Chapter II
Concerning the transgressions of the faculties of the soul and the designation of those faculties which are the seat of the virtues and the vices[1]
Know that transgressions and observances of the Law have their origin only in two of the faculties of the soul, namely, the sensitive[2] and the appetitive, and that to these two faculties alone are to be ascribed all transgressions and observances. The faculties of nutrition and imagination do not give rise to observance or transgression, for in connection with neither is there any conscious or voluntary act. That is, man cannot consciously suspend their functions, nor can he curtail any one of their activities. The proof of this is that the functions of both these faculties, the nutritive and the imaginative, continue to be operative when one is asleep, which is not true of any other of the soul’s faculties.[3]
- ↑ For a discussion of the contents of this chapter, see Scheyer, Psychol. Syst. d. Maim., p. 102 ff.; Jaraczewski, ZPhKr., XLVI p. 10; and Rosin, Ethik, p. 54 ff. On the title, see Hebrew text, c. II, p. 14, n. 1 and 2.
- ↑ In ascribing transgressions and observances to the faculty of sensation, M. differs from Aristotle who asserts that sense is the originating cause of no moral action, since brutes, too, are possessed of sense, but are in no ways partakers of moral actions (Eth. Nic., VI, 2). M., however, draws a distinction between the sensitive faculty of man and that of animals. Sensation as applied to man and beast is a homonymous term, the sensitive faculty of man being different from that of all other animate beings. See supra, c. I, pp. 39—40.
- ↑ M. differs from al-Farabi who ascribes participation in moral and immoral acts to all the faculties of the soul (התחלות הגמצאת, p. 35 ff.). The
