548 P E R P E R him in 1682 the appointment to the chair of eloquence and history at Franeker, where his expositions of Cicero, Terence, Floras, and Suetonius, as well as his lectures on general history, attracted a large and increasing number of hearers. In 1693 he was promoted to the corresponding chair at Leyden, where he succeeded F. Spanheim in 1701. His death took place in that city on 6th April 1715. The works of Perizonius both as an author and as an editor were very numerous, and by universal consent entitle him to a place of the highest rank among the scholars of his age. Special interest .attaches to his edition of the Minerva of Sanctius or Sanchez (1st ed. 1687, 4th ed. 1714), which may be said to be one of the last developments of the study of Latin grammar while in its pre- scientitic stage, when the phenomena of language had not yet ceased to be regarded as for the most part disconnected, conventional, or fortuitous. Mention must also be made of his Animadvcrsioncs historicse, in quibus qiuim plurima in priseis Romanarum rerum scd utriusquc linguae auctoribus notantur, multa ctiam illustrantur. atque emcndaniur, varia denique antiqtwrum rituum eruuntur et uberii S explicantur (1685), a work which Bayle lias characterized as deserving to be entitled "The Errata of scholars and critics," and of his Dissertationes duie de Rcpublica Romanci,, alluded to with honour by Niebuhr in the preface to his Roman History (4th ed., 1833) as marking the beginning of that new era of classical study with which his own name is so closely associated. PERJURY is an assertion upon an oath duly admin istered in a judicial proceeding, before a competent court, of the truth of some matter of fact, material to the question depending in that proceeding, which assertion the assertor does not believe to be true when he makes it, or on which he knows himself to be ignorant (Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Laio, Art. 135). In the early stages of legal history perjury seems to have been regarded rather as a sin than as a crime, and so subject only to supernatural penalties. The injury caused by a false oath was supposed to be done not so much to society as to the Divine Being in whose name the oath was taken (see OATH). One of the practical effects of this view was to make perjury so common in the Middle Ages that the probable reason for preserving trial by combat was the difficulty of securing a just cause against the perjury of witnesses (Hallam, Middle Ages, ch. ix. pt. 1). The almost universal existence of compurgation was no doubt another explanation of the frequency of perjury. In cases of compurgation, or in cases where wager of law was allowed, it is difficult to imagine that the defence could as a rule have been an honest one. In Roman law, even in the time of the empire, the perjurer fell simply under divine reprobation, and was not dealt with as a criminal, except where lie had been bribed to withhold true or give false evidence, or where the oath was by the genius of the emperor. In the latter case punishment was no doubt inflicted more for the insult to the emperor than for the perjury. False testi mony leading to the conviction of a person for a crime punishable with death constituted the offence of homicide rather than of perjury. In England, perjury, as being a sin, was originally a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance. At a later period, when it had become a crime, the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts became gradually confined to such perjury as was committed in ecclesiastical proceedings, and did not extend to perjury committed in a temporal court. The only perjury which was for a long time noticed at common law was the perjury of jurors. Attaint of jurors (who were originally rather in the position of witnesses than of judges of fact) incidentally subjected them to punishment for perjury. Criminal jurisdiction over perjury by persons other than jurors seems to have been first assumed by the Star Chamber, acting under the powers supposed to have been conferred by 3 Hen. VII. ch. 1. After the abolition of the Star Chamber by the Long Parlia ment in 1641 and the gradual diminution of the authority of the spiritual courts, perjury (whether in the strict sense of the word or the taking of a false oath in non-judicial proceedings) practically fell entirely within the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal tribunals. The jurisdiction of the spiritual courts over perjury may now be considered obsolete. An unsuccessful attempt was made as lately as 1876 to induce the Court of Arches to entertain a criminal suit against a layman for a false oath taken before a surro gate (Phillimore v. Machon, Law Rep., 1 Prob. Div., 481). See further, for the history of the law of perjury, Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, vol. ii. p. 408 ; vol. iii. p. 240. At common law only a false oath in judicial pro ceedings is perjury. But by statute the penalties of perjury have been extended to extra-judicial matters, e.y., false declarations made for the purpose of procuring marriage (19 and 20 Viet. c. 1 19, s. 18), and false affidavits under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 and 42 Viet. c. 31, s. 17). False affirmation by a person permitted by law to affirm is perjury (32 and 33 Viet. c. 68, s. 4; 33 and 34 Viet. c. 49). In order to support an indictment for perjury the prosecu tion must prove the authority to administer the oath, the occasion of administering it, the taking of the oath, the substance of the oath, the materiality of the matter sworn, the falsity of the matter sworn, and the corrupt intention of the defendant. The indictment must allege that the perjury was wilful and corrupt, and must set out the false statement or statements on which perjury is assigned, subject to the provisions of 23 Geo. II. c. 11 (which also applies to subornation of perjury). By that Act it is sufficient to set out the substance of the offence, without setting forth the bill, answer, etc., or any part of the record, and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court before whom the perjury was committed. The matter sworn to must be one of fact and not of mere belief or opinion. It is not homicide, as in Roman law, to procure the death of another by false evidence, but the Criminal Code, ss. 118, 164, proposes to make such an offence a substantive crime of greater gravity than ordinary perjury, and punish able by penal servitude for life. It is a rule of evidence, founded upon obvious reasons, that the testimony of a single witness is insufficient to convict on a charge of per jury. There must be corroboration of his evidence in some material particular. Perjury is a common law mis demeanour, not triable at quarter- sessions. Proceedings may also be taken under 5 Eliz. c. 9, but this Act is of little practical importance, as the common law is more extensive than the statute. Most persons in a judicial position have the right of directing the prosecution of any witness, if it appears to them that he has been guilty of perjury (14 and 15 Viet. c. 100, s. 19). The provisions of the Vexatious Indictments Act (22 and 23 Viet. c. 17) extend to perjury and subornation of perjury. By that Act no indictment for either of such offences can be pre ferred unless the prosecutor or accused is bound by recog nizance, or the accused is in custody, or the consent of a judge is obtained, or (in the case of perjury) a prosecution is directed under 14 and 15 Viet. c. 100. Subornation of perjury is procuring a person to commit a perjury which he actually commits in consequence of such procurement. If the person attempted to be suborned do not take the oath, the person inciting him, though not guilty of subornation, is liable to fine and corporal punish ment. Perjury and subornation of perjury are punishable at common law with fine and imprisonment. By the combined operation of 2 Geo. II. c. 25 and later statutes, the punishment at present appears to be penal servitude for any term, or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding seven years (see Stephen, Digest, Art. 137). Perjury or prevarication committed before a committee of either House of Parliament may be dealt with as a contempt or breach of privilege as well as by prosecution. As to false oaths not perjury, it is a
