held mandates which had actually expired as long ago as June 1914, but whose renewal war and invasion had effectually pre- vented: those for Croatia had been elected in Jan. 1914, those for Montenegro were delegated by the revolutionary assembly of Podgorica in Nov. 1918. But in Bosnia and most of the other provinces the deputies had no popular mandate whatever, beyond being members of the self-constituted local committees which had sprung up amid the ferment of the revolution. Meanwhile the union of so many distinct political organisms had reduced the party system to chaos, and the first two years were taken up by a process of regrouping, the dominant issue being Cen- tralism versus Federalism. In accordance with the Declaration of Corfu, the decision regarding the actual form of the State was left to a constituent assembly: but as the machinery of Belgrade was naturally quite inadequate to the task of administering a country three times the size of the Serbia of 1914, the provincial Governments of Croatia (with the Ban at its head), Slovenia, Dalmatia and Bosnia continued to function, though the local diets were no longer summoned.
During 1919 internal politics centred in a struggle between the Radicals, who still possessed the best party machine and stood for a narrowly Serbian as opposed to a Yugoslav programme, and the newly constituted Democratic party, which absorbed most of the Serbian Opposition parties, the old Serbo-Croat coalition of Zagreb, and the Slovene Liberals. The Radicals of Serbia being conservative in all but name, made a working alliance with the clericals of Zagreb and Ljubljana, and under the leadership of Protic favoured decentralization, combined with concessions to the expropriated landowners. But in the land question the Radical party was paralyzed by its Bosnian wing, which sided with the peasantry: and thus in Sept. Protic was replaced by Davidovid, the Democrat leader, and though the Government remained a coalition, its weight was transferred far- ther to the Left. An internal trial of strength continued through- out the winter between the rival governmental groups, until in May 1920 a breach was only averted by a reconstruction of the Cabinet under Vesnid, who as Serbian minister in Paris since 1004 enjoyed wide prestige, and though a Radical, stood aloof from party dissensions. Under his weaker but more neutral guidance, and aided by the unifying force of the Adriatic crisis, the parties reached agreement upon a new parliamentary franchise, based on universal suffrage. Though otherwise progressive, this law committed the injustice of temporarily disfranchising the non- Yugoslav minorities, on the convenient pretext that they could not claim the vote until the expiry of the two years during which the Treaty of Trianon secures their right to choose citizen- ship in a neighbouring State. This law was the last serious act of the provisional Parliament, which had shown itself singularly barren in legislation, and contrasts most unfavourably with the first assemblies of all the other " Succession States."
The elections to the Constituent Assembly (Nov. 1920) did not clear up the situation as had been expected. No party secured an absolute majority, and the two strongest, the Radicals and Democrats, being almost exactly balanced, were forced to strengthen still further their unnatural alliance. In open opposi- tion stood (i) Stephen Radic, the Croat peasant leader whom the Democrats had unwisely imprisoned in 1919-20, and who now swept the boards in Croatia with a Republican and Federalist programme and induced his party of 50 to absent itself from the Constituent: (2) the Croat and Slovene clericals, who strongly opposed centralization, and (3) the 58 Communists, led by a small group of extreme theorists, but owing their strength to the subversive elements in the Backa, Macedonia and Monte- negro and the secret aid of the Carlists in Vienna and Budapest. As the coalition lacked the necessary majority, it was reduced to gathering support piecemeal among the more neutral groups: and for this task Pasic, who became Premier in Jan. 1921, was specially qualified. By the promise of 100 million dinars to the expropriated Begs, he won over the Moslems of Bosnia, and by similar methods he detached the Slovene section of the newly founded Agricultural party (Zemljoradnici). But though he was thus able to carry the first reading of the new constitution
by 227 to 93 votes, he was faced by the passive resistance of the great majority of Croats and Slovenes, who regarded with suspicion his " Great Serbian " and centralizing aims. It is significant that Protic, hitherto Pasic's most intimate associate, withdrew from the Radical party and from Parliament rather than sanction a constitution so inimical to provincial interests: while Trumbic, the foremost advocate of full national unity, recorded his vote against it. In many quarters it was openly accepted on the ground that any constitution was better than none, and that further delays and discussions would arrest the new State's development and discredit it abroad: but the settle- ment could not be regarded as definitive. On June 28 (Kosovo Day) the Prince Regent took oath to the new constitution, but the ceremony was marred by an attempt to assassinate him and the premier, by a bomb thrown as they drove back to the palace. This outrage, which was traced to the Communists, provided fresh proof that the Democratic leader Draskovic, as Minister of the Interior, was justified in his charges of widespread terrorist conspiracy and even in the much debated Decrees (Obznane) by which he sought to combat them. When then on July 21 Draskovic 1 was murdered by a young Bosnian Communist, Parliament resolved on reprisals, and 10 days later passed by 190 to 54 laws of extraordinary severity for " the Defence of the State," terrorist agitation being made punishable by death, prolonged penal servitude or heavy fines. The mandates of the 58 Communist deputies were annulled, and eight arrested as privy to the attempt on the Regent. No less an authority than the ex-premier Proti6 publicly challenged the constitutional validity of such action.
