The attack of Oct. 23 was followed three days later by another. The Turks and Arabs who attacked in the eastern oasis were beaten off after some hours' fighting, but south of the town the line was rushed by a large body of Arabs who penetrated into the gardens and were dislodged with difficulty by the reserves. For a short time the situation was anxious, but after about five hours' fighting the attacking tribesmen were driven off, leaving many dead. This fight showed that the line occupied was too long for the number of troops available, and it was reduced in extent by a considerable withdrawal in the eastern oasis. This withdrawal was made the subject of alarmist rumours in the European press and many thought that Tripoli would shortly be retaken; and the United States cruiser " Chester " was sent with orders to embark the Ameri- can consul and any other American subjects. The consul declined to go, and his action was of value in indicating the true situation. No doubt, in addition to frightening Europe, the withdrawal encour- aged the Turks and Arabs, who appeared to be in the position of besieging Tripoli. For a month the town did give the impression of being beleaguered ; in reality, during this period, Gen. Caneva's chief enemy was cholera. The disease broke out towards the end of Oct. and for some weeks it caused much loss and still more anxiety. In all, nearly a thousand soldiers died of cholera, and the native population suffered heavily. The problem of tackling the epidemic was rendered more difficult by the large number of " immigrants " from the oasis, who had sought refuge in the town in the early days of the occupation, or had been brought in when the oasis was cleared. Prompt and effective measures were taken, but it was not until the middle of Nov. that the authorities could breathe freely, and for some weeks the situation required vigilance.
From the events of Oct. 23 and the following days it was clear that the calculations of the Italian Government had been at fault. Turkey was not prepared to lose the Tripolitan provinces without a struggle, and the local tribesmen were joining in the resistance of the garrison. Reinforcements were immediately dispatched to Tripoli, and on Nov. 5 a decree was published in Rome, annexing the two Turkish provinces. Italy was no longer inclined to consider a com- promise, and the annexation was proclaimed in order to stop all efforts in that direction and define her intentions, not only to Turkey, but to the European Powers. Further reinforcements followed, and by the fourth week in Nov. Gen. Caneva had under his command 34 battalions of infantry (nearly 25,000 rifles) and 1 6 batteries of field and mountain artillery. On Nov. 26 an advance was made through the oasis on the east and the old lines were occu- pied after stiff fighting. Eight days after, on Dec. 4, a force of 12,000 men, with five mountain batteries and two squadrons, sup- ported from the trenches by field guns and a few heavy guns which had arrived some days earlier, advanced into the plain against the main body of the enemy, which was based upon the little oasis of 'Ain Zara. It was hoped that the Turks would stand, but this was not their policy. They fought a stubborn containing action, and lost the few guns they possessed, but they retreated in good time, leaving to the quick-moving tribesmen the task of delaying the Italian advance. "Am Zara was occupied in force by the Italians, and Turkish headquarters were established at 'Aziziya, some 30 m. south of Tripoli, while a strong force, mainly Arab, was encamped at Suani Beni Adham, a day's march from the town. The eastern oasis was deserted by the Arabs, and its farthest point, Tajura, was occupied by the Italians on Dec. 13.
At the beginning of Nov. the Italian Government had considered the possibility of extending the theatre of war, by sea at least, in the hope of inducing Turkey to give up the struggle. Austria- Hungary intervened, backed by Germany, and on receipt of a report of Italian activity off Salonika, Count Aehrenthal told the Italian ambassador in Vienna that Italian action " on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or in the Aegean Islands could not be allowed either by Austria or by Germany, as it would be contrary to the Treaty of Alliance." He said further that he considered " the bom- bardment of ports in European Turkey such as Salonika, Ka valla, etc., as contrary to Article VII." (of the Alliance). Italy's action being limited in this way, it was necessary to solve the Tripoli problem directly, but the task was more difficult than it need have been owing to other limitations laid upon the military authorities by the Italian Government. Gen. Caneva's orders appear to have been that he must not risk reverses or suffer heavy loss. In the circum- stances a desert expedition in pursuit of the Turks and their mobile auxiliaries seemed hardly practical. In any event, the four months following the battle of 'Ain Zara passed without any action of importance in Tripolitana. A flying column sent southwards from 'Ain Zara on Dec. 1919 had a stiff fight near Bir Tubras. The oasis of Gargaresh, 2 m. west of Tripoli, was occupied on Jan. 20, after a skirmish with a body of Arabs who came up from the south when the Italians advanced into the open. Five weeks later the situation at Homs was improved by the capture and retention against counter- attack of the Mergheb, a hill which dominates the little town. No other fighting took place in the western province until the spring was nearly over, though in feb. the arrival of camels, motor lorries and Eritrean askaris seemed to point to an early advance.
