 | An image should appear at this position in the text. A high-res raw scan of the page is available. To use it as-is, as a placeholder, edit this page and replace "{{missing image}}" with "{{raw image|EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/934}}". If it needs to be edited first (e.g. cropped or rotated), you can do so by clicking on the image and following the guidance provided. [Show image]  | |
Permanent works a Buossoia h Creveaux
b la Salemagn* j El Basse C Berailllea k Hautmont
d dea Santa I Le Bourdiau
e Heronfontoinem Ferriere-le- PM f Leveau n Cerfontaine
g Feignies o Rocq
(Mobilization works D
and Belgium had robbed the place of its former significance as a road centre and river crossing, but on the other hand it was the junction of several lines of railway, and the control of these by fortifications was justified, if not absolutely essential. By 1914 however, conditions had altered considerably. Progress in siege artillery equipment had made Sere de Rivieres' designs obsolete, and French mobilization plans had been so far per- fected that it was thought possible to initiate operations by an offensive from the eastern front towards the Saar. In these circumstances the French General Staff was confronted with the choice between spending large sums of money on modern- izing Maubeuge, or else treating it as a place of subordinate importance; and thus the door was opened for differences of opinion which resulted in the place being neither modernized nor demilitarized. The question of reconstruction was put aside as of " no immediate interest until work on the eastern fortresses has been completed." In 1910, the governor was officially informed that he was not expected to hold out more than a few days if attacked, and that "the hypothesis of an isolated defence against regular siege need not be considered." On the verge of hostilities Joffre told General Fournier, the recently appointed governor, that he would probably employ him and his 30,000 war garrison to besiege Metz.
The ring of forts and internal works had an average diameter of about 4 miles. In the main, the fortifications were high-
command works of earth and masonry, but some of the newer works had concrete shelters, two of the eastern forts (Cerfontaine and Boussois) possessed each'an old type cupola, and Forts Haut- mont and Le Bourvian on the slope south of the town and Fort des Sarts north of it were modernized about 1910. In the first days of mobilization the intervals were converted as usual with artillery positions into infantry redoubts, trenches and wire in front of them, and in some cases the forts themselves were treated as the nuclei of groups of field works.
But already in the mobilization period local difficulties, un- certainties as to the real role of the place, lastly, reports of the Germans passing to the left of the Meuse at Huy, had brought about a crisis. The Minister of War, M. Messimy, alarmed by the governor's reports, published a decree dismissing him from his post and, moreover (according to General Pau's evidence before the subsequent court-martial), sent Pau to Maubeuge with instructions to have him shot. Pau, however, was satis- fied with what he saw and the decree was cancelled. Thus the defence was morally disorganized from the start, and the collapse of Liege and Namur, both fortresses of concrete and armour, before the 42-011. and 30-5-011. howitzers of the enemy, made it evident that resistance could not be maintained for long even before a German patrol had appeared. Finally, the retreat of the French V. Army on the right of the place and of the British forces on the left of it, left Maubeuge exposed to the
