of open plateau under observation of captive balloons and with- out effective support from their own guns. One condition fa- voured their action; their attack was a surprise.
Though the tanks succeeded in clearing the enemy out of their positions, their success had no tactical result, for the infantry could not follow up and consolidate the ground gained. But they caused panic, and inspired a. nervousness and hesitation amongst the Ger- mans which was invaluable at the moment. This and their sub- sequent actions carried out during June served to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the forest.
Meanwhile, four groupements of medium tanks led and greatly assisted Gen. Mangin's counter-stroke at Mery-Belloy on June n against the flank of the German salie'nt between Noyon and Montdidier, by which the enemy's progress toward Compiegne was arrested. The tanks played a great part in this operation which had such strategic importance, but this action was the high-water mark in the career of the medium tanks, for they were becoming worn out and were gradually replaced by the new and more efficient Renault tanks as the latter were produced.
By July considerable progress had been made in organizing and equipping fresh units, and the Artitterie d'Assaut was able to cooperate on a large scale in the battle of Soissons, Gen. Foch's decisive counter-stroke of July 18 and following days, against the German salient formed between Chateau-Thierry and Reims. This was the vindication of the French tank arm. To the X., V., and VI. Armies were allotted respectively six, one, and one groupements of medium tanks, and to each three bat- talions of Renault tanks, or a total for the operations of eight groupements of medium and nine of Renault tanks. The battle, which lasted from July 18 to the 23rd and 26th, so far as the tanks were concerned, formed a turning point in the war. The entire operation was based on the action of the tanks; every available machine was thrown into the fight; and they were given a chance of showing what they could do.
The tactics employed were those which had been urged all along by Gen. Estienne and M. Breton, and were a repetition of those initiated at Cambrai. The attack opened with the advance of a mass of tanks without preliminary bombardment, as it happened, in a slight fog, and was a complete surprise. Similar tactics on a smaller scale were made use of again after the first day, but on the 23rd the tanks suffered severely from the enemy's guns. Two battalions of Renaults acted with the VI. Army east of Reims on July 1617, an d cooperated with two medium groupes with the IX. Army on July 18 near the Marne, and some with the British on July 23 near Espilly. In these operations, especially the main attack on July 18, the tanks achieved what it had been claimed they would if properly used. On July 30 the commander-in-chief issued a special Order of the Day to the Artillerie d'Assaut -"Vous avez bien merite de la Patrie," whilst Gen. Estienne was made a commander of the Legion of Honour and promoted general-of -division.
The battle of Soissons had a great effect on succeeding oper- ations. It established the value of the tanks beyond all doubt, inspired enthusiasm in all that concerned the arm and expedited the manufacture of the machines and the training and organiza- tion of new units. Without giving even the list of actions in which the tanks took part to the end of the war, it can be said that the infantry now clamoured for their assistance, in spite of their faults and failings, and they were employed whenever possible. They were asked for by the commander of the VI. French Army when transferred to Flanders, and on Sept. 30 and several days in Oct. were in action. Some were also sent to Salonika. Out of the 120 days between July 15 and Nov. n they were used on 45 days, and the casualties suffered amounted to 300 officers and 2,300 other ranks. During 1918 3,988 indi- vidual engagements were fought: 3,140 by Renault, 473 by Schneider and 375 by St. diamond tanks. Toward the end their actions amounted to disposing of the enemy rearguard machine-guns which continually held up the infantry.
By Aug. the machinery of production and training had been so improved that it was found possible to turn out one battalion of Renault tanks (75 machines) per week, which implied a vast increase in the whole of the rear organizations, which were now of a capacity for the continuance of the tank effort on a greater scale in 1919. As in England the production of tanks had become an industry. Though the construction of medium tanks had been abandoned, Gen. Estienne's opinion as to the necessity for heavy machines had not changed from the time in Feb. 1918, when he had asked for 900. But the same influences that had in 1917 retarded the introduction of the light tank were now adverse to the contemplation of heavy machines. To provide such machines an Inter-Allied factory was
established, but this was not completed before the Armistice. In Oct., negotiations which had been carried on with the British Govern- ment resulted in the promise of some Mark V. and Mark V. Star tanks. Of the latter, 77 were handed over in November.
In Aug., at the instance of Gen. Foch, an Inter-Allied tank school was opened in France. It was equipped with a staff of French and British instructors and various types of British and French machines. This school was for the interchange of views and the establishment of a common basis for tactics and staff work concerned with tanks.
The reliance that had come to be placed on the Artillerie d'Assaut can be gauged by the fact that in Oct. 1918 its actual strength in the field amounted to 18,023 of all ranks.
Since the war the French have been continuing their development of cross-country machines. The construction of a very heavy ar- moured tank was in hand in 1921, while a much lighter machine, the " Kegresse," of Russian invention, had been tried. It consists of the substitution of small rubber tracks for the rear wheels of a motor- car. It is light, cheap, can travel on the flat at a speed of 15 to 20 m. per hour, and can cross any country over which cavalry can pass. An amphibious tank propelled on land by tracks and on the water by a screw has also been tried successfully.
AMERICAN TANKS
Though the tank had not accomplished much in the way of results by the time that the Americans came into the war, in April 1917, its military potentialities were at once appreciated by them, while its mechanical side appealed to their national genius. But hostilities did not continue long enough for them to bring their vast resources to bear on its development. The Americans lost no time in inquiring into the subject, and at once requested information as to designs, etc. At this time there was some doubt as to whether the tanks should not be taken up by the American Marines, but the final decision was in favour of the Army. In June the commander-designate of the American Tank Corps, Col. Rockenbach, arrived in France, and an officer was detailed to inquire into the technical aspect of the tank arm. An Inter-Allied Tank Bureau was also established. In Sept. 'a scheme for an American Tank Corps, to consist of five battalions of heavy tanks and 20 of light tanks, was approved, and in Oct. an expert technical officer reached England to consider further the question of development.
The question of the .provision of machines and spare parts, which had proved such a difficulty with the British and French, was also taken up. It was realized that in matters of design, it would be best for the Americans to profit by the experience of the British and French, whilst relying, as far as possible, on their own resources for materiel, and it was decided to adopt a heavy tank of the British type, and a light tank of the French Renault type. As a result of consultations between the British and French Ministries of Munitions and the American command- er-in-chief as to joint production, an Anglo-American commis- sion was appointed in Dec. to deal with the question, and in Jan. 1918, an agreement was signed by the two Governments for the manufacture of tanks in France. It contained, amongst others, the following main provisions: that a factory capable of pro- ducing 300 tanks a month, and of being extended to turn out up to 1,200 a month, should be erected in France at the expense of the two Governments; that 1,500 machines, or more if required, should be made during 1918; that, in broad terms, in accord- ance with national facilities for production all the machinery should be of American and the structure and armament of Brit- ish manufacture, the armour plate being of American steel, and that the first 600 tanks should be allotted to the Americans, and the remaining output as agreed upon, including sale to the French. The type of machine was to be the " Liberty " or " Allied " tank, which was the British Mark VIII. machine equipped with the Liberty aero-engine. 1 It was decided during the summer that an additional 1,300 of these tanks should be built in the United States, as well as several thousands of Renault machines. The scale of this programme shows what importance was attached to this arm by the Americans. The site chosen for the factory was Neuvy-Pailleux, near Chateauroux, and work was started there in the spring. But the building was not completed till Nov., so this scheme of joint production did not actually come to fruition,
1 The first Liberty tank of British structure and American mechan- ism was assembled and successfully tried in America in Nov. 1918. One machine was constructed in England by the end of 1918.
