Page:EB1922 - Volume 32.djvu/882

(and there are numerous other examples) prove the soundness of Prof. Keith's reasoning, and show that in healthy sections of the community his standard is reached and even exceeded.

This standard may be represented graphically, and it is instructive to place alongside this representation of what we may regard as the normal standard for a healthy community a similar graph representing the proportions actually found in the total gradings during the whole year's work in Great Britain (the figures have been given above).

65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10

70

36

31-3

1O2

11

1

g

^

$

|

%

^

20

|

?Z

%

Grade I

Proportion In healthy community

I II III IV

Proportion actually found in Great Britain

These two diagrams show graphically the differences between the relative proportions of men of the four grades of fitness actually found and the standard relative proportions in a healthy community. In actual numbers the difference works out as follows: Among the zj million examinations there was in Grade I. a deficiency of 825,000, in Grade II. an excess of 61,000, and the alarming excess of no less than 575,000 in Grade III., and 190,000 in Grade IV.

With such results before them the committee which presented the report express surprise that with human material of such physical quality it was found possible to create the invincible armies which overthrew the Germans. We may well share their surprise, and indorse their opinion that the spirit of the race, which alone made this possible, deserves that no effort should be spared to ameliorate the conditions which had brought about such deplorable effects upon the national health and physique.

(H. W. K.) THE POST- WAR ARMY

The development of British military organization from 1910 to the end of the World War is treated under the heading ARMY, section British Army. The period immediately following a war of any importance usually sees many changes in army organiza- tion based upon the experiences gained during the war, and the years directly following the War of 1914-8 were no exception in this respect. The years 1919-21 were devoted to incorporating into the British army organization various essential innovations which a war of such magnitude was bound to produce.

Generally speaking, the war had shown that the broad frame- work of army organization, as it existed in 1914, had been built upon sound lines. In certain respects, it is true, defects had been found in this organization, e.g. an inelasticity in the system which failed adequately to provide for the expansion entailed when a nation is absorbed into military service; but these defects were connected more with details than with broad principles. Army reorganization had still to provide for an expeditionary force, trained garrisons for maintaining the various parts of the

Empire, and home defence. To make provision for carrying out these duties, therefore, the after-war army was organized, in its main outlines, similarly to what it had been in 1914. This organi- zation may be described as an expeditionary force, formed al- most entirely of regular soldiers with their reserves, backed up and supplemented by the militia; whilst the territorial army, composed of troops which would require several months' training on mobilization to fit them to take their place in the field, would be available for expanding the expeditionary force, should a state of national emergency arise.

It may be noted that the old name " militia " once again found a place in army nomenclature (although this force had not yet been finally reconstituted by the end of 1921); when or- ganized its functions were to remain identical with those of the Special Reserve in 1914. Briefly, these may be enumerated as completing the establishment of the expeditionary force on mobil- ization and providing drafts for the regular units during the first few months of war, after those provided from the regular re- serves have become exhausted. The militia is also required to produce on mobilization certain technical personnel, whose work in war, being akin to that performed in peace, would need but little military training to fit them to take their place in regular units in the field. The r&le of the reorganized militia, therefore, may be considered as the definite one of being a reserve to the regular army, without any idea of its units being employed as a separate force. It may further be noted that the name of the old territorial force has been changed to that of " Territorial Army." The special functions of this army remain the same as they were in 1914; but the organization to enable those duties to be carried out has been altered in conformity with the lessons learnt during the war. The after-war territorial formations, in fact, have been shaped into an exact counterpart of their prototypes in the regu- lar army, and this has entailed certain units, which had existed in 1914, becoming surplus to requirements; such units had cither to be merged into new ones or disbanded. It was on this account that many of the old mounted yeomanry regiments became surplus to the actual needs of the army, and were offered con- version into other arms of the service which the war had shown to be necessary for modern war, but which had no place in the pre-war territorial organization, e.g. army field artillery brigades and armoured car companies. Similarly surplus infantry bat- talions were asked to convert into other arms of the service in which the pre-war territorial army organization was deficient. The establishment of the territorial force in 1914 was some 314,000, all ranks. The establishment of the reconstituted terri- torial army in 1921-2 was some 220,000, all ranks.

Whilst the broad outlines of army organization remained in 1921 practically identical with what existed in 1914, the organiza- tion of the various formations for war underwent some modifica- tions. Notably was this the case in the additions made to the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, both in army and divisional troops, and the new units were added as a result of war experience, e.g. Tank Corps, Signal Corps. But whilst changes naturally had to take place, the infantry allotted to formations still remained unchanged; for instance a division comprised 3 infantry brigades as formerly, and infantry brigades once again were composed of 4 battalions, as in 1914, instead of the 3-battalion brigades which force of circumstances had imposed towards the latter part of the war.

Broadly speaking, the greatest changes which have been made in army organization may be attributed to two main causes: neces- sity for increased firepower and improved mechanical science. As coming under the former heading, first and foremost may be cited the artillery. Yearly, as the war had progressed, heavier and still heavier calibres of artillery had been brought into the field ; and the number of guns which had been considered sufficient in 1914, had been multiplied several times by the end of the war. The reorganiza- tion of the artillery, therefore, had to take into account, and make provision for, this increased need of artillery.

The peace organization of the artillery includes not only horse and field artillery but also medium artillery as well. On the other hand the horse-drawn 6o-pdr. battery, which formed part of the divisional artillery in 1914, no longer exists. In pre-war days the heaviest mobile gun or howitzer figuring in the British artillery organization was the 6-in. howitzer. During the war ordnance of heavier calibre