charge of the work of the chief -of -staff in the higher command of the navy. He was promoted to be rear-admiral in 1895, and in
1896 and 1897 he was in command of the cruiser division in east Asiatic waters. In 1899 he reached the rank of vice-admiral and in 1903 that of admiral. For the long period of 19 years, from
1897 to 1916, he was Secretary of State for the Imperial navy, and in this capacity advocated the navy bills of 1898, 1900, 1907 and 1912 for increasing the German fleet and successfully carried them through the Reichstag. In 1911 he received the rank of grand-admiral, and he retired in 1916.
The best account of Adml. von Tirpitz's naval achievements and political activities is contained in the book which he pub- lished in 1919 under the title of Erinnerungen. In that book he shows how gigantic was the task of creating the new German navy with which Great Britain had to reckon at the outbreak of the World War. Not only had a whole array of subsidiary in- dustries to be established and supplies of raw materials secured; thousands of skilled workmen and hundreds of directing person- alities of strong character and exceptional ability had to be found and trained. It has been customary to attribute the creation of the German navy to the Kaiser William II., and it is true that in large part the initiative for successive increases, and the dema- gogic appeals by which they were supported, originated with the Emperor. On the other hand, it was Tirpitz who not only con- ducted the practical advocacy of these schemes in the Reichstag, but also organized the service of propaganda in the German press and on the platform, putting popular pressure on the parliamen- tary representatives of the nation and constraining them to agree to the enormous expenditure which these schemes entailed. Wil- liam II. was often a hindrance as well as a help, and Tirpitz gives instances in which the work of the construction departments and even that of the Secretary of State were interrupted or hampered by wild-cat Imperial projects for the construction of architectur- ally impossible vessels or of mechanically impossible machinery. One of these projects, on which an elaborate report had actually to be submitted to the Emperor, was a device for which it was claimed that it had solved the problem of perpetual motion. In the conduct of the naval war the official role of Tirpitz was con- fined to reporting and advising at general headquarters, the ac- tual conduct and initiative in operations being in the hands of the higher command of the navy at Wilhelmshaven, subject to the Emperor's approval or veto. Tirpitz advances two conten- tions; first, that he would have sent the navy into decisive action at an earlier stage of the war; secondly, that he would have made an earlier and more ruthless use of the German U-boats; but his opponents traverse both these claims, and in particular assert that as Secretary of State he had neglected the construction of submarines, so that Germany entered the war with a compara- tively small supply of these vessels.
In the political sphere Tirpitz was a bitter opponent of Beth- mann Hollweg, whom he charged with indecision, half-hearted- ness and nebulous conceptions of the necessities of German policy. His own experiences in the, Reichstag, and the close contact with the political parties which his advocacy of successive naval bills had involved, made him a master of political intrigue. During the years which immediately preceded the war, as well as during the first 18 months of the conflict, he was himself a candidate for the office of Imperial Chancellor, in the sense that many of the reac- tionary Conservatives and of those who advocated a ruthless con- ception of policy in peace and war regarded him as their political hope. Lord Haldane, in his book Before the War (1920), records his impression of Tirpitz when he visited Berlin in Feb. 1912 in order to make tentative proposals for an agreement regarding the limitation of new construction. Bethmann Hollweg, Lord Hal- dane thought, was willing to entertain the British suggestions; it was Tirpitz who behind the scenes offered a most strenuous opposition to any restrictions. Tirpitz himself maintains that his naval aspirations were directed not towards a war with Great Britain, but to the creation of a state of naval equilibrium or of German superiority, which would have enabled Germany to in- sist upon the unreserved cooperation of British policy in her world aims. It was probably true that Germany's policy was directed rather towards being so strong at sea as to make Eng- land unwilling to fight her unless absolutely necessary, than towards actually challenging British naval supremacy. But this policy was, in any case, bound to make England peculiarly sensitive to provocation by Germany, a point which was ignored by the champions of a great German navy. Tirpitz's book, in so far as his statements may be trusted, throws much light upon the circumstances in which German policy was directed or drifted in July 1914 into paths which inevitably led to war. He enlarges in particular upon what he considers the folly of the declaration of war upon Russia (see BETHMANN HOLLWEG). He is naturally influenced to some extent in what he says by his poor opinion of Bethmann Hollweg's capacities and by his own thorough knowledge of the Emperor's fickle and impetuous character.
His resignation in 1916, and the stages of his relations with the Emperor and the Higher Naval Command which led to it, are described in his Erinnerungen with almost tragic vividness. Tir- pitz remained a leading figure in the political agitation against the Chancellor's policy and was selected as president of the " Va- terlandspartei," a political association started in Sept. 1917 un- der reactionary auspices to combat all attempts at peace by com- promise, and to advocate the prosecution of the U-boat warfare with extreme ruthlessness. This association offered a vigorous opposition to the movement, which succeeded only when it was too late, for obtaining alterations in the constitution limiting the power of the Emperor and laying the foundations of real par- liamentary government in the Empire and in Prussia.
After the revolution Tirpitz was one of those against whom German popular animosity was chiefly directed as being the in- spirer of the naval and world policy which led to the war, and also the most powerful influence in prolonging it. He was one of those who found it inadvisable to remain in Germany, and he departed to find a refuge in Switzerland. After the republican Government seemed fairly established, and the reign of law and order was being restored, he returned; but, possibly on account of his advanced age, did not appear during 1921 to be taking any further part in political. intrigue or agitation. (G. S.)
TISZA, STEPHEN, COUNT (1861-1918), Hungarian statesman
(see 26.1017). During the Coalition Ministry (1906) Tisza re-
tired into private life on his estate of Geszt. It was only in the
House of Magnates that he expressed his views against the
extension of the franchise. When Count Khuen-Hedervary took
office in 1910, Tisza was his most earnest and effective oppo-
nent in the country. His return to the political arena took place
during a period of obstruction. In 1912 he became president of
the House of Deputies, and on July 10 1913 again returned to
power as prime minister. When the World War broke out a
truce was arranged between Tisza and the Opposition, but it did
not last long, and in 1917 he was compelled to resign. Though
hitherto he had been the most zealous adherent of Dualism
and the partnership with Austria, he declared for the scheme of
personal union after the manifesto of King Charles on Oct. 17
1918, the Pragmatic Sanction to hold good on the question of national defence, but with a separate Hungarian army and separate diplomatic representation abroad. When he saw no prospect of winning the war he pleaded for a peace in common with Germany on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. On Oct. 31 he was assassinated in his villa by men in military uniform, said to have been worn as a disguise.
Tisza had a power over Austria and Hungary such as had hardly ever been exercised before by an adviser of the Crown. He was distinguished by his determination and inflexible convictions, and was opposed to any policy involving weak concessions. In the newspapers Magyar Figyelo (Hungarian Observer) and Ignazmondd (Truth), he published articles on many subjects; in addition he published the historical study Von Sadowa bis Sedan (in Hungarian and German).
See the biography by Karl Szaz (Hungarian); and David Angyal, In Memory of Stephen Tisza (Hungarian). (E. v. W.)
"TITANIC " DISASTER, 1912. No single event in 1912 could compare, in the intensity of its universal appeal to human
