The Russian resistance, which manifested itself in violent counter- blows, was not to be overcome. Farther N., too, neither the Liineburg group, which had been forced to give up a brigade to Woyrsch's army group (attacked by superior numbers at Barano- vichi), nor Bernhardi's Corps (which had sent the nth Bavarian Inf. Div. from Sokul to the seriously menaced position in the Styr salient) could make any further progress.
Loss of the Styr Bend. The increasing exhaustion of the troops of the II. Corps and Path's Corps in the Styr bend, due to in- cessant fighting, was not lost upon the Russians, and Brussilov turned his attention more and more to the wing of the Russian VIII. and III. Armies. On the S. flank of the Styr bend, the I. Turkestan and V. Cav. Corps were brought up to join the XXX. Corps in the attack, while the Russian XLVI. Corps, with 4i inf. and 2 cav. divs., pressed against the N. flank. The Russians won the first success on July 4 at Kopyli, when they established themselves on the N. bank, and were not to be driven away even by the nth Bavarian Inf. Div. which was hurriedly brought up. On July 5, at Kolki, the 2nd Polish Bde. and half of the 45th Schiitzen Div. had also to yield ground; and as on the same day Path's left wing and the ist and 3rd Polish Bdes. posted at Kolodia on Hauer's S. wing were broken through in spite of a brave defence, the risk of Path's doubly outflanked corps being cut off could now only be averted by ordering his seriously exhausted troops back to behind the Stochod. Hauer's Cav. Corps, whose position had now become untenable owing to its exposed S. flank, had also to retire behind the Stochod, whereby the nth Honved Cav. Div. on its flank was involved in further fighting which cost it heavy losses. To strengthen the new Stochod front the 37th Inf. Bde., which had been sent northward by train, to join Woyrsch, was now diverted to Path's Corps, while in the new area of Hauer's Cav. Corps the German 9th Cav. Div. from Marwitz's group, the Bavarian Cav. Div. sent up by train from Hindenburg's group, and the combined Clausius Div., were assembled. Path's Corps was placed under General Bernhardi, to assure unity of command. In connexion with these events, the centre and right wing of Bernhardi's Corps from Sokul, and the S. wing of the Gronau group (82nd Res. Div.) from the Wiesiloncha, had to be withdrawn behind the Stochod. The Russians pursued hotly, and tried to push across the Stochod, attacking at different points up to the middle of July, but were everywhere, in some cases after the defence had put in its now adequate reserves, repulsed with bloody losses.
In view of the changed situation and the shifting of forces that had become essential, a renewal of Linsingen's offensive could no longer be considered. His troops received orders to establish themselves in a permanent position on the line reached.
At the end of June the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command saw itself forced to close down the offensive against Italy, and shorten the front on the Sette Communi plateau, in order to release troops for the difficult fighting on the eastern front. The first forces available (the VIII. Corps staff with the 4Sth Schiitzen Div. and sgth Inf. Div.) were dispatched at once by train to Pflanzer-Baltin's Army which was now, at the turn of the month, once more the focus of the fighting.
Battle of Kolomea. After the Russian XI. Corps, in the fighting at Kuty and Wiznitz, had pushed back Habermann's group to the heights W. of Kuty, Letchitsky massed his XII. and XLI. Corps astride the Pruth, and advanced against Benigni's weak divisions on June 28. On the N. wing the attack was repulsed with the aid of reserves, but in the centre and on the S. wing the Russians broke through, and Benigni's troops had to retire to the bridgehead at Kolomea and behind the Pistyanka. To conform to this, Pflanzer-Baltin brought back also those parts of his army that were farther north.
