were not so formidable as they had hitherto been. Be that as it may, it is none the less the fact that Marshal Foch had the courage and resolution to make his defence active, and to base it upon the counter-attack to return, that is, to the practice of former wars, and to the theories which he had himself so often preached in peace.
In this connexion two points of particular interest should be noted. First, it was not until the middle of July in 1918 that Foch was ready to pass from the defensive to the offensive, and by that time the Germans were perilously near Paris. There must, therefore, have been a grievous temptation to stand purely on the defensive, as Ludendorff had so often done with success, and it was a bold decision which rejected what to a lesser man might have appeared the easier and the safer course. Secondly, there was the peculiar configuration of the German front, which, after running almost due south from the English Channel to Soissons and Chateau-Thierry, turned sharply westward to 'Verdun. The German forces within this right-angled salient were lapped round and enveloped, with the result that in what- ever direction they attacked they must expose a flank to an active and vigorous opponent. If Ludendorff should attack southward, Foch would counter eastward from the west face of the salient; similarly, if Ludendorff attacked westward, the counter-move- ment would come from the south. In either case vital German communications provided a strategical objective within possible striking distance. It was indeed a weak tactical situation., in which a series of great and costly but only half-successful assaults had landed the German army, and of which the com- mander of the Entente armies intended to take full advantage.
His opportunity came in the middle of July. On the morning of the 1 5th the Germans attacked on both sides of Reims. For three days the battle continued with varying fortunes, until at daylight on the i8th Foch launched his carefully prepared counter-stroke on a front of 35 miles against the right flank of von Boehm's army. There was no artillery preparation, but the French advance was covered, on the Cambrai principle, by a swarm of tanks. The surprise was complete, and by nightfall the German flank was crushed and von Boehm's principal line of communication was in Mangin's hands. But more than this had happened, for at one blow Foch had passed from the defensive to the offensive, and had seized the initiative, on a more comprehensive scale, but in the form made classic by the great commanders of history. The initiative, once chosen, was never relinquished, but was followed by a series of rapid and vigorous blows, beginning with the brilliant attack by the British IV. Army south of the Somme on Aug. 8. From that moment until n A.M. on Nov. n the German army knew no rest, but was pushed from one strong position to another by victorious forces of many nationalities, into all of which Foch had been able to instil something of his own personality and surprising vigour. The time as well as the direction of the counter-stroke had been truly chosen, for, after acting on the offensive through four strenuous months, the German infantry had exhausted its strength, and moral defection and despondency had spread from the homeland to the armies in the field. It is Foch's eternal glory that he had had the moral daring to wait until this moment had come. So the great counter-stroke of 1918 had in it all the elements which had gone to make the success of exactly similar, if smaller, efforts in former campaigns. It was carefully prepared as an integral part of a general plan of campaign ; it was directed against an adequate strategic objective ; it came as a surprise; and it was correctly timed. Perfect in con- ception and execution, it met with its reward, but the curious thing is that it contained nothing new. What the world really saw on that July morning of 1918 was the touch of the artist who knew how to express old ideas in modern terms of war for Foch was bigger than the tools he handled. Perhaps Ludendorff was not but it is easy to criticize the commander who fails.
Attack Tactics. At this point it may be as, well to leave the subject of the counter-attack and to return to the study of infantry and artillery cooperation as exemplified in the latest phase of the operations. Once more we may turn with advantage
to a French memorandum on attack tactics. This time it is one dated July 12 1918, only six days before Mangin's counter- attack. In it, as in all the more recent documents, stress was laid upon surprise, and it was expressly laid down that attacks must be launched either without artillery preparation, or, if that was not possible, then the bombardment must be as short and as violent as possible. Then followed the important words: " Finally, the infantry must realize that it possesses an armament which is strong enough to enable it to exploit its first success, and to continue its progress, while overcoming local resistance with its own resources and without artillery action.
The same spirit inspires the IV. Army instructions for Aug. 8 when the tactics of Cambrai were more or less closely followed. What a change from the memorandum of June 1916 when the system of methodical advance from position to position, with artillery preparation preceding each stage of the infantry move- ment, is insisted upon. Surely tactical opinion has again come round full circle, and at the end of four years' war we are not very far from the position at which we started: " Artillery does not prepare the infantry attack, but supports it." Yet both the tactical memoranda from which we have quoted have the same high authority, that of Marshal Foch himself, and both are wise, for the conditions of 1918 differed widely from those of twoj years earlier. In 1916 the initial attack was against positions upon which months of labour had been spent, and held by an infantry confident in their leaders and in themselves, and quite sure of ultimate victory. Against such defences and with the material" at the disposal of the Allied commanders, prolonged bombardment offered the only possible prospect of success; but it equally increased the difficulty of subsequent movement across heavily shelled country and left the enemy in no uncer- tainty as to ultimate intentions. In minor operations, notably round Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel, real tactical surprise was ! frequently attempted with success, but only in comparatively minor operations undertaken with important but limited objectives when the defence had been already disorganized.
In 1918, on the other hand, German infantry had been wearied by incessant travelling from front to front in its efforts to burst through the network of opposing armies, with which Entente strategy had encircled it. Two years of effort, which history will certainly look upon as prodigious, had culminated in the great offensive which, begun on March 21 and ended on July 18, had exhausted the physical energy of the troops and produced a corresponding deterioration of moral. At the same time two years of under-nourishment and nervous strain had undermined the spirit of the civil population to an extent which was necessarily reflected in the army. The defences, again, were but improvised trench systems, hastily adapted to the i requirements of the moment and in no way comparable to those ; of 1916. Against them the British and French armies could bring a more numerous and more powerful artillery than at any previous period of the war; a better and more numerous air service; a more formidable infantry equipment, thanks to the now universal light mortars; and, finally, an ample provision ! of tanks those new engines of war which were certainly the best means of overcoming the German machine-gun defence i and, by their moral as well as their physical effect, were to play so great a part in the final phase of the war. With such changed conditions it would indeed have been strange and wrong if corresponding changes had not been introduced into tactics, i Changes in tactics are brought about by scientific discovery and consequent improvements in the means of killing. At no time in history have men of science devoted themselves so universally and so whole-heartedly to war requirements that is to say, to the art of killing their fellow-creatures as they did from 1914 to 1918. Gas, bombs, smoke screens, wireless teleg- raphy in the field, are but a few of the means by which scientists had a direct influence upon tactics and by which the research student in the laboratory was directly connected with the platoon commander in the field.
It was, therefore, by the united efforts of all classes in a truly national war that trench warfare came to an end in Aug.
