of the war, tanks were accepted as being the best and most eco- nomical means of arriving at a decision in the field, as the ratio of results obtained to material and man-power absorbed was greater than from any other means. In England develop- ment in design has since continued in the direction of the evolu- tion of tanks possessing greater speed and a greater radius of action than that of the more or less embryonic machines which were evolved during the war, and also in the production of machines which can function either on land or on water. Success in these directions will endow the machine, originally improvised with the limited object of assisting the infantry to break through an entrenched line, with far greater powers.
FRENCH TANKS
It is not remarkable that allies fighting a common enemy, side by side in the same theatre of war and subjected to similar conditions, should have evolved a similar means of meeting them. And it would have been natural had they done this simultaneously, in a common effort, or at least with mutual knowledge from the beginning on the part of each of what the other was doing. Curiously enough, this was not the case with the British and French, the two nations concerned in the creation of the tank. Forced into being by the same causes, a remedy for the same disease, even suggested in form by the same mechan- ical prototype, the British tank and the French Char d'Assaut were conceived separately, and for many months developed on independent lines, the British ignorant of French intentions and the French ignorant of what the British were doing. In the case of the latter, as of the former, it was the difficulty expe- rienced in carrying out the pre-war theories of infantry attack against a prepared defensive which finally led to the new ma- chine, though the effect of the H.E. shell of the French field gun may have prevented its necessity being felt so soon.
The French owed their tank 1 to the foresight and pertinacity of Col. (later Gen.) J. B. E. Estienne of the artillery, who, during the retreat of 1914, perceived the desirability for having some means of transporting infantry under cover across obstacles and swamps and ploughed land. Later, during the summer of 1915, on seeing the caterpillar gun tractors in use in the field by the British, his ideas took a more concrete shape in the direction of a cuirass^ lerrestre (land battleship). This was to be a caterpillar- propelled machine 4 metres long, 2-60 metres broad, 1-60 metres high, weighing nearly 12 tons. It was to be provided with a petrol engine, to travel at a speed of 6 m. per hour on the flat, to be protected by armour up to 20 mm. in thickness, to carry an armament of two machine-guns and one light Q.F. gun for the attack of machine-guns behind shields, and to be capable of crossing trenches two metres wide and forcing its way through barbed wire. It was also to draw an armoured trailer carrying 20 men and equipment. This was worked out in greater detail, but was in essentials the same as the scheme put forward in England in Oct. 1914, except that as projected the cuirassg was to be somewhat of a hybrid between a tug to haul a transport filled with men and a fighting machine, and not purely a de- stroyer which would open out a way for men to advance on their feet. Actually, however, both types were developed as fighting
1 machines. Both, also, were inspired by the Holt tractor, of the existence of which the British originator had knowledge before the war, and of which the French originator first became aware when he saw it at work behind the British lines. Before these machines were introduced by the British in the early part of 1915 for moving heavy artillery, tractors on the caterpillar sys-
! tem were practically unknown in France. Later some brought over from Tunis were employed with the army of the Vosges. After communicating with the commander-in-chief, Col. Esti- enne on Dec. i 1915 put forward his ideas in an official letter with a request for an interview. This took place on Dec. 12, which date can be taken as marking the official conception of the French tank. After consultation between Gen. Joffre and Col. Estienne, and discussions between the latter and representa-
1 For convenience the word " tank " will be used generally to describe the French machines.
tives of the Renault and Schneider works during Jan., the French Army H.Q. submitted to the Ministry of War a demand for 400 tanks. These were to be of the design prepared jointly by M. Brille of the Schneider Creusot Works, and Col. Estienne. For the French, therefore, this was the commencement of the solution of the problem of mobile protection for the infantry.
In regard to the French tanks, the year 1916 can be taken as one of gestation. The year 1917 covered the birth and in- fancy of the medium (Schneider and St. Chamond) tanks; the first half of 1918 the adolescence and maturity of the medium machines and the birth of the light (Renault) tank; and the last half of 1918 the adolescence and maturity of the light machine. But the period of gestation before the birth of the new arm, i.e. the appearance in the field of the Arlillcrie d'Assaut, or " A.S.," was, as in the case of the British Tank Corps, somewhat lengthy. Its promoters still had much opposition and many obstacles to overcome, for the question of production was handled by more than one department or directorate, a state of things which is usually bound to result in friction and delay. It appears, also, that whilst some officials were impressed with the vital ur- gency for expedition others were moreconcerned to conduct matters in accordance with the regular routine of peace procedure. But there was no intervention by an outside department or ministry to save the situation. It is not on record that the French Min- istry of Marine collaborated in the creation of the Chars d'Assaut. On Feb. 25, after some inter-departmental discussion and trials of a baby Holt tractor, and without waiting for the construction of any experimental machine, an order was placed with the Schneider firm for 400 tanks, then called tracteurs Estienne t afterwards known as Chars Schneider, to be delivered within six months. This was only two weeks after orders had been placed by the British for the first 100 Mark I. tanks. So far the comparative progress in development of the new arm by the two nations had been as follows: the idea of the tank had oc- curred at about the same time to both; the matter had been put forward officially by the British in the third month of the war and by the French 14 months later; the first actual order for machines, given by the British 18 months after war began, was followed by that of the French only a few days later. The British machines, however, took the field six months before those of their Allies. In addition to the 400 Schneider tanks a contract for 400 more machines of a different type was placed with the St. Chamond Works in April, without the knowledge of the commander-in-chief or of Col. Estienne.
Not long afterwards steps were taken for the formation and training of personnel for the new arm at Marly-le-Roi. In June French H.Q. received from British G.H.Q. official intima- tion of what was being done in England. Col. Estienne visited England, and after inspecting the Mark I. tank in the training area at Elveden reached three conclusions. One was that the two countries should collaborate in the production and cooperate in the use of the new weapon in the field. The second was that neither should forestall the other in employing it and so dis- count its maximum value for the Allies as a whole. On this Col. Estienne was specially insistent, because it was apparent that the British were far ahead in production and would proba- bly be ready before the French. The third was that as a comple- ment to the heavy, somewhat slow, British tanks, capable of negotiating almost any obstacle, the French should specialize in the production of a speedier and more handy machine, which would be to the British tank what field artillery is to heavy artillery, would perform the duty of a swarm of skirmishers in armour armed with a machine-gun, and would be capable of going wherever an infantry soldier could go. The scheme for light tanks did not meet with a favourable official reception, and sanction for the construction of 50 machines of this type was not given. Nevertheless designs were put in hand by the Renault firm and at the end of Nov. were so far completed that construction could have been started. Though no executive action was taken for some months, except that 150 machines for use as " command " tanks for the units of the ArtUlerie d'Assaut were given, this was the genesis of the Renault tank.
