"the intervention of Rumania," to whom an Entente loan had been 'guaranteed three months before; nor was it the ineffectiveness of Italy's attacks across the Isonzo. It was the military defeat of Russia in Galicia and Poland, and Great Britain's failure in the Dardanelles, that provoked the next accession of strength to the enemies' cause.
Bulgaria's Entry. Bulgarian neutrality had always been precarious, and the Government itself had difficulty in restraining 'its irregulars and komitajis from raiding the Serbian frontier. A serious affray of this sort occurred on April i at Valandova while King Ferdinand was still waiting upon events, but by July the Russian debacle in Galicia and the British failure to .make much advance in the Dardanelles convinced him that 'Germany would win, and on the i;th a treaty was concluded which offered Bulgaria, in return for her intervention, the whole 'of Serbian Macedonia and Albanian Epirus; she was also allowed to extort from Turkey a strip of territory along the Maritsa 'controlling that river and Adrianople. Belated efforts had been made to buy off this new enemy, but it was not until Aug. 23 .that the Serbian Skuptshina was brought to recognize " the -sacrifices indispensable for the preservation of the vital interests x>f her people." They would have preferred more heroic measures, 'and in vain begged the Entente to authorize a Serbian attack on Bulgaria before the latter got her blow in first. The normal correctitude of the Entente was reinforced by the fact that Serbian aggression would release Greece from her treaty obli- gations to assist Serbia if attacked by Bulgaria. It did not ioresee the autocratic dismissal of Venizelos by Constantine on
- 0ct. 6, the acquiesence of the Greek parliamentary majority,
and Constantino's repudiation of his treaty obligations when Bulgaria took the offensive. It was carefully synchronized with Mackensen's invasion from the N. ; and, taken on two fronts, Serbia was in a desperate position. The British and French f troops hastily transferred from Gallipoli to Salonika were too late even to assure the Serbs a retreat down the Vardar; and they had to make their perilous way across the trackless and snow- clad mountains of Albania to the inhospitable shores of the Adriatic. The outposts followed the centre of the Entente posi- tion in the Balkans; Montenegro was overrun by Austria; and the British evacuated Gallipoli, keeping Salonika as a thorn in the enemy's side and a bridle on Greek vagaries.
Christmas, 1915, marked the climax of German success in the war. She had easily held her western front with inferior forces against wasteful and premature Allied attacks, while she conquered Galicia and Poland, and with Bulgarian help overran Serbia and made a corridor to Turkey and the East. Von der Goltz was already in Mesopotamia organizing the Turkish
- forces which saved Bagdad from Townshend in Nov. 1915 and
then captured his army in Kut in the following April; while Egypt had to withstand Arab attacks on the W. and Turkish attempts in the Suez Canal. But it needed a longer and stronger arm than even Germany possessed to strike with much effect across the torpid body of the Turkish Empire and the sands of Syrian and Arab deserts. Russia more than atoned for the British failure before Bagdad by the rapid and brilliant seizure 'of Erzerum in Feb. 19-16, and then pushed on S. to Mush, Bitlis, and Van, and W. to Trebizond. On June 7 the Grand Sherif of Mecca threw off his allegiance to Turkey, occupied Jidda 'and Yambo', laid siege to Medina, cut the Hejaz railway and "was joined by tribes farther S. who captured Aunfuda; on Dec. 16 he was recognized as King of the Hejaz by Great Britain. 'Between March and Sept. Smuts conquered nine-tenths of German E. Africa, while Portugal threw in her lot with Great Britain to assist in the campaign; and, although the week after the fall of Kut did not seem a happy moment for the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 9 1916, its arrangements ior British, French, and neutral zones in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were intelligent anticipations of the future. Ger- many's oriental visions were unsubstantial, and her Balkan allies would not be much help toward a decision on the western 'front. She had merely secured immunity for her eastern fron- ' tiers and relief from^fear lest Austria should collapse, while she
turned her forces once more to the W. for a blow at the heart of France before the first serious Allied offensive matured. The Marne had taught her the risks of the far-flung line, and she now selected the shortest route to a vital spot at Verdun.
