Early in 1915 the Lewis gun was first issued to battalions in the field, and at the same time the -303-^. Vickers machine- gun was issued to infantry machine-gun sections and entirely superseded the Maxim gun. At this time, therefore, the two weapons (i.e. the Vickers and Lewis guns) were used side by side in the same unit, but little or no difference was made in their tactical handling.
It is an accepted principle that the tactical handh'ng of a weapon must be based on its characteristics, and it is necessary to state briefly what is the difference between the characteristics of the so-called " light " machine-guns, such as the Lewis and the Hotchkiss guns, and the " heavy " machine-gun, i.e. the Vickers gun in the British service, the modified Maxim in the German and others, and the Browning Heavy in the U.S. army.
Owing to the fact that it is not fired from a stable mounting, the Lewis gun cannot carry out overhead fire with safety and is not adapted for indirect fire. Being an air-cooled weapon it is not capable of sustained fire action and is limited to short bursts of fire. It is sufficiently light and portable to accompany and keep pace with the leading infantry. In the World War, functions similar to those which came to be allotted to the Lewis gun were performed by the Chauchat and others in the French army; by the Chauchat and, later, the Browning Light in the American; and by a somewhat lightened (finally an air-cooled) pattern of the Maxim in the German army. Their characteristics are dealt with under RIFLES AND LIGHT MACHINE-GUNS.
The Vickers gun is fired from a stable (tripod) mounting; it is therefore capable of overhead and indirect fire with safety to one's own troops. Being a water-cooled gun it is capable of sustained fire action subject only to considerations of ammunition supply. Neither the gun nor the mounting is sufficiently light to enable machine-gunners when man-handling their loads to accompany and keep pace with infantry in a rapid advance. It is evident that the tactical handling of two weapons having such widely different characteristics cannot be the same if the best possible value is to be obtained from each weapon.
At the outbreak of the World War the higher command of the British army did not appear to have realized the character- istic difference between the various types of automatic small arms in use (Vickers, Maxim, Lewis and Colt guns): all were classified under the general heading of " machine-guns." This lack of discrimination between the characteristics and conse- quently between the true tactical roles of the weapons undoubt- edly retarded the development of machine-gun tactics for up- wards of two years. In the autumn of 1915, however, partly owing to the very considerable increase in the output of Vickers guns and partly to a realization of the need for differentiation in methods of tactical handling, it was determined to form brigade machine-gun companies, armed with Vickers guns, to be separate from and independent of battalion machine-gun | sections, the latter to be armed with Lewis guns. It was evident that the per- sonnel to man these companies could not be found from and main- tained by the infantry, and it was therefore decided to form "a corps of machine-gunners." The large increase in machine-gun resources, and the decision to form machine-gun companies, led to the issue, in Oct. 1915, of a Royal Warrant for the forma- i tion of the Machine-Gun Corps, to be divided into three branches cavalry, infantry and motors. The machine-gun company comprised a headquarters and four sections, each of four guns. Unfortunately, the original establishment of these companies was fixed at a very low figure, only four men per gun being allowed for in the section; and this low establishment seriously militated against the efficiency of the companies when they took the field. It was finally decided that the Machine- Gun Corps should be armed solely with the Vickers gun and that the personnel should be trained in its use alone.
The year 1915 saw no change of doctrine in the British army at large as to the tactical handling of the Vickers gun. Never- theless, by the end of that year there existed a small body of officers who had had experience of handling the gun in the field, and who saw the possibilities of development in machine- gun tactics if overhead and indirect fire were put into practice
These officers used every endeavour to prove the need for and practicability of these methods of fire tactics, but a considerable time elapsed before general recognition was afforded to the principles they advocated. In March 1916 it was decided that, as additional Vickers guns and personnel became available, a fourth machine-gun company per division should be formed, this company to be known as the divisional machine-gun company and to be at the disposal of the divisional commander, whilst the brigade machine-gun companies remained as an integral portion of the brigades to which they were attached.
The summer of 1916 brought the long-drawn-out battle of the Somme. By this time each infantry brigade had its machine-gun company, which was entirely under the orders and at the disposal of the brigade commander. Throughout the period covered by this battle, it cannot be said that the new brigade machine-gun companies proved to be of any greater value than the former battalion machine-gun sections.
By this time, in the minds of officers of real experience, the following principles had, however, been definitely established, (i.) That the raison d'etre of machine-guns (i.e. Vickers guns) was the support of the infantry in all phases of the battle, and that this support was afforded by supplying covering fire of which a very large proportion must necessarily be overhead fire, (ii.) That the machine-gun was a weapon well adapted for carrying out overhead fire and that this form of fire facilitated disposition in depth, (iii.) That the movements of machine-gun units would rarely synchronize with the movements of the infantry they were supporting; in other words, that although machine-guns fight for the infantry they do not necessarily fight from the same positions as the infantry. In fact, as long as the machine-gun bullets are falling in the right place at the right time, it does not matter to the infantry where the guns are.
Throughout the battle of the Somme the low establishment of the British machine-gun companies had militated seriously against their efficiency. As a temporary measure to remedy this shortage of personnel, the expedient of attaching from 8 to 12 infantrymen to each machine-gun section had been resorted to. These men were mainly employed as ammunition carriers and some attempt was made to train them as machine-gunners. The arrangement was not, however, satisfactory to either the Machine-Gun Corps or the infantry, and, owing to strong representations on the subject from many quarters, approval was given in Oct. 1916 to the addition of two men per gun to the establishment of the machine-gun company. The gun detach- ment then consisted of six men; but subsequent experience showed that even this number was insufficient, and before the end of the war the establishment was raised to eight men per gun exclusive of headquarters and other details.
By the end of 1916 many of the British divisions in the field had received their fourth (or divisional) machine-gun company. The addition of this company pointed to the necessity for the appointment of a divisional machine-gun commander to control and coordinate machine-gun action within the division. The suggestion that such an appointment should be created met with considerable opposition, and eventually a divisional machine-gun officer was appointed, his status being solely that of an adviser, and he was appointed to command the fourth or divisional company only. A corps machine-gun officer, whose status was that of an adviser only, was also appointed in each army corps.
By the beginning of 1917 a distinct advance had been made in the methods of tactical handling of machine-guns throughout the army, due in great measure to the influence exerted by corps and divisional machine-gun officers. There was not such a general inclination to position machine-guns in the front-line trench, and some attempt was made to effect disposition in depth, although the dispositions adopted were entirely linear and still in many cases by single guns. There was as yet little or no realization of the offensive power available in machine-gun fire, i.e. the power of the weapon to afford close support to infantry in the attack. Neither had the infantry yet attained much confidence in the overhead fire of machine-guns. In the spring and summer of 1917, however, considerable advance in
