These operations, undertaken on the i sth and i6th, had hardly begun before it became evident that their continuance on the original lines was no longer warranted by the situation. The resistance met by the IV. Corps on the line Houthem-Ghelu- velt-St. Julien-Westroosebeke convinced French that it was indispensable first to clear the hostile forces from the area N. of his left flank. Foch, however, on being asked to assist in this, could promise no more troops before the 22nd at the earliest, as his forces were still assembling. Accordingly, the IV. Corps was ordered to push on along to Menin on the iSth, the 3rd Cav. Div. screening its left, in conjunction with de Mitry's French Cav. Corps, which had come into line on the previous day W. of Houthulst forest. This task Rawlinson felt himself unable to carry out owing to the advance of strong hostile columns, consisting of the XXVI. and XXVII. Reserve Corps, against his left S. of Roulers, and by the evening of the ipth he had fallen back to the line Kruxiseik-Zonnebeke.
On the same day the concentration of the I. British Corps in the N. was completed in the area Poperinghe-St. Omer. French had now given up his ideas as to the possibilities of an Allied offensive and, realizing he was face to face with strong hostile forces which were being rapidly reinforced, began to fear for the weakness of his long and thinly held line, reserves for which were lacking. Although the II. and III. Corps were fight- ing against powerful positions and had been heavily taxed, French considered that the danger was greatest in the N., where the IV. Corps was holding altogether too extended a front, and that a break through there, while less fatal in its results than a similar disaster in the S., was inevitable unless reinforce- ments were sent at once. Accordingly the I. Corps was sent N. with orders to advance on Thourout with the object of capturing Bruges'if possible, before the enemy reinforcements, now believed to be in movement across Belgium, could be brought into line. French, however, was not too confident that this would prove feasible, and his instructions to Haig therefore envisaged not only the further prosecution of an eventual success toward Ghent, but also the possibility of the I. Corps having to go to the help of the IV., if the latter were heavily attacked.
Meanwhile the II. and III. Corps and the cavalry were ordered to confine themselves to the defensive, in view of the hos- tile superiority in their front.
The I. Corps only came into line to the S. of the IV. Corps on the 2ist and by that date the advance of this latter toward Menin had, as we have related, come to an end; the 3rd Cav. Div. and de Mitry's horsemen to the N. had also been forced back, while the British Cav. Corps had retired to the Messines- Wytschaete line. To the S. Conneau's French cavalry were in line between the British II. and III. Corps.
It was only on Oct. 21 that the full extent of the menace to the British front burst on French, to use his own words, " like a veritable bolt from the blue." He at once realized that, in face of this overwhelming hostile superiority, all hope of a suc- cessful British offensive must be given up and indeed that he might have serious difficulty in maintaining his present posi- |i tions. The British situation was certainly no easy one, for at I the moment all available troops were in line, and the only re- I serves and reinforcements that seemed likely to be available for some weeks consisted of the Indian Corps, one division of I which had just detrained W. of Hazebrouck, two Territorial I battalions, and one cavalry and two yeomanry regiments.
Fortunately, French reserves were being hurried up from the
S. The first of them, the IX. Corps, began to detrain in the
I Ypres area on the 23rd. During these three days from the 2ist
I to the 23rd, when the British army was left to itself to withstand
I the shock of the enemy, it succeeded in holding its own without
It great difficulty. By the evening of the 2.ist the I. Corps had
' even commenced an advance, but the withdrawal of the French
I cavalry and Territorials on its left, which had been forced back
I by the advance-guard of the XXIII. Reserve Corps, com- | pelled Haig to halt on the line Bixschoote-Langemarck-
II Zonnebeke. Here he held his ground against repeated attacks that night and all next day despite the wideness of his front;
and, though the positions of the ist Div. were broken into N.W. of Langemarck late on the 22nd, counter-attacks held up the German advance and finally on the 23rd recovered practically all the lost ground. Meanwhile the rest of the ist Div. line held its positions against the attacks of the XXIII. Reserve Corps until the evening of the 23rd, when the 2nd Div. was relieved by the newly arrived troops of the French IX. Corps; 24 hours later the ist Div.'s place was taken by French territorials.
The 7th Div. on the front Zandvoorde-Zonnebeke had also had heavy fighting to do from the 2oth onward. The German
XXVI. and XXVII. Corps, despite some success against the French on Rawlinson's left, which compelled him to retire that flank somewhat, were unable to make any impression on his front until the 24th, when units of the XXVII. Reserve Corps forced their way into Polygon wood and had to be ejected by the reserves of the 7th, assisted by units of the 2nd Division.
By this time the French Command considered that the time had come to undertake a general offensive. The French IX. Corps had just come into line and the XVI. Corps was. on its way northwards. The British 2nd Div. was also available and was ordered to cooperate, as were also de Mitry's cavalry from Bixschoote and the French 42nd Div. along the coast from Nieuport. As a matter of fact the moment chosen was favour- able from factors which the Allied leaders could not be aware of. The Germans were suffering from a local shortage of munitions; their new troops had suffered heavily, thanks to their enthu- siasm untempered by training and experience and had every- where been brought to a halt before the Allied lines. But the odds against the attack proved too great. The French IX. Corps and the 2nd Div. to its right made little progress on the 24th, despite their valiant efforts, and the offensive gradually petered out, not without taking heavy toll of the Germans, on the line N. and E. of Langcmarck-W. of Poelkapelle, Pas- schcndaele, and Moorslede. The 7th Div. on its front had only been able to hold its ground, and, in view of its weakness after three weeks of incessant marching and fighting, was on the 2;th put under the I. Corps, together with the 3rd Cav. Div. ; at the same time Haig's two other divisions were again put into line. The right of the 7th was now at Zandvoorde, that of the ist on the Menin road, that of the 2nd just in Polygon wood.
To the S. of the I. Corps the 2nd Cav. Div. on the 2oth held the front from Hollcbeke to Messines; the ist Cav. Div. extend- ing thence to St. Yves; the 3rd Cav. Div. came into line later on the left of the 2nd and three Indian battalions were moved to Wulverghem in support. This part of the front, despite re- peated attacks by the German XIX. Corps, remained intact till the 3oth. On the right of the cavalry the II. and III. Corps also succeeded in maintaining their general line.
By the evening of the 2;th the German IV. Army had been brought to a standstill on the whole front. " The XXVI. and
XXVII. Reserve Corps were by this time " .(Oct. 24), says the German official account, " completely held up in front of strongly entrenched positions on line Langemarck-Zonnebeke- Ghcluvelt. . . . For the time being any further thought of a break-through was out of the question," and the decision which appeared at the moment to be " imminent " on the Belgian front near the coast had not yet been achieved. To assist the efforts of their comrades in this sector, and to cover the bringing up of further reinforcements to drive home the attack against the British line, the XXIII., XXVI. and XXVII. Reserve Corps were urged on to deliver holding attacks on their front. Despite their courage and persistence, the Germans, however, not only failed to make headway but were compelled in places to give back before the Allied counter blows; their_only gain was registered at Kruiseik, which was wrested from the 7th Div. on the 28th after to and fro fighting. To the S. also the enemy pressed heavily against the front held by the British II. and III. Corps, assisted from the 23rd onward by a brigade of the Lahore Div. which relieved Conneau's Cav. Here the XIX. and VII. Corps made some headway and by the 2gth had pressed the British front back to the line Givenchy-W. of Neuve Chapelle-S.E. of Armentieres-Messines, where the Cavalry
