noticed the Bavarian troops among their enemies, whose blood was shed unsparingly by the Prussian command.
General Joflfre thought that he had won the first trick in this cerrible game. In historic words he thanked the soldiers of Verdun. " Germany hoped," he told them, " that the capture }f Verdun would strengthen the courage of her allies and would
- onvince neutral countries of her superiority. She had not
.eckoncd with you . . . the struggle is not over, because the Germans must have a victory. You will take it out of their lands. Of you it will be said: they barred to the Germans the jtfay to Verdun."
The generalissimo dared then to tell his soldiers that the battle
.vould continue; he took up the challenge of the enemy, who
ittached a moral importance to the capture of Verdun, for want
of a strategical importance which it had not. The Germans had
dot obtained the rapid " break-through " which they had hoped
j'or, and their objective was limited to the capture of forts on the
ight bank of the Meusc, purely a local rectification of front.
They were reduced to give this objective an importance purely
Ictitious " Verdun, the chief stronghold of our chief enemy,
i he head and heart of France," etc., etc.
General Joffre's victory was enhanced by these same declara- ions of the enemy. He frequently visited the front, for two or hive days at a time. He kept Gen. Petain's second army under |iis own immediate command, thus relieving of responsibility the ntermediary " group of armies," a formation often useless, ometimcs harmful, always heavy and slow, unless under the ommand of a striking personality; as long as Verdun was to be ihe sole theatre of operations Gen. Joffre was to exert there his lirect personal action. He was thus able to calculate exactly vhat forces he could employ there, because he had to keep in eserve effectives necessary for the French offensive which was icing prepared on the Sommc, according to the plan of operations 'leaded upon in Dec. 1915, and the execution of which he was ollowing through impcrturbably. Sir Douglas Haig had been (uitc willing to extend his front so as to free the X. French Vrray, which force could then be employed as reinforcements or Verdun; the British general offered to contribute directly to he battle that was being fought; but Gen. Joffre declined his Ifffer as he wished the whole of the British forces to be available ior the forthcoming offensive.
j On March 12 and 13 the German bombardment was renewed n both banks of the Meuse with great violence; on the i4th a mall advance brought the attack line nearer to the Mort lomme, but it was stopped by some successful counter-attacks. . On the 1 6th the village and fort of Vaux successfully resisted i -Solent assaults repeated five times. On the 2oth, however, after
furious artillery bombardment, the Germans seized the Avo-
ourt wood, poorly defended by troops, who apparently allowed
hemselvcs to be unduly influenced by jets of burning liquid
' used in great quantities. However, on the following days, the
ttackers attempted to debouch from the wood in vain; well-
ilirected artillery fire stopped any advance.
Prepared at leisure, a French counter-attack retook this wood
. n the 2gth; it created a salient in the lines and might serve as a
>ase for an advance which would embarrass the whole position.
v violent struggle lasted four days for the possession of this
- round, which finally remained in the hands of the French.
But against this the whole Malancourt salient fell into German lands; the French were obliged to evacuate Bethincourt and to all back on the S. bank of the Forges stream; they even lost the ummit of Mort Homme.
On the right bank the end of March witnessed the gradual dvance of the Germans, slightly going beyond the village of ^aux. On April 2, descending the slopes of Douaumont, they eized the Caillette wood and crossed the Baril ravine; no de- cisive line, nor any reserve troops, separated them any longer rom Fort Souvillc. They had even gone beyond the barrage ire of the French artillery.
At this moment the sth Div. under Gen. Mangin came into ine, and forestalling the hour for relief hurled in its first regiment o counter-attack. Uncertainty concerning the ground given
921
up deprived the artillery of all accuracy in its fire, which was not able to support the counter-attacking line, but this uncertainty was the same for both sides. It was above all necessary to stop the enemy where he was, and then to drive him back. All arrangements were made during the night, and the fight was resumed on the 3rd with a first success of good omen.
On the following days the artillery was able to regulate its fire, the Caillette wood was recaptured completely, all the approaches to Souville and to the N. of Vaux were largely freed, in spite of German reinforcements. It was noticeable that this division had lost fewer men in recapturing the ground than the former division in losing it. The idea gained ground of continuing with the same troops so as to retake Douaumont.
The 5th Div. was sent back to rest, and the plan of attack, which anticipated an advance on the part of the division on its left, was drawn up. That division, however, lost ground instead of gaining it, and the objective now to be reached was altogether enfltche; as the adjoining divisions were not considered to be in a state to take part in the operation, the base of the attack became too narrow. Nevertheless it was launched on the 22nd about midday. After a fairly satisfactory artillery preparation, with magnificent dash it reached the fort in 1 1 minutes and occupied the superstructure with the exception of the northwestern angle.
To right and left the objectives laid down were reached almost entirely. The enemy, however, held on to the interior of the fort, and the outside was soon swept by his artillery fire; the machine- guns, in turrets which had not been knocked out, were soon augmented by others brought gradually into action.
The German reinforcements came up after the 23rd, because they were ready for this attack; the French reinforcements were too far back, and the officer in control of the attack did not have them under his orders. The struggle lasted two days, but the fort was lost again on the 28th.
Then the struggle broke out anew round Fort Vaux. The bombardment increased in intensity each day at the end of May; Damloup was taken on June 2 and the fort surrounded on three sides. The Germans finally occupied the superstructure, but Maj. Raynal continued the defence with steadfast heroism.
The fort fell on June 7. Its fall uncovered Fort Souville, already threatened by the German advance down the slopes from Douaumont; Thiaumont farm fell, the Caillette wood was re- taken; and it seemed as if the heroism of the French soldiers was to be powerless in face of this advance, which appeared to be in some way mechanical.
General Petain had taken over command of the group of French armies in the centre, and Gen. Nivelle of the Verdun army. General Petain had already drawn the attention of Gen. Joffre to the gravity of the situation in May. He referred to it again on June 1 1 , and insisted that the offensive to be undertaken on the Somme should take place as soon as possible. General Joffre replied the following day that he had made all his disposi- tions with this end in view, but that it was necessary to continue the struggle at all costs on the right bank, and even to risk the loss of batteries which could hardly be withdrawn.
The German advance, however, continued on the right bank, in spite of the energy of Gen. Nivelle, who repeatedly ordered counter-attacks, both immediate and instinctive.
The whole effort of the attacker was concentrated on this ground, an effort which amounted to a major operation having as its first objectives the work of Froide Terre, the village of Fleury and Fort Souville. Once that line was reached the old forts on the height St. Michel-Belleville would be easily seized, and the French would be hemmed in against the Meuse with its bridges under German artillery fire. Nineteen regiments be- longing to seven different divisions were to be engaged; the reinforcements and reserves were brought up close to the front line in order to take advantage of the first successes, and to insure the strength and continuity of the effort. It was the most im- portant and heaviest attack that Verdun had ever had to bear.
The artillery had been strongly reinforced, and began its preparation from June 20 with an intensity hitherto unheard of. On the morning of the 23rd the first-line trenches were literally
