Res. and XXXVIII. Res. Corps) 'should be the enveloping force, the right of its attack-mass of 6 divs. being directed on Kussen and the left " making a wide turning movement on or N. of the river Memel " with Wilkowiszki as its objective. Below's right (XL. Res. Corps and reenforced 2nd Div.) was to attack from Kurwien and Rudczanny, with Kolno and Johannisburg as the first objectives. The intermediate forces (VIII. Army left, X. Army right, viz. the 3rd Res. Div. aad the four Landwehr formations) were to bind their opponents by frontal activity. Below's attack was to begin on Feb. 7, Eichhorn's on the next day. Ludendorff himself has admitted that he " found it difficult to start the troops." Snowstorms blew from the E., deep snow and ice covered the ground and obliterated landmarks. Wheeled transport could scarcely move, yet the snow was often not firm enough for sledges. Shelter was rarely found in the advance, since the Russians burnt all villages and farms as they retired. In the later stages, thaw and rain converted the ice-hard ground into mud; the marshes which bordered the streams, great and small, became impassable for guns and transport.
The offensive of the right wing on Feb. 7, beginning in Johannisburg Heath, was delayed at first rather by the ground than by the enemy, but it encountered solid opposition on the line of the Pissek, and especially in front of Johannisburg itself, attacked f rontally by the reenforced 2nd Div. But in the night of Feb. 7-8, the left division (8oth Res.) of the XL. Res. Corps forced a passage at Wrobeln, and next morning the right (79th Res.) div. did so at Gehsen. Both almost immediately drew up to the N.E. with the object of clearing the passage for the 2nd Div. by threatening the Johannisburg defence in rear, the 7qth Res. Div. meeting a Russian threat on its outer flank by putting out a temporary flank guard towards Kolno. Thus, from the outset, tactical incidents gave the offensive a north-eastward direction on Bialla and left Kolno out of its sweep. On the night of Feb. 8-9, after the stubborn defenders of Johannisburg had been enveloped and overcome, the attack reached Bialla and pushed out its 3rd Cav. Bde. northward to Drygallen. On Feb. 9 another difficult march brought the three divisions up to Drygallen (2nd Div.), Bialla (Soth Res.), S. of Rollken (ygth Res.). Next day began a series of fierce combats about Lyck, which, like those before Lotzen and Arys in the Sept. battle, imposed a fatal delay upon the attempt to envelop the Russian left. In this case, as has been noted above, such an attempt really formed no part of Ludendorff's scheme, which intended a break-through eastward for the furtherance of an ulterior object, and the orders had indicated the role of Below as " attack " (angreifen) in contradistinction to that given to Eichhorn, "envelopment" (umfassen). But in default of any expression in the directive of the intention of driving on to Osowiec, tactical instinct and training led the commanders, once they had found a flank, to wrap themselves round it.
On the northern flank, Eichhorn ignored the suggestion of a wide turning movement N. of the Niemen (Memel river), possibly because he distrusted the Russian roads, and massed his six attack divisions in front of the Schoreller Forest. In the days before the battle the Russian general seemed to have suspected the impending blow, for the cavalry screen of the Germans was several times tested by local attacks. But at the last moment the attention of the defence was drawn off by Below's attack; and when, on the morning of Feb. 8, the German XXL, XXXIX. and XXXVIII. Corps passed through the out- posts, they met at first with little resistance. The Schoreller Forest was cleared on the first day. On Feb. 9 the Russian defensive and the state of the ground compelled the attack in general to slow up. But one bde. of the German XXI. Corps broke through, and pushed on in one long march of 29 hours to Wladis- lawow, which was carried by assault in the night of Feb. 9-10. Thereupon, finding even its defensive echelon turned, the Russian right wing fell back rapidly.
Sievers, in fact, followed the same general policy as Rennen- kampf had done. His object in holding a forward line in East Prussia (moral and political considerations apart) was, firstly, to be in position to cooperate in the much larger offensive of the
XII. Army contemplated on the southern front, and, secondly, to keep the Germans away from Kovno and Grodno. When, therefore, Hindenburg seized the initiative a month before the Russian XII. Army could be ready, Sievers began to take down his line from right to left as soon as his opponent's purpose became clear. This was on Feb. 9. Next day even the troops facing the Arys-Lotzen-Angerapp front began to withdraw, pivoting on the stubborn resistance of the III. Siberian Corps at Lyck.
