Mexico, which remained about eight months, without capturing Villa or accomplishing any other definite result. The three friendly nations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile commonly known as the “A B C Powers” offered a kind of mediation; and after many months of delay, at their suggestion Carranza was recognized as president by the United States. But disorder continued; neither life nor property was safe. Not till 1921, after 11 years of civil war and immense destruction of life and wealth, did Mexico emerge from the state of revolution which had been its chronic condition before the time of President Diaz.
The long controversy with Mexico was highly disturbing to the intention of the Administration to cultivate close relations with Latin-America in general. In spite of four pan-American congresses and several scientific congresses, in spite of the visits of Roosevelt and Secretary Root and Secretary Knox to S. America, and the opening of the short route to the W. coast through the Panama Canal—there could be no harmony if the United States were to continue annexing small and defenceless Latin-American nations and engaging in undeclared wars with Mexico. President Wilson sought to relieve apprehensions in this regard, and in a speech at Mobile Oct. 27 1913 declared that the United States had no designs on the territory or independence of its Latin-American neighbours. Colombia, too, had a grievance arising out of the loss of the isthmus when the Panama Canal Zone was annexed in 1904. Wilson gave his approval to a treaty to pay $25,000,000 to Colombia and to include an apology for the disagreeable events of 1904; but he could not push his measures through the Senate, though a similar treaty, minus the apology, was ratified by the succeeding Administration in 1921.
In regard to the Far East, Wilson had little opportunity to develop a policy. He began by disavowing the plans made under the advice of President Taft for a concert of American bankers with those of other countries to lend money to China. He continued, on the same lines as the Taft Administration, to argue with the people of California because they insisted on passing a statute restricting alien ownership of lands by Japanese residents. The World War soon made the United States and Japan temporary allies, and on Nov. 2 1917 the Lansing-Ishii note, on the same plan as the Root-Takahira note of 1908, set forth that the United States recognized Japan's “special interests in China.” In the deeper currents of East Asiatic diplomacy the United States did not enter until after the war.
Outbreak of the World War, 1914.—Long before the domestic and foreign policies of the United States reached the results described in the preceding sections, the United States was brought face to face with new and vital problems arising out of the war. That the country was peaceful in 1914, and expected to remain indefinitely at peace, is shown by the lack of anything that could be considered national military preparation in the terms of modern warfare. When on Aug. 4 1914 President Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality as between the two groups of European nations just engaging in a gigantic struggle, the authorized military establishment was about 107,000 men of whom some 87,000 were enrolled. The United States had not one military aeroplane of approved type; had only four modern heavy field guns and no transport for them; had not a trench bomb nor a mine-thrower; nor considerable supplies of any weapons or equipment except 800,000 excellent rifles; nor any officers experienced in the kind of warfare used in the recent South African, Manchurian, Balkan and Tripolitan campaigns; nor any instruction camps for officers or men. The navy included a fleet of battleships recently built, but was weak in small and swift vessels and particularly in submarines, though it had the great advantage of trained crews accustomed to the strategic units of sea warfare. For the protection of the Texas border, and as a second line in case of an invasion of Mexico, militia was available, but when called out later proved to be of little service. The tradition of a hundred years led the American people to expect no wars and in case of danger to rely on hasty volunteer enlistments. Bryan, in many respects a far-sighted man, publicly declared that the nation needed no preparation, for it could raise a million men between sunrise and sunset.
The foreign policy and the diplomatic organization of the United States were not fitted for such a crisis. Apparently not one of the American ambassadors realized the imminence of war in Europe or warned the Department of State of trouble; although Theodore Roosevelt as far back as 1909 had detected the hostile attitude of Germany toward the United States. The traditional diplomacy of America was based on the Monroe Doctrine as a principle that would keep European Powers out of the Americas, and therefore out of dangerous controversies with the United States. On the other hand, the principle of isolation forbade the United States to take any part in European crises or wars. Friendship with all nations had been the avowed policy of many successive presidents. If nations fought among themselves, the United States expected to remain neutral. As a neutral it stood by the principle of “freedom of the seas,” by which was meant in particular the right to carry on commerce with all belligerents, in case of war, subject to the limitations of the then acknowledged international law as to contraband and blockade. Moreover, the United States during the Civil War had laid down principles of “continuous voyages,” which it could not refuse to accept so far as its own commerce was concerned. Yet probably not one voter in ten had any clear notion of the external policy and principles of his Government, or understood that such a war as broke out in 1914 must deeply affect the United States, and might at last draw it into the struggle.
The diplomatic activities of the United States at the beginning of the war created no difficulties. Thousands of American tourists and residents were caught in the mobilization of the great European armies, and on Aug. 8 1914 $5,500,000 was sent over by the Government on a U.S. steamer to aid in bringing them home. A few weeks later relief was organized on a large scale for the Belgian people, most of whose country was overrun and held by the Germans. From year to year this system of relief was enlarged, so as to include French refugees as well as those who were still in the devastated portions of France, the unhappy peoples of Serbia and Asia Minor and other non-combatant sufferers, besides the sick and wounded of the contending armies. The agents of the American Red Cross and similar organizations were received in most parts of the war area, and privileged to work at the front and to carry on their operations within the warring countries. Supplies costing more than $1,500,000 were sent to Europe by the American Red Cross before the United States entered the war. This work of mercy put these unofficial representatives of the United States in the position of exponents of American neutrality.
Difficulties of Neutrality, 1914-7.—From another point of view the United States was compelled at once to take into account the relation between the war and American industries, commerce and finance. Very soon after hostilities began, loans were sought by most of the belligerent Governments. Large amounts were placed in the United States by Great Britain, France and Russia. The German Government floated several small loans, chiefly among their nationals and former nationals. President Wilson for a time advised Americans against aiding either side in that way and issued a proclamation (Aug. 18 1914) advising that the people remain neutral “not only in act but in word and in thought.” Such neutrality was impossible, because the natural course of neutral trade put the United States at once in the position of a source of supplies of every kind for any belligerent that could transport them. Probably not a dollar of the loans placed in America ever crossed the Atlantic in cash; as fast as the money was borrowed it was spent in the United States for the purchase of food, clothing, animals and especially munitions. Though the privileges of this trade were in theory equal, in practice it was decidedly unfavourable to the Central Powers. In the first weeks of, the war German commerce was driven from the seas' and more than 80 German steamers took refuge in ports of the United States. The Allied command of the sea very nearly cut off trade of any kind between the United States and Germany and her allies; while commerce continued in ever-increasing volume with England and France. This disparity led to violent protests on the part of the German Government, supported by