Despite acute party dissensions and bad administration the new State was in 1921 steadily consolidating itself. Separatism was non-existent, for the cogent reason that there was no point toward which a new irredenta could gravitate: the Habsburg cause had no adherents, save a few discredited traitors who congregated in Graz and Vienna: and communism, which was quite alien to an agrarian and peasant -owned State, owed its passing success to the aftermath of war and the blunders of the middle class rather than to its own attractions. There was general agreement on foreign policy, whose pivots were close alliance with Czechoslovakia, the series of bilateral agreements which made up the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia and Yugo- slavia Aug. 14 1920: Czechoslovakia and Rumania April 23 1921: Yugoslavia and Rumania June 7 1921), and the anti-Habsburg agreement concluded with Italy simultaneously with the Treaty of Rapallo (Nov. 12 1920). Yugoslavia's economic recovery had been surprisingly rapid, and the chief problems which confronted her in the autumn of 1921 were how best to exploit her vast undeveloped mineral and agricultural resources, improve her very faulty communications, and root out the illiteracy which was a legacy of alien rule.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. V. Klai6, Povjest Hrvata (5 vols., 1901-11); F. Sisic, Geschichte der Kroaten (to 1,102, 1917) and Hrvatska Povijest (3 vols., 1911-4); R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question (1911; much enlarged German ed., 1913); V. Zagorsky, Francois Racki et la renaissance de la Croatie (1909) ; T. G. Masaryk, Vasi6 Forgdch-Aehrenthal (1911) ; A. H. E. Taylor, The Future of the South- ern Slavs (1916); M. Kossitch, Die Siidslavenfrage (1918); L. V. Sudland, Die Siidslavische Frage und der Weltkrieg (1918, Austro- phil); J. Duhem, La question yougoslave (1918); V. Kuhne, Ceux dont on ignore le martyre (1917) and Les Bulgares peints par eux memes (1917) ; F. Barac, Croats and Slovenes Friends of the Entente (1919, contains important original documents) ; The Southern Slav Library (8 pamphlets published by the Yugoslav Committee 1915-8)- On Bosnia, see A. Fournier, Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen (1909); J. Cvijic, L'Annexion de Bosnie (1909); F. Schmidt, Bosnien-IIerze- govina (1914). On Banat, see Radonifi, Histoire des Serbes de Hon- grie (1919, with documents). On Dalmatia, see G. Prezzolini, La Dalmazia (1915); Lujo Vojnovic, Dalmatia (1920); Dalmaticus, La question de la Dalmatic (1918). On Adriatic questions, see C. Ma- ranelli and G. Salvemini, La Questione dell' Adnatice (2nd ed., 1919); Angelo Vivanti, L ' Irredentisme adriatique (1917, Italian original published 1912); F. Sisic, History of Fiume (1919); L. Hautecoeur, L'ltalie sous Orlando (1919); two collections of documents, viz. F. Sisic, Jadransko Pitanje (1920) and Adriaticus, La question adriatique (1920). On the new constitution, see published text and also S, Proti6, Nacrt Ustava (1920); J. Smodlaka, Nacrt Jugoslovenskog Ustava (1920). (R- W. S.-W.) .
