514 ARISTOTLE and tLat the greatest and most valuable of liis achieve ments, incomplete as he left them, but subsequently edited to some extent and touched up, remain for us, and contain the essence of his thought. In eight passages of the works which we possess under his name, there is a reference to " exoteric discourses " (efarepLKol Xoyoi). 1 This phrase has attracted a wonderful amount of notice, and a whole literature 2 has been com posed in support of the different meanings which have been attributed to it. But the question is now reduced to a very small one. The word " exoteric " suggests the opposite term " esoteric/ in the sense of secret ; and the writers of the later empire, 3 who were accustomed to the idea of mystical and hierophantic teachings, as professed by the neo-Pythagorean and neo-Platonic schools, took up the notion that Aristotle had two forms of doctrine : the one " esoteric," containing his real opinions, and confined to the circle of his initiated scholars, the other "exoteric," containing superficial ; truth with which the profane vulgar might be put off and satisfied. After the Renaissance the idea of a double doctrine in Aristotle was exploded, and it was acknowledged that " exoteric " in the passages above mentioned is not opposed to " esoteric " or " secret," but denotes the external, non-philosophical, non-scientific treat ment of a subject, as opposed to the strictly scientific treat ment of it (ouceios Aoyos). The only question, then, which remained is this, Does Aristotle, when he refers to "the exoteric discourses," mean to refer directly to his own more popular writings, or does he make general reference to popular discussions on philosophical subjects, including not only his own and other people s popular writings, but also the ordinary debates and discussions on such subjects, rife enough in Athenian society, and, of course, unscientifically conducted 1 Powerful supporters are to be found for either view, and Bernays 4 especially, in an elegant and learned monograph, has endeavoured to prove that each of the passages in which " the exoteric discourses " are mentioned refers especially to some one of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, the character and contents of which Bernays seeks to gather from the scanty fragments of them preserved by the ancients. It appears to us, however, that this attempt is infelicitous in its results, and that there are many reasons for thinking that Aristotle did not appeal to his own popular writings for conclusions in philosophy, but merely said, occasionally, that the popular views on some questions of philosophy were sufficiently accurate and might be accepted. Of the works that have come down to us as Aristotle s, the following are undoubtedly genuine : 1. Topics. 2. Prior Analytics. 3. Posterior Analytics. 4. On Sophis tical Refutations. 5. Art of Rhetoric. 6. Nicomachean Ethics* 7. Politics. 8. On the Art of Poetry. 9. A Physical Discourse. 6 10. On the Heavens. 11. On Genera tion and Destruction. 12. Meteorologies. 13. Researches* about Animals. 14. On Soul. 15. Appendices to the preceding work (a.) On Sense and Sensible Things, (b.) 1 See Bonitz s Index, sub voce, for the references.
- All recent German commentators have touched upon the question.
Most of the leading opinions upon it have been referred to by Grote Ar., vol. i. chapter 2. See also Grant s Ethics, vol. i. appendix B. 3 E.g., Aulus Gellius, xx. 4.
