ing the institutions are the national schools (Volksschuleri) , intermediate schools (Mittelschiden) and higher schools (Realschulen, Real-Gymnasien, Gymnasien). Up to 1921 the regular and periodical collection of school statistics had not been resumed. The last general statistics on the subject were compiled in 1911. At that date there were in Germany (old boundaries) 66,037 national schools, 1,2^.9 intermediate schools, and 2,515 higher schools. In the public national schools there were 148,217 male and 39,268 female teachers, in the middle schools 6,278 male and 5,787 female teachers; and in the higher establishments the numbers engaged in teaching were 35,339, of whom 21,998 had enjoyed a university education.
In 1921 there were 23 universities, II technical colleges, 7 lycees, 3 veterinary colleges, 4 agricultural colleges, 3 academies of forestry, 2 academies of mining, 4 commercial colleges, 18 colleges for com- munal administration, art, industrial art, etc., and II of music.
The total number of male students in German universities (with the exception of Konigsberg for which the figures could not be obtained) was in the winter half-year 1913-4 55,614, and, besides these, 7,848 persons were allowed to attend lectures. During the war years the numbers at first fell, but soon rose again ; and after the end of the war, in the winter half of 1918-9, they reached the figure of 67,644. The highest point in the winter half of 1919-20 was 79,213 students. In addition 7,794 persons were admitted to lectures. In part this enormous rise is the result of an accumulation due to the impossibility of completing studies in the war years. In the summer half of 1920 there was thus a setback, the male students being only 76,392. In the winter half, 1920-1, there was a further fall.
Female students in the winter half 1913-4 numbered 3,649, and in addition 1,510 were admitted to lectures. In the summer half of 1920 the number of female students was 7,750, and 2,857 were ad- mitted to lectures.
The technical colleges after the end of the war boasted an ever- increasing attendance. In the summer of 1913 there were only 11,705 male and 62 female students at these colleges. The numbers had risen in the summer term of 1920 to 20,505 male and 258 female students, and the attendance was still increasing. The study of architecture was less popular than formerly, while on the other hand there was an increasing rush to study machine-making and engineering, electricity, chemistry and mining and metallurgy.
(W. GR.) GERMAN FINANCE, 1910-21
The period from about 1895 up to the outbreak of the World War in 1914 had been one of growing economic prosperity for Germany. From time to time the advance had been interrupted by intervals of depression, but they were short-lived, and when they passed the progress continued. Between 1907 and 1913, for instance, German coal production rose from 143 million tons to 191 million tons, or roughly by one-third; the production of lignite from 62? to 87 million tons, or two-fifths; of pig iron from 13 to 19-3 million tons, or nearly one-half. Germany's imports increased in this period by 2 milliards (thousand millions) of marks * (100,000,000) and German exports by well over 3 mil- liards of marks (150,000,000), the total foreign trade of Ger- many increasing from 15$ milliards (775,000,000) to 20-7 mil- liards of marks (1,035,000,000).
German imperial finance reflected economic progress only to a small extent in its budget. Confederation had left the Empire itself in a weak position financially by reserving the most impor- tant sources of taxation for the individual component states. The governing theory was that direct taxes appertained to the states, while the Empire must rely on indirect taxation. In spite of the general financial and economic prosperity, the im- perial debt had risen in 1910 to 5,016 millions of marks (having been 1,240 millions in 1890, 2,201 millions in 1895, 2,418 millions in 1900, and 3,323 millions in 1905). German statesmanship had been slow to adapt the needs of the imperial budget to the chang- ing conditions. In 1909, however, an important fiscal reform was introduced. New sources of revenue to a total amount of about 500 millions of marks were tapped; the long-continued period of recurring deficits seemed at an end, and the hope of surplus income appeared justified. The additional expenditure on arma- ments, necessitated by the army estimates of 1912 and the naval estimates of 1913, amounting to about 185 million marks, was covered by increases in the customs duties and new property
1 Up to the outbreak of war, the German mark was practically equal to the English shilling (see EXCHANGE, FOREIGN). Its subse- quent depreciation in value makes it impossible to convert the later figures for paper marks, as given in this article, into their real money value. Only where gold marks are referred to, the pre-war parity with sterling holds good. (Ed. E. B.)
taxes were introduced. It was proposed to cover the extraordi- nary expenditure, estimated at about one milliard of marks, by a single " defence tax," levied as a capital-tax on properties of 10,000 marks up to 15,000 marks at 0-15%, increasing to 1-5% on amounts of over 5 millions, and as an income-tax, starting with i % on incomes of 5,000 to 10,000 marks and increased to 8 % on incomes of more than 500,000 marks. This " defence tax," levied in 1914-5, brought in 976-9 millions of marks, but, as events turned out, it was merely swallowed up in the exigencies of war expenditure.
The imperial budgets for 1910-3, for total revenue and expenditure ordinary and extraordinary, showed the following figures, in thousands of marks: 1910, revenue 2,943,419, expenditure 3,024,260; 1911, revenue 3,057,592, expenditure 2,897,403; 1912, revenue 2,91 5,384, expenditure 2,893,337; 1913, revenue 3,698,829, expenditure 3,698,829. There was a deficit in 1910 of 80,841,500 marks, and in 1911 and 1912 there were surpluses of 160,188,800 and 22,046,400 marks respectively.
War Finance. The pre-war " defence tax " was not an organic reform. It had provided the power to attack income and property as a source of imperial revenue, but only once. The Empire thus entered the war with an undeveloped system of taxation without, indeed, any large current revenue from taxation which (like an income-tax) could easily be increased in proportion with the enormous requirements of the war. To introduce it during the war would not have been an easy matter, and the view prevalent in Government circles was not in favour of such a course. They counted on a war of short duration, and did not wish to exacerbate the feelings of the population, greatly distressed as it was through sacrifice of blood and life in the field as well as through the blockade, by imposing heavy burdens of taxation. They did not wish to interfere with the right of the individual states to obtain their own revenue from direct taxa- tion, and desired to make as little alteration as possible in the existing arrangements. Therefore, the decision arrived at was that the cost of the war should be met not out of taxation, but by the issue of loans; only the interest on the loans issued was to be debited to the current budget and covered by income. The current budget itself was artificially assisted by taking out of it, at first in part and later in full, the largest items, i.e. the current expenses for the army and navy, and debiting them as extraor- dinary expenses of the war. In the course of the war, other ex- penses too, only indirectly connected with the war, such as bo- nuses to civil servants to compensate for the rise in prices, were debited to the war fund. On the other hand the revenue, which it was at first quite impossible to estimate, was simply included in the price of peace, although the most important part of it, for instance the customs revenue, suffered an immediate and very sharp reduction through the blockade and the resulting reduc- tion in imports, as well as the suspension of customs duty on corn, grains and other articles of pressing need, which took place immediately on the outbreak of the war. It was a system which at first seemed to lighten the burden, but afterwards made it only heavier, and which, the longer the war continued, was found less and less adequate.
The German system of war economics was directed by the enormous demands of modern war on men and material on the one side and by the blockade on the other side. Strict economy was to be observed in all that was necessary for the war, especially in raw material required for war purposes and the not less important labour, while distribution was to be organized in such a manner that everybody received at least a share of the necessaries of life. To increase production to the utmost for the requirements of the war, and to make the whole of the economic system subservient to its satisfaction, was from the first the ruling idea. This transference of all economic activity to the needs of the war provided at the same time the financial means of carrying on the war. As the German people were in- creasingly, if not totally, cut off from foreign supplies, they were more and more dependent on home produce, and the profits of the war expenditure remained for the most part at home. The continuance of the regular savings system, combined with the
