chief, who became very angry. He peremptorily ordered the V. Army commander to proceed with the offensive against St. Quentin; and menaça le général Lanrezac de lui enlever son commandement.
Before discussing the battle of Guise from the tactical point of view it is necessary to have a clear idea of the position of the forces engaged on either side. On the evening of the 27th the front of the V. Army from right to left was generally on the line Rumigny–Etreaupont–Guise–Origny St. Benoite. The main body, consisting of the I., X., III. and XVIII. Corps (in this order from right to left), lay between Aubenton and Guise, covered on the right by the reserve division of Gen. Bouttegourdand the cavalry of Gen. Abonneau, the latter being between Rumigny and Rozoy. On the left were two reserve divisions under Gen. Valabregue holding the passages over the Oise at Guise and below that town. To bring about the transfer of strength to the left, and to effect the change of front required for the offensive ordered, orders were given for the following movements to take place on the 28th. Gen. Valabregue was to close to his left and hold the left bank of the Oise S. of Moy. The III. and XVIII. Corps, each rcenforced by an African div., were to take post along the Oise between Origny St. Benoite and Moy. The I. Corps was to move to Sains and form the army reserve. The X. Corps was to take post along the Oise E. of Guise. The cavalry of Gen. Abonneau, to which was to be attached the reserve division of Gen. Bouttegourd, was still to operate on the right. On the left of the French V. Army the British were, throughout the 28th, continuing their retirement, and by the evening of that day were on the line La Fère–Noyon, with a gap between the I. Corps on the right and the II. on the left.
To turn now to the Germans, the two armies likely to come into collision with the French V. Army were the I. and II., of which the former under Gen. von Kluck was on the right. After the battle of Le Cateau that army, by the evening of the 26th, was on the line Hermies–Crèvecceur–Caudry–Busigny, and by the evening of the following day it was, generally speaking, on the front Combles–Estrées. Unlike Gen. von Bülow, the commander of the I. Army was being affected by the heady atmosphere of optimism. The victory of Le Cateau obviously required following up, but a more grandiose scheme was selected, and Gen. von Kluck's one idea now seems to have been to march S.W. until he should overlap the Allied left. Accordingly on the 28th his army switched off from the pursuit of the British II. Corps, moved in the direction generally of Peronne, and by evening was in possession of the passages over the Somme between Feuillieres and St. Christ. Thence he moved still S.W., becoming involved in fighting with French forces of Gens. d'Amade, Maunoury and Sordet, missing his chance of “eating up” the British II. Corps, and incidentally vanishing from the picture so far as the battle of Guise is concerned.
As for the German II. Army, on the evening of the 2yth it was on the line St. Souplet–Wassigny–Etreux–Laschelle–Buironfosse–La Capelle, with its corps (working from right to left) disposed as follows:—VII. (less 13th Div.), X. Reserve, X. and Guard. During the day the order which had put the I. Army under the orders of the commander of the II. was cancelled by Supreme Headquarters, and Gen. von Bülow was beginning to feel somewhat isolated. On his right Gen. von Kluck had begun his eccentric march, while on the left the III. Army was being sucked eastwards to assist the IV. which was in difficulties. In these circumstances Gen. von Bülow at first determined to throw forward his right so as to keep touch with the I. Army, while keeping his left in position; but early on the 28th more favourable news from the III. Army on his left led him to order the X. and Guard Corps to cross the Oise. On this day Gen. Lanrezac was making a flank march behind that river, and changing front from north-east to west. Thus the French V. Army, from being in a position to get in its blow against St. Quentin, was likely to have its own right flank attacked by the II. Army of the Germans.
Gen. Lanrezac's orders for the attack on St. Quentin on the apth were to the effect that while the X. Corps and Gen. Abonneau's cavalry should maintain their position, the main body (III. and XVIII. Corps) was to cross the Oise below Guise and march on St. Quentin, left in front, with orders to attack the enemy wherever found. Liaison officers brought the welcome intelligence that the British I. Corps would cooperate, and accordingly Gen. Lanrezac added a paragraph to his orders to the effect that the British I. Corps would debouch from Laon at 5 a.m. and move against St. Quentin. About 2 a.m. on the 29th, however, a telephone message was received to the effect that such cooperation was impossible, and accordingly Gen. Lanrezac ordered the reserve divisions of Gen. Valabregue to flank the left of the XVIII. Corps.
At daybreak on the 2gth the main body of the V. Army began to cross the Oise above and below Origny. For a time all went well, but at nine o'clock a telegram from the X. Corps announced the fact that it had been heavily attacked by German troops from the line GuiseEnglaucourt; in other words, by the German X. and Reserve Corps. The message went on to say that the left of the X. Corps was holding its own but that the right had been compelled to give ground. Gen. Lanrezac had again to modify his plan and to issue new orders, of which the tenor was as follows. The objective was still to be St. Quentin, but first of all the enemy attacking the X. Corps was to be thrown back over the Oise. The left flank was still to be protected by the reserve divisions of Gen. Valabregue. The XVIII. Corps was to continue its advance towards St. Quentin but was to avoid serious engagements with superior forces. The III. Corps was to maintain its advanced troops W. of the Oise, so as to facilitate the eventual crossing of the river and the connexion with the XVIII. Corps on its left. The main body of the corps was, however, now to face N. and attack Guise. The X. Corps was to attack on the right of the III. Corps. The I. Corps now in reserve about Sains was to be ready to assist the X. Corps. The right flank was still to be protected by Gen. Abonneau's cavalry division.
It was, however, impossible to carry out this new plan, for by the time the orders had reached the various commanders the X. Corps had been driven back too far to allow of an attack upon St. Quentin. Gen. Lanrezac accordingly decided to renounce definitely all idea of attacking that place and to confine his efforts to dealing with the Germans who were harassing the X. Corps. To this end he issued the following order shortly before 11 a.m.:—
In view of the large number of Germans who have appeared E. of Guise the project of attacking St. Quentin is now renounced. It is now a question of defeating the enemy E. of Guise, and of either destroying him or at any rate of driving him back across the Oise. The XVIII. Corps and the Reserve Divisions of Gen. Valabregue will mask St. Quentin, while the main body (III., X. and I. Corps) will make a determined attack to the north. Gen. Abonneau will leave a mixed detachment to maintain connexion with the IV. Army on the right and will then move the main bodies of his own cavalry division and of Gen. Bouttegourd's Reserve Division to Vervins ready to act against the enemy's left flank which has crossed the Oise W. of the Vervins—Avesnes road.
Gen. Joffre was present when the above instructions were drawn up, and gave them his tacit approval.
The French V. Army was now committed to two separate operations, in both of which the fighting was destined to be severe, for Gen. von Bülow had by now received definite orders from Supreme Headquarters to advance on Paris via the line Laon–La Fere. To take the fighting E. of Guise first, on the side of the Germans the Guard and X. Corps were facing the sist Reserve Div., the X. and I. Corps and the 4th Div. of Cavalry, to which were subsequently added the bulk of the III. Corps. The German Guard Corps was operating from the line Etreaupont–Flavigny; the X. from Flavigny to Macquigny by Guise.
The morning of the 29th was ushered in by a thick mist which limited visibility for some time to three or four yards. The French X. Corps had been ordered to take Audigny, and accordingly the 20th Div. on the left moved forward against that village, while the igth Div. followed in support on the right. The advanced guard of the 20th Div. entered Audigny, but was almost immediately attacked on its right flank, and after some