- Die Dialogs des Aristoteles, in ihrem Verhaltniss gu seinen iibrigtn
Werken, von Jacob Bernays (Berlin, 1863). With the exception of books v. vi. vii. See Grant s Ethics. 8 The title cannot with certainty be attributed to Aristotle. In some MSS. it stands as *UCTIK^ aKpAairis, fy irepl a.px<av. A.Kp6acris indicated a scientific, as opposed to a popular, lecture or discourse. rie/>l TO. (pa Iffropiai. Icrropla means a " record of investiga tions." Aristotle sometimes uses the word simply in the sensejof history," but it was a mistranslation to call his work on animals listona Animalium. Out of this the term "Natural History" has grown into modern usage. On Memory and Recollection, (c.) On Sleep and Waking. (d.) On Dreams and Prophesying in Sleep, (e.) On Longevity and Shortlivedness. (f.) On Youth and Old Age. (g.) On Life and Death, (h.) On Respiration. 16. On Parts of Animals. 17 . On Locomotion of Animals. 18. On Genera tion of Animals. 19. The Metarjhysics* The following works attributed to Aristotle are almost undoubtedly spurious : 1. On Rhetoric ; addressed to Alexander. 2. Eudemian Ethics. 3. Great Ethics. 4. On Virtues and Vices. 5. Economics. 6. On Colours. 7. Physiognomies. 8. On Plants. 9. On Strange State ments. 10. Mechanics. 11. On Indivisible Lines. 12. On Xenoplianes, Zeno, and Gorgias. 13. On the Universe; addressed to Alexander. 14. On Motion of Animals. 15. On Breath. 16. Problems? The following two works are of doubtful genuineness : 1. Categories; 2. On Interpretation. None, however, of the so-called works of Aristotle have been more commented on or studied than these two. They stand as the two first of the six logical treatises, or Organon, 10 of Aristotle, and thus had particular attention directed to them in the Middle Ages, 11 when the logical writings were solely or chiefly studied. The separate way in which these two short treatises are written, without any preface or other connec tion with the main body of analytic (i.e., demonstrative logic), seems peculiar and unlike Aristotle. We may safely say that they were not composed at the same time as the Analytics, to which they have been prefixed. Either they were earlier works written before the time of Aristotle s final residence in Athens, or else they are the productions of unknown and probably later Peripatetics. There is an important difference of doctrine between the Categories and works known to be by Aristotle. For in the Categories 12 it is laid down that " the first essence " (Trpwrrj oiWa) is the individual, and that the class, genius, or species, is a " second essence," that is, that it has an existence derived from and secondary to the individuals of which it is com posed. In the Metaphysics, 13 on the other hand, we are told that the " first essences " are universals, genera, or species. The former is the doctrine of nominalism, the 8 To juerck ra (pvfftKa. The name merely means " The writings which come after the Physics." It was given not by Aristotle himself, but by his posthumous editors. Out of it the name of "Metaphysics" grew for that science, which Aristotle himself called " First Philosophy," "Wisdom," or "Theology." See Bonitz, Metaphysica (Bonn, 1849), 2d part, pp. 3-6. The work is composite, with a spurious admixture. See below. 9 An interesting paper by Karl Prautl (Abhandl. der Philosoph.- philol. Klasse der K. Bayer- Akad. 1852) discusses thethirty-eightbooks of " Problems " attributed to Aristotle, in which questions on all conceivable subjects are proposed and answered. Prantl shows the contradictory and often anti-Aristotelian character of many of the answers given. His conclusion is that, though Aristotle certainly se* the example of starting and endeavouring to answer "problems" as a contribution to science, and though there may be a small nucleus of Aristotle s own writing here, yet the great mass of the contents of these books is the production of the Peripatetic school, after the time of Aristotle. The Problems, among other characteristics, exhibit strongly the materialistic tendencies of the Peripatetics. ali,-, 10 This name is said to have been given to the collective logical treatises by Andronicus, to indicate that they were not a part of philosophy, being neither "practical," "productive," nor "speculative," but that they contained the organ or instrument of philosophy, in the theory of reasoning. Aristotle himself uses the phrase about Dialectic, ov [uitpbv opyavov Trpbs yvSxrtv, Topics, viii. 14, 3. See Grote, vol. i. p. 78, and Brandis, Scholia, p. 140, a. 47, p. 259, a. 48. 11 During the 9th, 10th, and llth centuries, a war wa? furiously waged between Peripatetics and Platonists, i.e., between. Nominalists and Realists. But all this time the Peripatetic library of Western Europe seems to have been restricted to Latin translations (by Bouthius) of the Categories and Interpretations, together with a Latin translation of Porphyry s Introduction to the Categories. The whole question of Nominalism and Realism was started by Porphyry s Introduction. See Haureau, Uistoire de la Philosophic scolastigue, 2d. ed., i. (Paris, 1874). la Caleg., v. 1.
13 Metaph., vi. 7, 4 ; 11, 18, &c.