Rumania's Entry. France saved herself in the titanic con- flict which followed; but Germany, too, was hardly less success- ful in her resistance to the Franco-British attack on the Somme, while with her left hand, so to speak, she bolstered up Austria's stand against the unexpected and vigorous assaults which Brusilov launched in July, and then crushed Rumania when on Aug. 27 the fifth Balkan state ventured into the turmoil of war. Rumania, long shivering on the brink, chose an unfortu- nate moment to plunge. Her case was a replica of Italy's; there was a Romania iridenta (as the Rumanians spell it) across the Carpathians, subject to worse treatment from Magyars than unredeemed Italy suffered at Austria's hands. There were also strategic frontiers to be rectified, and a semi-circular state to be rounded off. By the secret treaty with Rumania which was signed by Italy, France, Great Britain, and Russia, Rumania was to receive the Banat, the whole of Transylvania, a large slice of Hungary up to a line from Szeged on the Theiss through Debreczen to half-way between Csap and Szatmar-Negeti, as well as the Bukovina up to the Pruth, " the most ethnically unjust of all the secret agreements made during the war," 1 which only the subsequent and separate peace of Bucharest in May 1918 released the Allies from their obligations to enforce. Nothing was naturally said about the Rumanes under Russian rule in Bessarabia or Bulgarians under Rumanian sway in the Dobruja. The treaty had been drafted on Aug. 8, but Stuermer objected that the Great Powers must not be bound to continue the war until all Rumania's territorial aims had been achieved, and Briand agreed to waive the point. Bratiano, however, threat- ened to resign, and on Aug. 12 the Tsar apparently yielded. The Allies were to advance from Salonika on the 2oth and Ruma- nia to declare war on the 27th.
Sarrail's plans had, however, been betrayed by two of his officers, and }t was not until Sept. 7 that he could move. Rumania kept to her bond, and attacked Transylvania on Aug. 28. Her subsequent disasters were attributed to her neglect of Entente counsels and wishes in attacking Transylvania instead of Bul- garia; but the criticism was unjust. There was apparently no stipulation about the direction of Rumania's action, and she had hopes that Bulgaria might not intervene. Justification for ag- gressive war must always be found in a political and not a strate- gical motive. Rumania had a legitimate grievance against Austria-Hungary in the treatment of Romania iridenta; she had none against Bulgaria whom she had robbed in 1913. Even on strategical grounds her conduct might be defended; her ruin was wrought, not by Bulgaria, but by Falkenhayn's Austro- German attack through the passes, and their progress would have been even more rapid had Rumania launched her armies against Bulgaria. She might have withstood Falkenhayn, had Russia done her duty and sent adequate forces into the Dobruja to oppose Mackensen and carry out the threats she had uttered against Bulgaria in 1915, while Rumanian neutrality barred their execution. The Entente Powers had, in fact, simply looked to Rumania to pull their chestnuts out of the Balkan fire; they had no idea that the battle of the Somme had left Germany in a condition to make an effort elsewhere like Falkenhayn's; while the creeping paralysis which had overcome Russia suggested the tale of a secret understanding between her ambiguous Premier Stuermer and the Habsburgs to partition Rumania, Wallachia to go to the Habsburgs and Moldavia to Russia. Before the end of the year Bucharest had been captured and the Rumanian armies driven behind the Sereth, while Sarrail's offensive in the S.W. barely reached Monastir. From the Aegean to the Carpa- thians, and from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, the Balkans had become a solid Teutonic block.
Peace Moves, igi6-f. The moment appeared favourable for Germany to make overtures of peace. The Kaiser had discussed the idea in a letter to his Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, at the
1 History of the Peace Conference, i. 184.
