348 HUME the intensest opposition, and expected that, if his principles were received, the greatest of revolutions, a change in general conceptions of things, would ensue. Apart from all con siderations of personal reputation, which undoubtedly had no small influence on him, he was, therefore, on the eve of the publication of his work, with justice perturbed " at the nearness and greatness of the event." It is true that in the Treatise there is little or no direct reference to the theological questions which were then prolific in the pro duction of literature, and probably this omission contributed towards the first failure of the work ; but Hume, as before said, is invariably chary of his references, and one cannot doubt that he was himself fully alive to the fact that in his philosophic analysis the matters in debate in the theo logical world had been reduced to their purest essence, had been brought back to first principles. Overlooking, then, the obvious fact that nothing is less common than systematic thinking, that the greater portion of opinion rests on the accidents of training and surroundings rather than on clearly perceived and rationally tested grounds, he anticipated an immediate and vehement onslaught on his work. His dis appointment was great in proportion to the height of his expectations ; and though he never entirely relinquished his metaphysical speculations, though all that is of value in his later writings depends on the acute analysis of human nature to which he was from the first attracted, one cannot but regret that his high powers were henceforth withdrawn for the most part from the consideration of the foundations of belief, and expended on its practical applications. In later years he was accustomed to explain his want of success as due to the immature style of his early thoughts and exposi tion, to the rashness of a young innovator in an old and well-established province of literature. " So vast an under taking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective." The disclaimer of the Treatise in the preface to the Inquiry concerning Human Understanding is well known. But all this has little foundation beyond the personal irritation of an author at his own failure to attract such attention as he deems his due. None of the principles of the Treatise are given up in the later writings, and no addition was made to them. Nor can the superior polish of the more mature productions overbalance the freshness and concen trated vigour of the more youthful work. Hume is at his best in the Treatise ; and it is curious to think what might have been the position of British philosophy at the close of the 18th century had the success of his first attempt encouraged him to continue with equal zeal and undivided attention his early metaphysical speculations. After the publication of the Treatise Hume retired to his brother s house at Ninewells and carried on his studies, mainly in the direction of politics and political economy, adding to this, however, a wide if not exact reading in classical literature. In 1741 he published the first volume of his Essays, which had a considerable and immediate success. A second edition was called for in the following year, in which also a second volume was published. It is interesting to learn from one of Hume s letters that Butler, to whom he had sent a copy of his Treatise, but with whom he had failed to make personal acquaintance, warmly com mended the Essays to all his friends. The philosophical relation between Butler and Hume is one of the curious points in history. So far as analysis of knowledge is con cerned both are in thorough harmony, and Hume s sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact are the foundations on which Butler s defence of religion rests. Butler, however, appears to retain, alongside of his destruc tive theory of knowledge, confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God, and certainly maintains what may be vaguely described as an a priori view of conscience. It is probable that, though Butler never worked out the system of his belief, his theological principles will be found to rest ultimately on ethical grounds. Hume had the greatest respect for the author of the Analogy, ranks him with Locke and Berkeley as the originators of the experimental method in moral science, and in his specially theological essays, such as that on Particular Providence and a Future State, has Butler s views specifically in mind. See BUTLER. The success of the Essays, though hardly great enough to satisfy the author s somewhat exorbitant cravings, was a great encouragement to Hume. He began to hope that his earlier and heavier work, if recast and lightened, might share the fortunes of its successor ; and at intervals through out the next four years he occupied himself in reducing its fundamental principles into a more succinct form, and in giving to them all the literary grace at his command. Meantime he continued to look about for some post which might secure him the modest independence he desired. In 1744 we find him, in anticipation of a vacancy in the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh university, moving his friends to do him good offices with the electors ; and though, as he tell us, " the accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, or theism, &c., &c., was started" against him, it had no effect, " being bore down by the contrary authority of all the good people in town." To his great mortification, however, he thought he could discover that Hutcheson and Leechman, with whom he had been on terms of friendly correspondence, were giving the weight of their opinion against the propriety of electing him to such a post. The after history of these negotiations is obscure. Hume in all probability perceived that fortune was against him, and accepted in 1745 a very anomalous post, that of tutor or guardian or keeper to the marquis of Annandale, a harmless literary lunatic. Although the salary paid during the year Hume spent in this capacity " made a consider able accession " to his fortune, the position was unmistak ably false and painful. The letters relating to this episode of his life, first printed by Dr Thomas Murray, 1841 (see Burton s Life, i. ch. v.), are not pleasant reading; and the close of the connexion between Hume and his pupil left the philosopher under the necessity of instituting an action for recovery of arrears due to him. The details of the affair are not sufficiently clear to enable a modern judge to assign either admiration or blame to Hume s tenacity in the matter of his rights. In 1746 Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St Clair, and was a spectator of the ill-fated expedition to France in the autumn of that year. His admirable account of the transaction has been printed by Mr Burton. After a brief sojourn at Ninewells, doubtless occupied in prepar ing for publication his Philosophical Essays (afterwards entitled An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding}, Hume was again associated with General St Clair, and in 1748 accompanied him as secretary in the embassy to Vienna and Turin. The notes of this journey are written in a light and amusing style, showing Hume s usual keenness of sight in some directions and his almost equal blindness in others. During his absence from England, early in the year 1748, the Philosophical Essays were pub lished ; but, to his great disappointment, the first reception of the work was little more favourable than that accorded to the unfortunate Treatise. " On my return from Italy," he writes, " I had the mortification to find all England in a ferment on account of Dr Middleton s Free Inquiry, while my performance was entirely overlooked and neglected." To the later editions of the work Hume prepared an " Ad vertisement " referring to the Treatise, and desiring that the Essays "may alone be regarded as containing his philo sophical sentiments and principles." Not a few modern
critics have accepted this disclaimer as of real value, but