On June 29 the Russians renewed the attack with the XI. Corps against Benigni's S. wing at Pistyn, and forced it back westwards. The course that the battle was taking, and the danger of Brudermann's Cav. Corps, farther to the S., being driven southward, led the Austrian Supreme Command to order the withdrawal of the army to the prepared position Berenzow- Sadzowka-Ottynia. Brudermann's Cav. Corps, with its right still
echeloned forward for the time being, held its ground until July i, when new attacks drove it to retire to the line Kosmacz-Zabie. Kolomea was thus given up by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Maj.-Gen. Leide's group, belonging to the South Army, which on the S. bank had been maintaining the liaison with the VII. Army, had meanwhile had to ward off mounted attacks by the 6th Don Cossack Div. on June 29. On June 30 this division again attacked on both sides of the Olesza-Tlumacz road, with a mass 6 lines deep and 3 km. wide, but once more the attack spent itself in vain, suffering exceptionally heavy losses, and providing yet another example of the uselessness of this type of cavalry attack on infantry, under modern conditions. Meanwhile reinforce- ments had come up from the Italian theatre, and were detrained at Nadworna and Delatyn. The ngth Inf. Div. was sent by the German Command to Tysmienica for the VII. Army.
Pflanzer-Baltin now intended, in conjunction with the South Army, to give the movement of battle a new character by attacks directed from the N. and S. wings of his Galician front. From the area S. of Delatyn the 44th Schiitzen Div., reinforced by a regiment of the German icsth Inf. Div., attacked north- westward, covered on its E. flank by Habermann's group; and from the area E. of Tlumacz, General Kraewell's group (German iigth and main body iosth Inf. Div., Maj.-Gen. Leide's group and 10 companies of the XIII. Corps) pushed southward. Both attacks met with success on July 2 and 3. In particular, Kraewell's group, to which Hadfy's group attached itself, gained ground up to the line running from the Dniester bend at Piotrow to Chocimierz and Molodylow, after once more repelling Russian cavalry attacks. But Brussilov had already taken his counter- measures. While the Russian IX. Army sent forward its powerful cavalry against Brudermann's N. wing, pressing him back to Tatarow at the northern exit of the Jablonica (Tartaren) Pass, Shcherbachev attacked the XIII. Corps of the South Army at Barysz and pushed it in. After some temporary successes in counter-attack by the reserves, the corps had to be taken back to the Koropiec brook in consequence of renewed Russian attacks. Violent attacks were also made on Benigni's group, N. of Sadzawka, Leide's group on the Dniester and the VI. Corps E. of Monasterzyska. But whereas Benigni, by the aid of 1 1 batts. of his own reserves, and the VI. Corps, with parts of the German ist Res. Div. which had just reached the South Army, was able to restore the situation, Kraewell's attack had to close down on account of the successes obtained by the Russians against Leide's group. All attempts to drive the Russians out of the region of the Jablonica Pass failed.
A brief offensive movement by the Austro-Hungarian XI. Corps from the S. corner of Bukovina did in fact gain ground up to Moldawa, but it had to be cut short and the troops withdrawn to their starting-point as soon as the object of drawing down the enemy's forces upon them was attained; and a brigade had had to be given up to guard the threatened Jablonica Pass.
If, however, the numerous counter-offensive actions which arose out of Pflanzer-Baltin's initiative were insufficient to bring about a change in the situation of his army, they had at least had the effect of forcing Letchitsky to remain passive for the moment between the Dniester and the Pruth, in order to give his exhausted troops a respite after the heavy losses they had suffered in consequence of his ruthless mass-attacks. The Rus- sians opposing Linsingen's group of armies, on the contrary, displayed much activity after the middle of July; and, moreover, by their repeated advances against the Carpathian front between the Jablonica and Prislop Passes they obliged the allies to give closer attention to this part of the front, not so much on account of the strategical importance of these operations, as in considera- tion of public opinion in Hungary, and of the extent to which a fresh misfortune in this quarter might be expected to react upon Rumania's attitude.
Organization of Command. The command of the front from the Jablonica Pass to the Rumanian frontier was accordingly given to General von Pflanzer-Baltin on account of his long experience in the minor operations in this mountainous country; and on the N. of the Carpathian front a reorganization of the
