and Penchard. The attempt by the divisions of Gen. Lamaze,
which formed the right wing of the VI. Army, to secure this
commanding ground brought on the battle of the Marne.
Almost exactly at noon, when a battalion of the S5th Div. was settling down to its midday meal near the hamlet of Villeroy, it was surprised by a storm of shells from some German batteries beyond Monthyon and Penchard. Some very fierce fighting ensued, and the French line gradually forced its way past Plessis and Iverny towards the Montge-Penchard ridge, while slightly to the S. Neufmontiers fell into the hands of the Moroc- can Brigade. The French, however, were not able to hold their gains against the resistance of the German IV. Reserve Corps and during the evening their line in this position of the field was withdrawn to Le Plessis-Iverny-Villeroy-Charny, while to the N. St. Soupplets was held by the s6th Div. The left wing formed by the VII. Corps meanwhile had taken up the line Dammartin-Plailly without incident. Thus the VI. Army after severe fighting in which heavy losses were incurred, had secured but little advantage of ground, although, on the other hand, the possession of St. Soupplets on the Senlis-Marne road was of distinct value.
During the day Gen. von Kluck had drawn up a set of orders in compliance with the instructions he had received from Supreme Headquarters relative to his taking up a position between the Oise and the Marne. This would imply a retro- grade movement of the I. Army; but Gen. von Kluck was at the time labouring under the delusion that there was as yet no great danger threatening his right flank, and that a march back to cover it could be carried out without interruption. Conse- quently his orders fixed no definite time at which the with- drawal across the Marne was to begin, and until late in the night of Sept. 5-6 he seems to have believed that he could still emulate the Red Prince of 1870. The reports which kept coming in, however, eventually undeceived him, and an urgent order was sent to the II. Corps to begin its retrograde movement early on the 6th so as to be in a position to support the IV. Reserve Corps if required, a movement which was to react upon the offensive of the French army.
That army moved out to the attack with both flanks covered by cavalry, on the right being a division under Gen. Cornulier- Luciniere, while Gen. Sordet's cavalry corps was coming up on the left. The bulk of the day's fighting took place opposite the right wing, especially on the extreme right. The 56th Div., leaving St. Soupplets at daybreak, fought its way without much difficulty to Marcilly, but farther S. the 55th Div. experienced far greater difficulties. Barcy was taken and retaken three times, but had finally to be abandoned, and Chambry was occu- pied by a portion of the 54th Div. only after several attacks by the 55th had been beaten back. It was now clear that the Ger- man IV. Reserve Corps was being reinforced, and the same impression was received on the VI. Army's left. No sooner had the VII. Corps come into action than two enemy columns were signalled as moving upon Vareddes and Lizy, and these were in fact the 3rd and 4th Divs. of the German II. Corps. Thus by the middle of the afternoon, while the divisions of Gen. Lamaze were facing the high ground about Etrepilly and the VII. Corps in the left wing had reached the line Villers St. Genest- Bregy, the German resistance had considerably hardened.
Gen. von Kluck could, however, only reinforce his right flank at the expense of his front, and, in consequence, opposite the British there was a noticeable slackening in the advance of the German I. Army. Put briefly, the relative situation of that army had changed. What had been its right flank consisting of the IV. Reserve Corps and a cavalry division was, by suc- cessive reinforcements, to become the front; while the original front, by a corresponding diminution, was transformed into the left flank, and the army as a whole was to face W. instead of S. The orders conveying to the British troops the news that their long retreat was definitely ended were issued during the after- noon of the sth, although many of the battalions did not know when they left their billets on the morning of the 6th whether or not they were to march southwards to the Atlantic. As
soon as the rank and file discovered that their route led north- wards, roars of cheering burst forth with such enthusiasm as to leave a lasting impression on those who shared in that memorable day. The hesitation observable in the German advance was soon followed by an unmistakable retrograde movement. The British lost no time in seizing the heights on the Grand Morin S. of Coulommiers, from which German heavy guns had during the morning brought an effective fire to bear, and by evening the British advance guard had reached Villiers-sur-Morin and Crecy (III. Corps), Coulommiers (II. Corps) and Choisy (I. Corps). Save for some fighting early in the morning about Rozoy an action brought on by the Germans to cover their retreat the British were not heavily engaged, though a few prisoners and machine-guns were taken.
In the orders issued by Gen. Joffre on Sept. 4, the V. Army of Gen. Franchet d'Espercy had been ordered to close slightly to its left and to take up the general line Courtacon-Esternay- Sezanne, so as to be ready to attack in a northerly direction. Some progress had been made in accordance with these orders on the 5th. On Sept. 6 the mission of the V. Army was to attack, in the general direction of Montmirail, with its right wing thrown forward, an operation designed to coincide with the advance of the VI. Army on the Ourcq, and to aim at enclos- ing the whole of the I. and portion of the II. Army of the Ger- mans. Gen. Franchet d'Esperey sent forward his army at dawn. It was disposed, from left to right, as follows: the XVIII. Corps, III. Corps, I. Corps, X. Corps, with the reserve divs. in second line. Immediately a violent battle developed all along the line, due to the fact that the Germans had also re- ceived orders to advance and thus precipitated an encounter. In the fighting which ensued the French showed themselves undoubted masters of the enemy. On the left the XVIII. Corps seized Courtacon during the day. It was assisted by Gen. Conneau's II. Cavalry Corps, which was operating on the left flank and maintaining touch with the British army, a task which it performed admirably, finally halting for the night on a line E. and W. through Choisy. In the centre, after a particu- larly fierce artillery preparation, the III. Corps seized the vil- lages of Montceaux-les-Provins and Courgivaux. On the right the I. Corps gained possession of Chatillon-sur-Morin, which had defied their efforts for several hours, and after darkness had set in they continued their efforts, eventually clearing the Germans out of Esternay. From here the X. Corps carried on the line, with its right thrown well forward, and that flank gained touch with the 42nd and Moorish Divs. of the IX. Army at Villeneuve-lez-Charleville.
The fighting round Sezanne had been long and bitter. The Germans had placed many machine-guns in position, and they thoroughly searched the wooded ridges, from which the French attack was expected to develop, with artillery fire. The French guns replied and an artillery duel went on for some hours, until it seemed that the German guns had been silenced and that it was time for the French infantry to go forward. Against the green background the pantalons rouges of the attackers showed up like scarlet waves as they moved on with the bayonet, and with such a target the German machine-guns were able to do great execution. The French fell " like corn before the sickle," and to complete their discomfiture many were killed by the fire of their own artillery. The check to the French had, however, only been temporary, and after a day of brilliant fighting the front of the V. Army may be said to have been marked by the line Courtagon-Esternay- Villeneuve-lez-Charleville.
The whole French countryside between Paris and Verdun was now ablaze, five French and one British army contending with the _ five German armies which had set out to pivot on Thionville and roll up the Allied line. South, too, of the fortress of Verdun the fighting round the Grand Couronne de Nancy, though not actually forming part of the series of battles included in the title of the Marne, nevertheless had a direct bearing upon it. For the moment, however, the interest in the struggle is confined to the fighting on the western flank within the area roughly marked out by the towns Betz-Meaux-Cou-