Both retreat and advance were carried out with high speed, in spite of the ground and the weather. The six divisions of the German X. Army, soon joined on their right by the Konigsberg Landwehr Div., pressed on, ahead of supplies and liaison. On the night of Feb. 10-1 the XXXIX. Res. Corps surprised and overran a Russian div. in Eydtkuhneh and Wirballen; the XXI. Corps reached Wilkowiszki, and the XXXVIII. Res. Corps Stalluponen and Deeden. Eichhorn's army was already at right angles to Below's, and its right division (Konigsberg Landwehr) was crowded out as early as Feb. 1 1 by the eastward advance of the VIII. Army's left. On the outer flank of the XXI. Corps, as it swung S. and intercepted the roads and railways leading to Kovno, protection against interference from that direction was provided, first by the ist Cav. Div. and its attached infantry (Sth Guard Inf. Bde.), and then by this Landwehr division sent across the rear of the line on Feb. 12-3. On the night of Feb. 12, the general line of the German X. Army and of the wheeling portion of the VIII. was: XXI. Corps, Ludwinow and Kalwarja; XXXIX. Res. Corps, Lubowo; XXXVIII. Res. Corps, Wizajny-Szittkehmen-Rominten Heath; loth Landwehr Div. in Rominten Heath (facing E.) and at Plautzkehmen; 3rd Res. Div., S.E. of Goldap; ist Landwehr Div., Altenbude. Half of the last-named div. was withdrawn from the ever-contracting line in readiness for service S. of Lake Spirding. Fighting on this day was especially sharp about Rominten Heath and Lake Wystiniec, where, at the angle of the line, the Russian forces had to gain time for the withdrawal of their congested trains.
Meanwhile, at the pivot of this rapid wheel-back, the III. Siberian Corps was still holding positions on both sides of Lyck against the 45 divs. of Below's right and centre. On Feb. 10 the German reenforced 2nd Div. and advanced guard of the 8oth Res. Div. came up against an advanced position of the defence on the line of the villages of Karbowsken, Baitkowen and Miechowen. It was known to the XL. Res. Corps staff that Lyck would be stiffly defended, and the 79th Res. Div. had continued north-northeastward from Rollken in order to reach the left flank of the probable line of defence; and, to strengthen the effect of this movement, the remainder of the Soth Res. Div. was switched southward onto the same route as the 79th Res. On Feb. n all attacks by the 2nd Div., 5th Inf. Bde. and advanced guard Soth Res. Div. on the advanced position of Baitkowen failed, and the right column (reenforced 7gth Res. Div.) only reached Prostken on the Lyck-Grajevo road, while on the other flank the nth Landwehr Div. (forming, with the ist and icth Landwehr and the 3rd Res., a group under I. Corps headquarters) was brought to a standstill in front of the Russian positions along the northern half of a line of lakes which leaves the main Masurian Lake system at Widminnen and joins the Osowiec marshes at Rajgrod. On Feb. 12 a Russian counter- attack on the left of the German 2nd Div. at Thalussen wa only checked by diverting to that field part of the nth Landweh Div., which was seeking to force the lake defiles farther N. at Woszellen. But, fearing attack from Prostken, the Russians that night drew back to the line Bartossen-Neuendorf nearer to Lyck, still holding Woszellen with their right.
Feb. 13 was the critical day. The Germans pressed sharply against the new front before Lyck and forced the defile of Woszellen, while their S. column carried out a wide-ranging manoeuvre from Prostken. The remainder of the Soth Res. Div. was swung up N. astride the river Lyck, came into line with its advance guard (which, as noted above, had been en- eaged in the frontal battle of Feb. 10-2), and, passing on beyond the flank of the defenders of Neuendorf, developed a threat on the rear of Lyck itself. Meanwhile the 7pth Res. Div., with the
