en. von Billow was endeavouring to wheel into position between Marne and Seine, and on his left the III. Army's orders were to push due south. As a result the French were attacked with considerable vigour all along the line; and so far from the 42nd and Moorish Divs. being able to gain ground on the left, they were forced to abandon Talus to the X. Corps of the German II. Army, and only managed to hold on to Villeneuve-lez-Charle- ville with some difficulty. The advanced guards of the IX. Corps fared no better against the left wing of the X. Corps and the Guard Corps of the II. Army, for they were driven from their line N. of the marshes and forced to fall back on the main body of the Corps, which, however, by holding the exits was able to maintain its position without difficulty. Farther to the E. the XI. Corps was violently assailed by the XII. Saxon Corps of the German III. Army, and had to swing back its left and take up a position with that flank in the woods S. of Ecury- le-Repos, while E. of Vatry the pth Cavalry Div. was engaged throughout the day by Saxon cavalry. The close of the day's fighting found the French IX. Army on the line Villeneuve-lez- Charleville-southern edge of the marshes-Lenharee, in touch with the Germans all along the line, except where the marshes separated the two fronts.
Although the right of the German II. Army was becoming exposed, Gen. von Billow on the 7th was still able to push on with his centre and left, that flank working in conjunction with the right of the III. Army. Gen. von Billow's left was formed by the Prussian Guard Corps, and, as the III. Army consisted entirely of Saxon troops, memories of the concerted action at St. Privat on Aug. 18 1870 fired the German soldiers to press the French IX. Army to the utmost of their powers. The latter had in consequence to endure a series of very heavy attacks throughout the day. The significance of these efforts was not, however, lost on Gen. Foch, who shrewdly remarked that the very fury of the German onslaught was tantamount to an admis- sion that things could not be going well with them elsewhere on their line. His own orders had contemplated the continuance of the offensive of the day before with his left, and briefly summar- ized they ran as follows: The 42nd and Moorish Divs. were to preserve connexion with the X. Corps of the V. Army on their left and were to endeavour to renew the offensive from Ville- neuve-lez-Charleville towards the north-west. The IX. Corps was to maintain its hold upon the southern edge of the marshes of St. Gond, but was to be ready to advance without delay if called upon. The XI. Corps was to hold the line to which it had been forced back the evening before: but, like the IX. Corps, it was to be ready to advance if required, in which case it would be called upon to move round the eastern edge of the marshes; a reserve division was to be left about Lenharee to protect the right flank. The pth Cavalry Div. was to be generally S. of the Sommesous-Vitry-le-Francois railway and was to keep touch with the left of the IV. Army about Humbauville.
Early in the morning the Germans attacked all along the line, and E. of the marshes German heavy artillery of the XII. Corps of the III. Army came into action, to which the French replied with similar pieces. E. of the marshes the outlying villages of Morains and Aulnay, held by advanced units of the IX. Corps, were taken by the Germans, the capture of the villages striking at the junction of the French IX. and XI. Corps, while on the left the 42nd and Moroccan Divs. were hard put to it to stave off the weight of the attacks of the German X. Corps. Here the chateau of Mondement, a two-story mansion dating from the sixteenth century, was recognized by both sides as a feature of outstanding tactical importance. Head- quarters of the Moroccan Div. were shelled out of the building early in the day, but towards evening a combined attack of the 42nd and Moroccan Divs., with the 77th Regt. of the IX. Corps, restored the situation. Owing to this effect and thanks, too, to the assistance afforded by the X. Corps of the V. Army against Gen. von Billow's exposed right, no ground was lost. So that, after a day of severe fighting, the Germans had made no impression on the French IX. Army, other than to deny it the possibility of making progress to the N. and W.
Before dawn on Sept. 8 from Mondement Hill the French observed enemy troops advancing to the attack. These, belong- ing to the X. and Guard Corps, were repulsed, and a counter- attack which gained a considerable amount of ground was made by the 42nd and Moroccan Divs., aided again by the 77th Regt. of the IX. Corps. Owing, however, to the unfavourable situa- tion developing on the right of the IX. Army it was impossible to exploit this advantage, and a withdrawal was ordered. For, although immediately to the right of this action the IX. Corps still held the line of the southern edge of the St. Gond marshes, beyond that a somewhat serious situation for the French devel- oped during the day. Attacked by the left wing of the Guard Corps of the German II. Army, and by two corps of the III. Saxon Army, the French XI. Corps was driven back as far as the line Cannantre-Corroy-Gourgancon, a circumstance which involved the transfer of Gen. Foch's headquarters from Pleure right back to Plancy on the Aube. Behind the stream La Maurienne, which runs across the greater portion of the front it had now taken up, the XI. Corps re-formed, and, aided by a counter-attack made by one of the reserve divisions with the IX. Army, it was enabled to advance and regain some high ground N. of Oeuvy. The situation had, however, been dis- tinctly disquieting, and to a chief possessed of less imperturba- bility than Gen. Foch it might have seemed the prelude of disaster. On the extreme right the gth Cavalry Div. about Mailly had maintained its close connexion with the IV. Army, and had supported an attack made by it near Sompuis.
In spite of the setback to his right during the 8th Gen. Foch was able to review the situation without alarm. The news which came in during the evening as to the progress of the battle E. and W. of him was reassuring. He learnt that the VI. Army, in spite of violent German counter-attacks, was holding its own upon the Ourcq, that the V. Army was making steady progress N.W. of the marshes of St. Gond, and that on his right the III. and IV. Armies were gaining ground towards Vitry-le-Francois and Chalons. His orders, issued shortly before midnight, pre- scribed generally the offensive for the coming day. The X. Corps, from the V. Army, was now definitely under his orders, and this access of strength prompted him to withdraw the 42nd Div. as a general reserve.
Once more was Mondement the scene of bitter fighting. It was seized at daybreak by a sudden German attack, and some hours later Mont Aout also fell. Nevertheless, in spite of the disquieting events upon his left, Gen. Foch shortly after 10 A.M. directed the 42nd Div., which had now arrived on the line Linthes-Pleurs, to move farther to the right, where it was to take the offensive with the XI. Corps. The apparent audacity displayed in withdrawing the general reserve of his army from his shaken left to join in an attack from his right flank called forth paeans of praise from critics of the battle. Gen. Foch, however, realized that the danger to his left was more apparent than real. The V. Army, beyond that flank, had reached the line Marchais- en-Brie-Montmirail-right bank of the Petit Morin on the even- ing of the 8th, and with the great gap which now existed between the right of the German II. Army and Gen. von Kluck any movement of the former S. of Mondement was exceedingly unlikely. As a matter of fact Gen. von Billow's increasing uneasiness as to the state of affairs had reached fever heat over reports as to the forcing of the line of the Marne by British troops during the pth. He came to the conclusion that retreat was inevitable for Gen. von Kluck, and that, in these circum- stances, his own II. Army must fall back at once if it were to avoid envelopment on its right flank. With the object of gaining time to get his long trains safely back over the Marne, the offen- sive by his left and centre was carried out with vigour during the morning, the French right being driven back to Salon; but early in the afternoon the German II. Army and the right of the III. Army were in full retreat, strong rearguards being left facing the French. Gen. von Billow transferred his headquarters from Montmort to Epernay; and by evening, from Betz to beyond Fere Champenoise, the defeated German right and centre were falling back before the victorious Allies.
