Page:EO 14023 Commission Final Report.pdf/66

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States

Endnotes: Chapter 1


  1.   The Federalist No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
  2.   Id. at 392, 394.
  3.   Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788, at 83 (2010).
  4.   See Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in the Founding Era 154 (2018) (noting that although the Federalist essays “were not yet cloaked in national mystique, and were far from being deemed the authoritative constitutional commentary they would later become, as early as the spring of 1789 they enjoyed wide purchase”); see also Maier, supra note 3, at 84 (“The series’ reach and the number of people who testified to its distinction expanded substantially after the spring of 1788, when the essays were collected and printed together in two volumes of some 600 pages (with Hamilton picking up over half the cost) … .”).
  5.   See generally Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constituion (1996); Maier, supra note 3; Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter II, eds., 1987).
  6.   See Gienapp, supra note 4, at 4 (2018) (“The Constitution was born without many of its defining attributes; these had to be provided through acts of imagination.”).
  7.   See also Alison L. LaCroix, The New Wheel in the Federal Machine: From Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 393 (2007) [hereinafter The New Wheel in the Federal Machine] (“The language of Article III, combined with the Madisonian compromise, had deliberately left a lacuna in the constitutional structure.”). See generally 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
  8.   U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
  9.   See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 8 (7th ed. 2015).
  10.   Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in Origins of the Federal Judiciary 13, 14 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
  11.   Id. (alteration added) (footnotes omitted).
  12.   See Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 182–85 (2010) [hereinafter Ideological Origins].
  13.   An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
  14.   See Marcus & Wexler, supra note 10, at 27 (noting that “politics had a greater influence than the language of the Constitution on the decisions Congress made with regard to a new judicial system”).
  15.   See Ideological Origins, supra note 12, at 201 (noting that “beginning in 1789, judicial power emerged as the focus of both practical and theoretical disputes about the nature of multilayered authority” in the American federal republic).
  16.   Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (July 31, 1789), in 4 Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, at 491 (Maeva Marcus, ed., 1992) [hereinafter DHSC].
  17.   See Ideological Origins, supra note 12, at 186.
60 | December 2021