some light upon the obscurity of the future. Always we are left
groping our way through what is at the best semi-darkness, but
any ray of light is helpful. It is in this spirit and with full con-
sciousness of the difficulties and dangers which lie ahead that
the present writer attempts here the task of reviewing the prac-
tical developments of the decade 1910-20 and of presenting them
in a form which in 1921-2 might already be out of date.
I. TACTICS IN THE WORLD WAR
Tactics and Strategy. First it may be as well to inquire exactly what is meant by tactics, and whether the division between strategy and tactics is left as clear as it was before the World War introduced the new feature of continuous lines offering no flanks for attack, and ceaseless fighting which, from day to day and month to month, varied only in intensity.
Let us ask two questions: (a) Can grand or combined tactics still be defined as the sphere of the higher commander on the day of battle ? and (6) if so, can we accept the corollary that all the fighting on the western front from 1915 until 1918 was tac- tical and outside the sphere of strategy ? All days were battle days; but does this mean that the problems which the command- ers of the British, French and Italian armies in the field were called upon to solve were essentially tactical in their nature? The definition may require some modification, but to the second ques- tion the answer is distinctly " Yes." They were vast problems in- volving all sorts of considerations, but they were essentially tactical. Questions of strategy, so far as Britain was concerned, were dealt with in London, or in conference with her Allies in Paris, Rome or elsewhere. It was in these places and not in the field that great decisions were formed as to the despatch of troops to the various theatres of war, the formation of new forces, and the wisdom, or the reverse, of embarking upon fresh undertakings. Behind them all were the equally anxious problems of finance and allotment of man-power. In modern wars, Army, Navy (in which is included the Merchant Marine) and Munitions are only three departments of the nation; each puts forward its rival claims, which can only be judged by the Government in consultation with the technical advisers. And so it is that, as war absorbs into itself more and more of a nation's energies and resources, the Government with the prime minister at its head must accept responsibility for strategy in the highest possible sense of the word. In no sense, however, can the Government be held to be responsible for tactics, which are the exclusive sphere of the military commanders. The Government, in con- sultation with their technical advisers, allot troops; soldiers alone command them. Whether that command, in its turn, gives scope for strategy, as in Palestine, or only for grand tactics, as on the western front, depends upon the number of men available in proportion to the size of the theatre of war, upon the railway and road development of the theatre of operations, and upon many other considerations.
Strategy, now as always, is the art of bringing the enemy to battle on terms which are disadvantageous to him; grand tactics are the methods employed for his destruction by a force of all arms. Before the war, when aviation was still in its infancy, the term " all arms " included as a rule no more than infantry, artillery and cavalry. Even the engineers were rarely consid- ered as having any direct influence upon the result of a battle. All this is changed, and to the four arms there must now be added, without any doubt, aeroplanes and tanks, and it is a matter for the gravest consideration whether in future wars the chemist will not occupy as important a position as he now does in peace. Machine-guns are purposely excluded here, not be- cause their importance is underrated, but merely in the hope of avoiding unnecessary complication and because they may be included in the wide term of infantry, which also covers such accessories as bombs and rifle grenades.
The sphere of the higher commander in battle is therefore by so much enlarged in that he must know how to utilize and combine far more weapons than were at his disposal in earlier wars, and the demands made upon him are in the same degree heavier and more complex. And so through all the long chain
of command, from " the Chief " at G.H.Q. to the platoon com- mander in the foremost trench. It has been amply proved that, more than ever, no arm of the service is complete in itself; each requires in a greater or less degree the assistance of others in order to win even a small success. The smallest raid into a German trench needed hours, almost days, of careful prepa- ration: night patrols and aeroplane photographs for recon- naissance; artillery and trench mortars to destroy the enemy's wire; if the ground won is to be held engineers must help to make it good, and even if it is not to be held the engineers must be called upon to destroy with explosives enemy machine-gun emplacements or other defences. Then, according to the object of the raid and the intentions of the commander, arrangements must be made for the withdrawal or reinforcement of the raid- ing party, all of which require most thorough and careful fore- thought. Much of the detailed preparation for a minor oper- ation of this kind will fall upon company and platoon command- ers; and when it is remembered that in war platoons may be, and often are, commanded by junior non-commissioned officers, it is seen that, just as responsibility for the success of higher strategy must depend upon the wisdom of the prime minister and the Government, so responsibility for tactical success ex- tends to the last link in the chain of military command.
War has become national in a sense in which it never was before, and it is a sad reflection that, after twenty centuries of Christianity, its study is more important than ever. Owing to the insular position of Great Britain, its dense population and consequent dependence upon overseas trade, it, more than any other country, is dependent upon success in war. No country in the world could so ill support defeat; yet in no country is the study of war so much neglected. There has recently been a most praiseworthy effort to train the British soldier in the arts of peace; it might be well if similar efforts could be made to fit the civil population in all classes of society for the vital responsibilities of war. The response to Lord Kitchener's ap- peal in 1914-5 proved beyond doubt the essential soundness of the national spirit; but the story of a hundred battles proves that spirit without professional knowledge and skill is desper- ately expensive in life.
Hence it is that, just as our conception of war has become na- tional and the need of study more general and less strictly pro- fessional, so our definition must be less restricted. We prefer to regard tactics, even " combined tactics," simply as the art of commanding troops in action, without any limitation as to the number of troops employed or the status of the commander. Indeed, it is perhaps easier, in considering the fighting in France and Belgium, to exclude the role of the commander-in-chief than that of many of his junior subordinates. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, we shall be concerned entirely with the sphere of the larger formations, with organization and equip- ment, with the effect of inventions upon attack and defence, and with the changes and developments in tactics since Russia and Japan fought themselves to a standstill in the plains and high- lands of Manchuria.
Communications. Now, these changes have been brought about by exactly the causes which have produced the whole evolution of tactics during the last two thousand years, namely, improvement in weapons and communications that is, in conveying ever more men to the field of battle and in furnishing them with ever more efficient means of killing when they get there. For, after all, the object of tactics is to kill; if possible without being killed, but in any case to kill. For the first time in history these developments enabled armies during the World War to be placed and maintained in positions which offered no flanks for attack and therefore afforded no scope for strategy or for manoeuvre. Increase of population was a contributory cause, but primarily the "continuous lines" extending from sea to sea were rendered possible only by the development of railway and road communications, and by firearms of marvellous range, rapidity and precision. It was these features, existing so far only in Europe, and attaining their fullest influence only in western Europe, which differentiated the World War from everything
