When Italy denounced the alliance with Austria-Hungary, on May 3 1915, Vienna was already convinced that war was certain. The attempts to continue discussions had only been undertaken for the purpose of gaining time, and military prepara- tions were hastened. It was the first intention of Gen. Conrad von Hotzendorf to wait for the Italians at Klagenfurt and Laibach and attack them as their columns came out of the mountainous country, but the plan was not approved by the German command. Falkenhayn declined to give the 10 divisions which Conrad required for this plan, and it was abandoned. Conrad wished to smash Cadorna's offensive by manoeuvre and counter-attack. Falkenhayn was not only unwilling to spare the troops for this plan but he doubted whether Cadorna would allow himself to be led into Conrad's trap; he feared the difficulties of recovering territory once abandoned, and he realized the great natural strength of the Isonzo and Carso lines. It was decided to conduct an obstinate defensive rather than to attempt Conrad's plan. The command of the Austro- Hungarian armies on the Italian front was given to the Archduke Eugene, who had commanded the Balkan armies. His chief of staff was Gen. Krauss, and under his direction Gen. Dankl, lately in command of the I. Army, was entrusted with the Tirol and Trentino sector; Gen. von Rohr commanded on the Carinthia front, while Gen. Boroevich von Bojna, lately in command of the III. Army, took charge of the Isonzo-Carso front. It was not until May 21, three days before the declara- tion of war, that the main body of Boroevich's army, consisting of five divisions brought from the Serbian front, began to be entrained from near Agram. When war was declared the Isonzo front, from Tolmino southward, was lightly held by three divisions under Gen. Ludvig von Goiginger.
Meanwhile Cadorna had to adapt his plans to the quickly changing circumstances. The Russian armies N. of the Carpathi- ans had given way under the attacks of Mackensen and Boehm- Ermolli, and had begun the great retreat that was to go so far. There was no word of movement, even of demonstration, on the Serbian front. The request of the Allies that the Serbian armies should resume action, or at least make a show of action, met with no response, and in May the Austro-Hungarian troops on the Serbian front were reduced by five divisions, their place being taken by three newly formed German divisions, which had not yet completed their establishment. Various reasons, military and political, have been given for the inaction of the Serbians, but in the present connexion it is simply the fact that matters, the fact which allowed five Austro-Hungarian divisions to be transferred en bloc from the Serbian front to the Italian theatre of war.
The altered circumstances compelled Cadorna to revise his immediate objectives, but not his general plan of attack. A further handicap, in his view, was imposed by the denunciation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary three weeks before the declaration of war, and by the immediate leakage regarding the London agreement between Italy and the Entente, which gave the enemy more grace to prepare against his initial moves. The time for preparation was further lengthened by the political crisis caused by the last efforts of Berlin and Vienna to keep Italy out of the war. On the other hand, the main body of the Italian army was not ready for an earlier advance. It was not fully ready when war was declared. Mobilization was nearly complete as far as the men were concerned, for drafts had been brought up gradually during the previous months. The armies were ready to fight in their positions against an Austrian attack, or for preparatory movements on a limited scale. They were not ready, the eastern armies in particular, for a big advance.
On the eve of war, Cadorna's dispositions were as follows: Brusati's I. Army, with 5 divisions and 10 battalions of Alpine troops, was to push forward in the Trentino, and carry out the limited offensive already indicated. The IV. Army under Nava was to advance, the right wing upon the Pusterthal, the left wing across the great Dolomite road, past the peaks of the Sella group, to threaten the valleys running down to the Eisack. Nava had five divisions and seven Alpine battalions, while a
sixth division of his army was at first held in reserve about Spilimbergo, near where the Tagliamento runs out into the plain of Friuli. To this army, in view of the positions which it had to attack, especially the Landro and Sexten fortifications, was assigned the bulk of Cadorna's very limited supply of heavy artillery, including practically all the guns above 149 mm., with the exception of seven batteries of zio's, assigned to the Carnia force. The task of Lequio's Carnia force, which consisted of an infantry division and 16 battalions of Alpine troops, was that designed in the original plan, the probable movements, in the event of success, depending upon those of the armies to right and left. The II. and III. Armies were to attack with all speed upon the Isonzo front, but their movements were to be inspired by strategic caution. They were to get under way as quickly as possible and break through the enemy's covering troops. Further movement was to depend upon what they found, and upon the news from the other fronts. While initial speed was obviously the essence of Cadorna's plan, he was handicapped by the fact that another fortnight was required for complete mobiliza- tion. Frugoni's II. Army was to consist of three army corps (eight divisions), and Zuccari's III. Army of three corps (six divisions) -with three cavalry divisions. On May 24 only three corps and two cavalry divisions were ready for the initial attack. Meantime there had been a difference of opinion between Cadorna ard Zuccari, and the clash of two strong characters made the difference irreparable. As a result Zuccari was relieved of his command and the III. Army was entrusted to the Duke of Aosta, on the very eve of the declaration of war.
In addition to the divisions already mentioned, a central reserve of 10 divisions and one cavalry division was in process of mobilization in the plains of the Veneto and Friuli, 5 infantry divisions in the rear of the Trentino sector, the other 5 and the cavalry between the Tagliamento and the eastern frontier, but these troops could not be ready for action for some three weeks. The first shots of the war were fired by Austrian guns upon the Carnia front, a few hours before midnight on May 23, the hour fixed for the opening of hostilities, and early on May 24 the Italian advance began.
The opening moves of the campaign, all-important as they were in relation to the future operations which depended upon them, failed to obtain the results hoped for in Cadorna's design. The I. Army was prompt to carry the limited objectives assigned to it, overcoming the weak resistance of the enemy covering troops and occupying positions which not only were in them- selves much better adapted for defense than the frontier, but greatly reduced the length of the line to be held. The IV. Army was very slow. Its heavy guns were not ready when hostilities began, and Nava waited upon their arrival, preoccupied by the strong positions which faced him and the permanent fortifica- tions which lay beyond. It would appear that he was influenced by the positions themselves and assumed the existence of an opposition which in fact he would not have found. He was not ready himself to carry out his plan of advance, which was based on the supposition that the enemy resistance was already adequately organized. He held by his plan and may have missed an opportunity of reaching his objective by changing it. His initiative was hampered by adherence to method. Lequio's Carnia force was quick to move, and found that the enemy was equally quick. This sector was all-important to the Austrians, from the point of view both of offence and defence. It was essen- tial to prevent a break-through to Tarvis and Villach, and if they could hold the frontier line it preserved for them the chance of the attack down the valleys converging upon the Tagliamento which had long figured in the plans of their general staff. This sector had been quickly reenforced as the danger of war became imminent; and here alone, in the first days of the campaign, there was, roughly speaking, an equivalence of infantry strength. The contending troops met on the passes and the mountains that flanked them; and though the Italians had the best of the fighting which folio wed, and wrested several important positions from the enemy, it was quickly evident that the way was blocked here against all but an attack in overwhelming
