognition to the three republics; to preventing war between them; and to embodying in the Treaty of Sevres a provision for the settlement of the frontiers of Erivan, with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Few will hold that wisely it could have done more.
The British occupation of Trans-Caucasia continued until the end of Aug. 1919, and then, with the exception of a small garrison left in Batum, the troops were withdrawn, their mission fulfilled.
During the same year the situation in Georgia was not a little complicated by the intrigues and hostility attending Gen. Denikin's movement against Bolshevik Russia. As early as Jan. 1919 Gen. Denikin, whose headquarters were at Ekaterinodar in Cis-Caucasia, had collected nearly 200,000 men. At first he met with remarkable success. In the early autumn, indeed, it looked as if he might destroy Bolshevik rule. His armies were successful; his navies controlled the Black Sea and the Caspian; he had unlimited supplies. Throughout he viewed with extreme disfavour the independence of the Trans-Caucasian provinces, and did what he could to promote disunion and hostilities be- tween them. He had an understanding of some kind with the Armenians of Erivan whom he encouraged and supported against Georgia, regarding that republic as the chief danger to future Russian supremacy in Trans-Caucasia. He seemed to fear that Georgia, accessible from the sea, might pass under British con- trol and be made the foundation of a united Trans-Caucasian state, rich in oil and minerals and powerful enough, with British support, to maintain its position permanently. Towards Georgia, therefore, his policy became one of almost active hostility. He refused to recognize her flag at sea, fired on her shipping, and attacked her frontier guards. The collapse of Gen. Denikin's operations in the autumn of 1919 was the end of a reactionary movement entirely incompatible with Georgian independence.
But, Denikin out of the way, Bolshevik Russia began to push her designs in Trans-Caucasia. Propaganda and corruption on a lavish scale prepared the ground. It was not until April 1920 that active military measures were taken; but in that month the XI. Soviet Army from Cis-Caucasia moved on Baku, occupied the city without fighting, overthrew the republic of Azerbaijan, and set up a Soviet Republic. Established there, Russian troops
advanced along the railway towards Georgia, intending the capture of Tim's, but were repulsed at the frontier and found it necessary to suspend their operations. Having the 'Polish cam- paign on her hands at this time Russia was unable to press her efforts in Trans-Caucasia. She was content to wait. She signed a treaty of peace with Georgia on May 7 a provision of which recognized the district and port of Batum as Georgian territory.
The Supreme Council having abandoned the idea of creating a free state at Batum, no sufficient reason existed for retaining a British garrison there; transfer to Georgia became desirable, and was carried out on July 7 1920. An agreement, however, was made with Georgia by which she granted Erivan and Azerbaijan the same port and railway rights they would have enjoyed had Batum been under the rule of a Free State, and Erivan a special concession for a direct line of railway to the pert.
The Batum area was peopled chiefly by Ajarians, a warlike Mahommedan tribe with Turkish sympathies, whose readiness in arms had previously caused Georgia considerable difficulty. These stout hillmen were now won over by giving them a form of autonomy under Georgian sovereignty.
In the summer of 1920 Georgia was able to regard her position with satisfaction and some degree of hopefulness for the future. In two years of independence she had made great national prog- ress. Her territory was untouched by war; her internal affairs were tranquil, her Government and administration effective for her needs; her population was prosperous, and the large propor- tion opposed to the theories of Bolshevism, notwithstanding propaganda and the presence in Tiflis of a loud-voiced Bolshevik mission, prodigal of gold. Externally, however, her outlook was not so bright. Bolshevik Russia and Nationalist Turkey were in league, pursuing common aims, and, in effect, seeking a common frontier in Trans-Caucasia. Georgia did not stand geographical- ly in the way of Russo-Turkish approach, but she could not fail to be affected by disaster to her Armenian neighbour who did. The difficult question for Georgia was that of support for Eri- van in the event of a Russo-Turkish attack. It was complicated further by Turkey not having renounced her claims to Batum.
At the end of Sept. these matters reached a crisis. A Turkish army invaded Erivan ; a Bolshevik army threatened Erivan and Georgia along the railway line leading from Baku to Tiflis. In spite of Armenian resistance, which met at first with some success Turkish troops overran Erivan; Bolshevik risings broke out in the capital and other towns, and Erivan became a Soviet Repub- lic nominally allied with Russia. Georgia had hesitated when the danger first became evident; her people had strong instincts against military operations outside their own territory; they could not realize that their best line of defence lay not in Georgia but in Erivan; they felt, too, that resistance would have slight prospect of success. If aggression were directed against their own country they would, they believed, fare better by a policy which avoided desperate resistance than by a policy of resistance to the uttermost. They had faith in the turnings of the wheels of time.
A Bolshevik invasion of Georgia followed immediately; and simultaneously, in the usual Bolshevik way, risings proclaiming Soviet rule occurred in Tiflis and various Georgian towns. No serious resistance was attempted. The Turks reoccupied Batum; Georgia became a Soviet Republic dependent on Russia; and thus, in fact, if not at once in form, Russia had reestablished her- self in Trans-Caucasia by 1921. And she took care that her vital Trans-Caucasian seaport should not remain in Turkish hands. She insisted that it must belong to the Soviet Republic of Geor- gia; and the Turk gave way. (W. J. C.*)
GEORGIA, U.S.A. (see 11.751*). The pop. of Georgia in 1920 was 2,895,832 as against 2,609,121 in 1910, an increase of 11%. For the preceding decade the rate of increase was 17-7%. During 1910-20 negroes increased from 1,431,802 to 1,689,114, but relatively they decreased from 45-1% of the total pop. to 41 7 %. The urban pop. was 2 5- 1 % as compared with 20- 6 % in 1910. The density of pop. in 1920 was 49-3 per sq. m., as against 44-4 in 1910. The census of 1920 revealed an important move- ment of population from the mountain counties of the northern portion of the state and from central Georgia to south-central
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