During the period of inaction the relations between Italy and France came under a cloud. On Jan. 15 and 18, respectively, the French mail steamers " Carthage " and " Manouba," en route
from Marseilles to Tunis, were stopped and brought into Cagliari by Italian cruisers. The grounds given were that the " Carthagp " was carrying an aeroplane destined for the Turks, and that a Red Crescent Mission which was on board the " Manouba " included several Turkish officers. The French Prime Minister, M. Poincare, made a speech that was exceedingly sharp in tone, and the press of both countries heaped fuel on the flames kindled by the incident. The matter was referred to The Hague, where the verdict was given in favour of Italy, but M. Poincare's speech and the threats of the French press were not forgotten by Italian public opinion.
In Cyrenaica progress had been no more speedy than in the region of Tripoli. No effort, in fact, had been made to advance towards the interior, or even to extend the area of occupation round Bengazi, Derna and Tobruk. Nothing, certainly, was to be gained by an advance into the blank desert behind Tobruk, and it was decided to make no move from Bengazi and Derna. Enver Bey succeeded in reaching Cyrenaica early in the winter, and by his energy and personality he succeeded in organizing a formidable resistance, securing a unity among the tribesmen, and a willingness to cooperate with the Turks, which had never before existed. Under Enver's direction both Bengazi and Derna, but especially the latter, were closely beset throughout the winter. The Derna lines, which were dominated from the hilly ground immediately behind the town, were harassed frequently, and between the end of Dec. and the first week in March four important attacks were delivered at inter- vals of about three weeks. All these attacks were repulsed after hard fighting, and the result of the engagement of March 3, in which the attack was directed by Enver Bey in person, seemed to con- vince the Turks and Arabs that their attempts were useless. The neighbourhood of Derna remained quiet for nearly five months. At Bengazi, except for one reconnaissance in force at the end of Nov. when an Italian column went out some 6 m. from the town and returned after a sharp fight, there was no action of any importance till March. Blockhouses were built to secure the Italian lines, and these were occasionally attacked, but the Italians made no move- ment until March 12, when Gen. Briccola, who commanded the garrison, sent out a column to attack a large body of Arabs who had occupied an oasis, or rather a collection of gardens, known as the Two Palms, less than half-a-mile from one of the Italian redoubts. A mixed force of Turks and Arabs also approached the town from the south-east, but did not press home their attack. The Arabs in the oasis stood firm, but they were overwhelmed by the Italian attack and suffered very heavily.
After the battle of the Two Palms there was practically no fight- ing in the Bengazi district, but in April the long spell of inaction in the western province came to an end, and from that time onward the resistance of the Turks and Arabs was gradually broken by a series of operations at various points. On April 10 and II a landing was effected, without opposition, at Ras Makabes, a headland not far from the Tunis border, and a base was established near the old fort of Bu Kamesh. The Italian force consisted of two brigades, one from Tripoli and one from Italy, under the command of Gen. Garioni, and it made short work of a few minor attacks delivered by the Arabs. A landing on this part of the coast would have been effected earlier if it had not been for the difficulty of keeping up supplies during the winter. 1
In April Italian warships appeared off the entrance to the Dar- danelles. They were fired on by the Turkish forts, and their answer to this fire drew a fresh and very energetic protest from Vienna. The Italian ambassador was informed that if Italy " wished to resum her freedom of action " Austria could do the same. Any furthe action on similar lines " might have grave consequences.' After a daring exploit by Capt. Millo, who penetrated the Dardanelles in a small destroyer, the northern Aegean was left alone by the Italians, but in May the island of Rhodes and 12 small islands of the Sporades were occupied by Italy. Only in Rhodes was there any resistance, but the Italian force under Gen. Ameglio, which was formed in the main of troops from Tripoli and Bengazi, fought a brilliant little action at Psithos and captured some 2,000 Turkish regulars.
On May 2 Gen. Reisoli pushed back the Arabs some distance to the east of Horns, inflicting considerable loss, and five weeks later the Tripoli district once more became the scene of fighting. Encour- aged by the long period of quiet the Turks and Arabs had come nearer the town, and a considerable force was entrenched near the oasis of Zanzur, a few miles west of Gargaresh. On June 8 two Italian brigades drove the enemy out of their positions, while a reserve brigade nearer Tripoli awaited the expected arrival of enemy reinforcements. The Arabs came up in strength, but were soundly beaten, losing nearly 1,000 killed, while the Italians had over 300 casualties. A few days later the Arabs attacked the Italian posi- tions near Homs, but were driven off with heavy loss (about 700 killed). They were taken in flank by a battalion of Bersaglieri, and after this repulse Homs was undisturbed by any further fighting. On June 15 an Italian force under Gen. Camerana landed near Misurata, and occupied the town some days later, and on June 27 Gen. Garioni started a series of operations from Bu Kamesh, which ended, after various successful actions, in the occupation of Zuara
1 Transports actually left Italy for Zuara (Zoara) in Dec. but returned after being a month at sea in persistent bad weather.
