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yearly fair has some importance for the neighbouring districts. The town is also a watering-place, yearly visited by several hundreds of persons. Population in 1881, 27,900; with military and railway servants, 30,000.
The port of Libau, Lyra portus, is mentioned as early as 1263; it then belonged to the Livonian order. In 1418 it was burnt by Lithuanians, and in 1560 it was mortgaged by the grandmaster of the order to the Prussian duke Albert. It was annexed to Russia in 1795.
LIBEL and SLANDER are the terms employed in English law to denote injurious attacks upon a man's reputation or character by words written or spoken, or by equivalent signs. In most early systems of law we find verbal injuries treated as a criminal or quasi-criminal offence, the essence of the injury lying not in pecuniary loss, which may be compensated by damages, but in the personal insult which must be atoned for, – a vindictive penalty coming in the place of personal revenge. By the law of the XII. Tables, the composition of scurrilous songs and gross noisy public affronts were punished by death. Minor offences of the same class seem to have found their place under the general conception of injuria, which included ultimately every form of direct personal aggression which involved contumely or insult. In the later Roman jurisprudence, which has, on this point, exercised considerable influence over modern systems of law, we find verbal injuries dealt with in the edict under two heads. The first comprehended defamatory and injurious statements which were made in a public manner (convicium contra bonos mores). In this case the essence of the offence lay in the unwarrantable public proclamation, in the contumely which was offered to a man before his fellow-citizens. In such a case the truth of the statements was no justification for the unnecessarily public and insulting manner in which they had been made. The second head included defamatory statements which were made in private, and in this case the offence lay in the imputation itself, not in the manner of its publication. The truth was therefore a sufficient defence, for no man had a right to demand legal protection for a false reputation. Even belief in the truth was enough, because it took away the intention which was essential to the notion of injuria. The law thus aimed at giving sufficient scope for the discussion of a man's character, while at the same time it protected him from needless insult and pain. The remedy for verbal injuries was long confined to a civil action for a money penalty, which was estimated according to the gravity of the case, and which, although vindictive in its character, doubtless included practically the element of compensation. But a new remedy was introduced with the extension of the criminal law, under which many kinds of defamation were punished with great severity. We find at the same time increased importance attached to the publication of defamatory books and writings, the libri or libelli famosi, from which we derive our modern use of the word libel; and under the later emperors tho latter term came to be specially applied to anonymous accusations or pasquils, the dissemination of which was regarded as peculiarly dangerous, and visited with very severe punishment, whether the matter contained in them were true or false.
The earlier history of the English law of defamation is somewhat obscure. Civil actions for damages seem to have been tolerably frequent so far back as the reign of Edward I. There was no distinction drawn between words written and spoken. When no pecuniary penalty was involved such cases fell within the old jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which was only finally abolished during the present reign. It seems, to say the least, uncertain whether any generally applicable criminal process was in use. The crime of scandalum magnatum, spreading false reports about the magnates of the realm, was established by statutes, but the first fully reported case in which libel is affirmed generally to be punishable at common law is one tried in the Star Chamber in the reign of James I. In that case no English authorities are cited except a previous case of the same nature before the same tribunal; the law and terminology appear to be taken directly from Roman sources, with the insertion that libels tended to a breach of the peace; and it seems probable that that not very scrupulous tribunal had simply found it convenient to adopt the very stringent Roman provisions regarding the libelli famosi without paying any regard to the Roman limitations. From that time we find both the criminal and civil remedies in full operation, and will now consider how the law stands with regard to each at the present time.
Civil Law. – The first important distinction we encounter is that between slander and libel, between the oral and written promulgation of defamatory statements. In the former case the remedy is limited. The law will not take notice of every kind of abusive or defamatory language. It must be shown either that the plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct consequence of the slander, or that the imputation is of such a nature that we are entitled to infer damage as a necessary consequence. The special damage on which an action is founded for slanderous words must be of the nature of pecuniary loss. Loss of reputation or of position in society, or even illness, however clearly it may be traced to the slander, is insufficient. When we cannot prove special damage, the action for slander is only allowed upon certain strictly defined grounds. These are the imputation of a crime or misdemeanour which is punishable corporeally, e.g., by imprisonment; the imputation of a contagious or infectious disease; statements which tend to the disherison of an apparent heir (other cases of slander of title when the party is in possession requiring the allegation of special damage); and lastly, slanders directed against a man's professional or business character, which tend directly to prejudice him in his trade, profession, or means of livelihood. In the latter case the words must either be directly aimed at a man in his business or official character, or they must be such as necessarily to imply unfitness for his particular office or occupation. Thus words which merely reflect generally upon the moral character of a tradesman or professional man are not actionable, but they are actionable if directed against his dealings in the course of his trade or profession. But, in the case of a merchant or trader, an allegation which affects his credit generally is enough, and in the same way it has been held that statements are actionable which affect the ability or moral characters of persons who hold offices, or exercise occupation which require a high degree of ability, or infer peculiar confidence. In every case the plaintiff must have been at the time of the slander in the actual exercise of the occupation or enjoyment of the office with reference to which the slander is supposed to have affected him.
The action for libel is not restricted in the same way as that for slander. Originally, as we have seen, there appears to have been no essential distinction between them, but the establishment of libel as a criminal offence had probably considerable influence, and it soon became settled that written defamatory statements, or pictures and other signs which bore a defamatory meaning, implied greater malice and deliberation, and were generally fraught with greater injury than those which were merely made by word of mouth. The result has been that the action for libel is not limited to special grounds, or by the necessity of proving special damage. It may be founded on any statement which disparages a man's private or professional character, or which tends to hold him up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. In one of the leading cases, for example, the
