was, however, postponed to allow the French and the Lahore Div. one more attempt upon the Pilckem ridge but this also achieved nothing substantial and was followed by renewed Ger- man attacks and desperate fighting. On May i an attempt upon Hill 60 in which gas was effectively used was only just beaten off by the gallantry and steadiness of the ist Dorsets. Next day a violent attack was launched against the northern face of the salient from St. Julien to the canal, bearing hardest upon the I2th Bde., who suffered terribly from the gas. Prompt counter- attacks by the local reserves, including dismounted troopers of the 3rd Cav. Bde., restored the situation and drove thfe Germans back with heavy losses while elsewhere the line was successfully maintained. The actual withdrawal, begun on the night of May 2-3 and completed on May 4, was covered by a stubborn defence of the left of 28th Div.'s line N. of Broodseinde by the 2nd Buffs and the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, thanks to which the final stages of the retirement were unmolested by the Germans, who did not indeed discover what was happening until too late to interfere. Their one substantial success was the recovery of Hill 60, recaptured on May 5 by a renewed gas attack.
The evacuation of the advanced position of the V. Corps may be taken as ending the first stage of the battle. Fighting con- tinued, however, for another three weeks during which the Ger- mans delivered three major attacks, on May 8, May 13 and May 24. The first of these broke through the 28th Div. near . Frezenberg and resulted despite several counter-attacks in the loss of most of that division's front line, though on its left the 4th Div., which had replaced the Canadians, maintained its position. Between May 8 and May 13 there was particularly bitter fighting round Hooge where the 27th Div. was posted astride the Menin road. After repeated attacks the Germans contrived to make a few lodgments in the line, but their advances in mass formation had given good targets and they lost heavily, more than one local counter-attack meeting with success. South of the road against the 8ist Bde. they gained nothing sub- stantial, though N. of it the front trenches had to be evacuated in favour of a line just W. of the Bellewarde wood. The attack of May 13 extended from Hooge to the left of the British line. The exhausted infantry of the 28th Div. had now been relieved by the ist and 2nd Cav. Divs. acting as infantry on whom fell the brunt of the exceedingly heavy bombardment. This was followed up by infantry attacks which had little difficulty in occupying positions which had been almost obliterated. Counter- attacks by the yth and 8th Cav. Bdes. (ist and 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, loth Hussars and Essex and Leicester Yeomanry) reached the front line only to be forced back again by the violence of the bombardment, and the day resulted in the establishment of a new line some distance in rear of the original position, while the hamlet of Valorenhoek passed into German keeping and the left of the troops in the Bellewarde position had to be flung back to connect up with the cavalry's new line. On the other flank, however, in front of Wieltje the 4th Div. held firm and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, retaking such portions of the line as the Germans had temporarily captured.
After May 13 ten days of intermittent heavy shelling and occasional sharp local fighting followed, during which the French recovered Streenstraate and thrust the Germans back across the canal. But the Germans had not finished. Early on May 24 a tremendous bombardment opened upon the whole front from the Menin road, northward. Gas was discharged in great quantities and at certain places, notably Hooge, " Shell Trap Farm " and the Bellewarde ridge, the defenders were com- pletely overcome by the fumes. The Germans therefore had only to advance against positions practically denuded of defend- ers. Counter-attacks were launched, but without much success beyond preventing the Germans from penetrating deeper than the front line, while just S. of Hooge the determined resistance of the ist Cav. Div. checked the extension of the German success. During the night of May 24-25 some units of the 27th and z8th Divs., hastily recalled from rest camps where they were seeking to assimilate the large drafts with which they had just been replenished, were put in to try another counter-attack. This,
however, failed to recover Hooge or the Bellewarde ridge, and similarly, though the 4th Div. maintained most of its front, its centre had to be retired to a new line through Wieltje.
This fighting, however, marked the last serious German effort on this front. With all the advantages of surprise derived from their use of gas, they had not succeeded in taking Ypres and if they had made substantial gains of ground and had inflicted heavy casualties on the defenders their own losses whenever they had ventured on an infantry advance had been heavy. When viewed as a whole the defence of the Ypres salient during April and May 1915 stands out as a splendid achievement. Many battalions were in the front trenches for three weeks and more on end, without any relief, constantly shelled, subjected to repeated attacks, at a fearful disadvantage in having to face gas-attacks with only the most inadequate and improvised protection. Ground was lost, but the main position was held and the II. Army's tenacious resistance supplies a good example of " economy of forces." When the German attack on Ypres was launched the Allied offensive further S. was about to be resumed. The II. Army was asked to maintain its ground without depending upon the men and munitions needed elsewhere. Only one division of the I. Army was employed in the defence of Ypres and it was not because of any diversion of resources to the Ypres area that the British offensive of May 1915 proved a bitter disappointment.
(C. T. A.)
HI. BATTLES OF 1917
Continuous fighting of a violent character took place in the Ypres- Yser region during many weeks in the summer and au- tumn of 1917, but the operations as a whole may be said to have consisted of two distinct phases. The undertaking started with the brilliantly successful combat lasting only a few hours which has come to be known as the Battle of Messines. There followed a period of comparative lull, although progress was made at some points and although counter-attacks had to be beaten off. Then there were launched immediately to the N. of the scene of the Messines combat a series of attacks at short intervals which gained ground as successive waves do on a rising tide and which lasted for more than four months.
The object in view throughout was the occupation of the whole of the belt of high ground which extends from a point about three miles directly N. of Armentieres to near Dixmude, beyond the forest of Houthulst. Its general direction is at first north-eastward to about Gheluvelt, then it turns north- ward to near Staden, and from that point it veers back west- ward toward the Yser, N. of the above-named forest. A con- tinuation of somewhat more conspicuous high ground lying N. of Hazebrouck and Bailleul, this belt represents the watershed between the basins of the Lys and of the Yser. It rises generally some 100 to 150 ft. above the great Flanders plain, and it reaches a height of over 200 feet at a few points. Its southern portion in the spring of 1917 inclosed to a great extent the Ypres salient and had been the scene of many desperate encounters during the Ypres- Yser battles of 1914 and 1915; here the Allies' trenches gave them possession of some of the lower slopes on their side of the high ground, although all the upper portion was in German hands. Further to the N. the enemy held the whole of the high ground as well as stretches of plain to the W. of it, as from opposite Gheluvelt the direction of the Allies' front ran north- westward, i.e. diverging from the line of heights. The general plan of operations was to begin at the southern end, where the belt of high ground was almost contiguous with the British front, and to work from thence northward. This procedure was indeed almost dictated by the fact that the Ypres salient would have to be extended outward ere full use could be made in later under- takings of the important communications which diverge from Ypres itself toward Bruges and Ghent and Oudenarde. The capture of the line of high ground its total length was about 23 m.-^only represented the first part of the general strategical plan, which contemplated the initiating of subsequent operations in the coast district by another force.
