had done their duty nobly. The German " peace offensive," and a speech by the Socialist deputy Treves, in which he promised that in the following winter no one should be in the trenches, all served to accentuate the state of mind which made Caporetto possible. A minor cause was the revolutionary strike in Turin in Aug. 1917. The pretext of the rioting was that on a certain day the city's bread supply had failed. The men who promoted the trouble were very highly paid workmen in the munition and motor factories, who had not a shadow of a grievance, but merely wished to imitate the Russian Bolshevists; German and Austrian money was probably not unconnected with the affair. The authorities repressed the rising with considerable energy and several of the rioters were killed or wounded. Many of those implicated were punished by being deprived of their exemption from service in the army and sent to the front, where they at once initiated a revolutionary propaganda among the other troops. Many of these men were incorporated in the bri- gades which afterwards collapsed at Caporetto, while others, employed in the motor transport service, were able to spread their suggestions throughout many units.
There had been signs of unrest and of a diminished military spirit among certain regiments, notably in the fighting on the Monte Ortigara on the Asiago plateau (June 1017), and in the operations against the Hermada on the road to Trieste in Aug., which, after a successful beginning, had been held up owing to the failure of certain units. This state of things had certainly not escaped Gen. Cadorna, but, in spite of his warnings, the Government, and in particular Sig. Orlando, the Minister of the Interior, had failed to pay attention to them or to take any adequate measures against the Bolshevist, defeatist and pacifist propaganda. Papers like the Avanli were not only published freely with only the mildest censorship, but were even allowed to reach the troops at the front.
The enemy offensive began on Oct. 23 1917, at Caporetto on the upper Isonzo. The objective had been not only to drive the Italians out of Austrian territory and to inflict a crushing defeat on the whole Italian army, but, as far as Austria was concerned, to reconquer Venetia for the Monarchy. The attack on Caporetto was followed immediately by another on the Asiago plateau. The results actually achieved were the breaking of the eastern front and the collapse of the whole of the Italian II. Army (Gen. Capello), which involved the retirement, albeit in order, of the III. (Duke of Aosta) from the Carso, and of the IV. (Gen. di Robilant) from the Cadore. The whole of the provinces of Udine and Belluno and parts of those of Venice, Treviso and Vicenza were occupied by the enemy. On the Asiago plateau, on Monte Grappa (between the Brenta and the Piave) and along the lower course of the Piave the Austro-Germans were held up, but no one knew if it would be possible to resist for long. The consequences of the disaster were grave indeed. The enemy had captured 300,000 prisoners, 2,500 guns (including most of the heavy artillery) and vast quantities of stores. Venice was now only 30 km. from the front and its fall at one time seemed inevitable, together with that of other important towns, manufacturing centres and rich agricultural districts. Depression and gloom spread throughout Italy, intensified by the throngs of refugees flying panic-stricken before the invaders, who murdered, raped, plundered and burnt their way onward (see CAPORETTO, BATTLE or). 1
Germany and Austria were convinced that a knock-down blow like this would have left Italy prostrate, and they counted on a revolution leading to a separate peace, as was afterwards to take place in Russia at Brest Litovsk. Then all the enemy armies would be able to concentrate on the western front and obtain a decisive victory there before American help could arrive. Even in the Allied countries and in Italy herself it was thought impossible that after so crushing a disaster the army and people could recover. But the impossible happened. The feeling
1 The report of the Royal Commission on the responsibilities of Germany and Austria for violations of international law, published in April 1921, contains a vast mass of evidence of the atrocious be- haviour of the enemy in the united provinces.
Caporetto.
of dissatisfaction at the length of the war, the hope of peace by ! compromise, Germanophil sentiments, and the general sense of hopeless weariness gave way to the determination to resist at j all costs. Everyone from the King to the poorest peasant realized that the new lines must be held. " Di qui non passer anno" (" Here they shall not pass ") became the universal cry. The King's example was splendid. Since the beginning of the war he had always been at the front, constantly visiting the trenches and the most exposed positions, but without interfering in the conduct of military operations, although nominally commander- in-chief; he took only the same leave as any ordinary soldier, , 1 5 days a year. But now he multiplied his efforts a thousandfold. His proclamation of Nov. 10 was a stirring trumpet call to the whole nation. " As neither My House nor My People, united in a single spirit, have ever wavered before danger, so even now we look adversity in the face undaunted. Citizens and soldiers, be a single army! All cowardice is treachery, all discord is treachery, all recrimination is treachery." Another man who did much to rouse the country was the poet D'Annunzio. He had given proof of wonderful courage in fighting, and he now influenced public opinion by the marvellous eloquence of his speeches and articles. Between Nov. 10 and 22 the defeated Italian army, which had pulled itself together, resisted on the Asiago-Grappa-Piave line, and the enemy, in spite of repeated attacks, failed to break through.
As soon as the extent of the Caporetto disaster was realized the Boselli Cabinet resigned (Oct. 26), and on the 3oth Sig. Orlando succeeded in forming another, with himself as premier. Baron Sonnino remained Foreign Minis- Ministry ter and the other portfolios were distributed as fol- lows: Gen. Alfieri (War), Adml. Del Bono (Marine), Meda (Finance), Nitti (Treasury), Colosimo (Colonies), Dari (Public Works), Gen. Dallolio (Arms and Munitions), Sacchi (Justice), Fera (Post Office), Miliani (Agriculture), Ciuffelli (Trade and Industry), Bianchi (Transport), Bissolati (Pensions), Crespi (Supplies). Gen. Cadorna now ceased to command the army, and Gen. Diaz was appointed chief of the general staff in his place, with Gens. Badoglio and Giardino as assistant chiefs.
The Allies came forward generously to aid Italy in her dire need, and at once hurried fresh troops to the Italian front, amounting eventually to six British and five French divisions. Marshal Foch also visited the Supreme Command to assist with his valuable advice, but he endorsed all that Gen. Cadorna proposed almost without suggesting any change. The arrival of the Allied contingents exercised a most inspiriting moral effect on the Italian troops and public. But it must be remem- bered that no French or British contingent actually came into the fighting line until after the enemy had been definitely held up by Italian troops alone between Nov. 10 and 22. This fact had an important bearing on events yet to come, but is apt to be for- gotten. On Nov. 5 the prime ministers of Italy, France and Britain and the Italian Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs met at Rapallo, where the permanent Inter- Allied Military Committee of Versailles was constituted. Gen. Cadorna was the first Italian representative on*it, and remained there until, the Caporetto inquiry having been ordered, he was recalled.
A very serious problem which faced the new Government was the relief of the refugees from the invaded area. About 4-4% of Italy's territory had been occupied by the enemy and one-third of the inhabitants of those provinces had been able to escape and were scattered all over the country. The Govern- ment granted large sums for their assistance, and 35,000,000 lire was raised by public subscription. Their presence did much to strengthen the national spirit of resistance, and much valu- able propaganda was carried out by the association of disabled soldiers (mutilati di guerra), the organization of which was largely due to the heroic Capt. Paulucci di Calboli, who, although hopelessly crippled, toured the country advocating resistance to the bitter end, until he died in consequence of his wounds. In the meanwhile the army was almost wholly reorganized, and the losses in artillery and other material more than made good in about four months' time, largely owing to the patriotic
