at i -.50 the German light cruisers were ordered to fall back on the " Moltke " and " Von der Tann." At 2 P.M. the German battle cruisers passed the bar of the Outer Jade. The German ist and 3rd Squadrons were now getting up steam, and the German battle cruisers were ordered not to advance against the British squadron (2:41 P.M.) but to wait for the " Seydlitz " 25 m. W. of Heligoland. By 3:50 the three battle cruisers had reached that position, and had been joined by the " Strassburg," " Kolberg " and " Stralsund." There were no signs of the enemy. The squadron turned back before reaching the posi- tion where the " Coin " went down, and no survivors were found that day. A single stoker was picked up by a torpedo-boat on Aug. 30. Four others had managed to get hold of a battered dinghy, but he alone survived.
For the British it remained only to get home. Adml. Camp- bell's cruisers met the " Lurcher," with the " Mainz's " crew on board, escorting the "Laurel" and "Liberty," at 4:30 P.M., and the "Laurel " was taken in tow by the " Amethyst." The " Arethusa " struggled on at 6 knots till 7 P.M., then had to signal for assistance, and at 9:30 P.M. was taken in tow by the " Hogue " and reached home safely.
Mist, uncertainty arising from the appearance of British light cruisers, and the speed of the enemy's light cruisers militated against the success of the British submarines. E 7 had begun the day by firing a torpedo at G 194, had sighted the ist L.C.S. at 10 A.M. and recognized them as British; she had seen the " Danzig " later at 12:40, and at 1:15 had sighted Beatty's battle cruisers, which passed over her this probably gave rise to the report of an attack on the " Queen Mary." E 4 had fired a torpedo at the "Stettin," picked up the "Defender's" men and seen the " Ariadne " going W. at 1 2 :io P.M. E 6 had been attacked by the " Southampton " at 9 :3O, had watched the action between the " Mainz " and the flotillas, and had prepared to attack a four- funnelled cruiser at i .'45, only to recognize it just in time as the " Liverpool."
The German submarines had all been held back off Heligoland by the chief of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla, and the reports of attacks by them on the British were fictitious. When, at noon, it was clear that battle cruisers had entered the Bight, the Ger- man submarines ware ordered by the chief of the ist Submarine Flotilla to attack the enemy in the vicinity of Heligoland, but as the enemy was 35 m. off and it would have taken them at least four hours to reach him, the order was ineffective.
The engagement was a severe blow to the German fleet. They had lost three light cruisers and one destroyer, and their casualties were 63 officers and 649 men killed, 20 officers and 361 men wounded, 9 officers and 140 men prisoners, a total of 1,242, against the British 35 killed and some 40 wounded. The Germans had at first expected the British fleet to enter the Bight, but as days passed without a sign of it they became less circumspect and Beatty caught them off their guard. In these circumstances they had only two courses before them either to keep everything back or send everything out. As it was, the light cruisers had proceeded independently and had fallen victims to greatly superior forces. The exposure of the patrols to sudden attack entailed one of two policies to keep heavy ships continuously on patrol and tie them to the defence of the rivers, or to lay mine- fields to cover the approaches. The latter policy was adopted and mines began to be laid to the W. of Heligoland in September 1914. The engagement had a further effect, for it confirmed the Kaiser in his determination to limit the German fleet to a strictly defensive policy. When Beatty swooped down on the Bight he drove a great wedge into German naval policy. Von Tirpitz, whose son had been taken prisoner in the " Mainz," wearied himself with plaints, but all in vain. For the British nation and navy the victory came, too, at an opportune time. The irresist- ible advance of the German army was being viewed with some- thing like dismay. The news of a naval victory in the very gates of the enemy lightened the gloom and gave the nation faith that the navy was equal to its gigantic task. It gave the navy, too, confidence in its leaders. They knew that where they were Beatty also would be. Many a day was to pass before, on another misty
day, also in the mouth of another river, Beatty was to look on a very different scene, but the first naval laurels of the war were gained in the Bight, and this naval action ranks as one of the most important of the World War. (A. C. D.)
HELMET (see 13.247). Tlje World War again demonstrated the truth of the old saying that " in war it is the unexpected that
happens." In view of the developments which had taken place
in the science of gunnery, and the destructive effects of modern
gun and rifle fire, it would hardly have been anticipated that
the world would again witness the spectacle of soldiers in hel-
mets throwing hand grenades and bombs at an enemy only a few
yards distant in fact, a return of the grenadiers in helmets.
Against modern rifle-fire, helmets are of no use; and except for
ornamental purposes they had long been abandoned. But the
World War brought them again into use.
It was not until the war was well advanced, and the armies on the western front had been engaged in trench warfare for some considerable time, that it was realized that a great number of head wounds caused by shrapnel bullets, fragments of shell, etc., travelling at relatively low velocities, might have been prevented by very slight protection. Even then an immense amount of research and experimental work had to be carried out before an efficient helmet was produced, and an immense amount of prej- udice had to be overcome before the soldier realized its value and could be induced to wear it. Helmets were first introduced into the French army, and they eventually formed an essential part of the equipment of every soldier.
The problem to be solved in the manufacture of a helmet is very different to that of the ordinary bullet-proof plate which is designed to stop direct rifle-fire. The governing factor is weight, and as it is impossible to attempt to stop direct rifle-fire owing to the excessive weight of metal which this would necessitate, efforts must be confined to securing defence against shrapnel bullets and fragments travelling at low velocities. A hard steel is out of the question, as it would break up under impact. On the other hand a soft steel would be too easily perforated. The properties which the metal must possess are those of extreme toughness and ductil- ity, so that the resistance offered to the impact may be gradual and distributed over as large an area as possible. The effect can perhaps be best described by comparing it with the action of a loosely hung net in stopping a cricket ball or a golf ball. The one material which possesses these requirements to a high degree is manganese steel. This steel can be rolled into thin sheets from which the helmets are pressed, and in this form its ductility is remarkable. The thickness of the metal is only 20 B.W.G. or 036 of an inch, and this is required to withstand the impact of a shrapnel bullet (forty-one to the pound) travelling at a velocity of 750 ft. per second. Under actual test they resisted this attack at 900 ft. per second.
A comparison of the British helmet with the French and Ger- man is of interest. The French helmet weighed slightly less than the British 23! oz. as against 25^ oz. but was only made of mild steel and could be easily perforated by shrapnel bullets at as low a velocity as 350 ft. per second'. It must be remembered, however, that the French were the first to realize the value of helmets, and at once issued two million of them manufactured from the only material available to the army. Arrangements were subsequently made for these helmets to be replaced by manganese-steel helmets, but in the meantime the Armistice was signed and they were never delivered. The German helmet was made of nickel-chrome steel and weighed as much as 37 oz., or nearly 12 oz. more than the British. It was easily perforated by shrapnel at low velocities, and in addition suffered from the fatal defect of cracking and breaking under impact. The helmets supplied to the U.S. troops at the beginning of the war were exact copies of the British types. The model of 1917, of manganese steel, -036 in. to -040 in. thick, weighs, complete with lining and chin strap, 36 ounces. (E. F. L.)
HEMY, CHARLES NAPIER (1841-1917), British painter (see 13.265), died at Falmouth Sept. 30 1917.
HENDERSON, ARTHUR (1863- ), British Labour politi- cian, was born in Glasgow of working-class parents Sept. 15
