in five "moras," or regiments, corresponding to the five tribes ; later, a sixth, which included a small force of cavalry, was added. The armies were usually commanded by the kings of Sparta ; when one only was formed, one king remained at home. The king was accompanied by a body guard, comprising the winners of the prizes at the athletic games, and had attached to him two polemarchs, or chief . staff officers, and three administrative officers, who relieved him of all care of details, leaving him free to devote his
mind to the great task of his command.
The phalanx, formed of the hoplitai, or heavy-armed infantry, drawn up eight deep, was the basis of all Greek tactics.[1] The Spartan and Athenian phalanx differed slightly in interior organisation and subdivision, but the general principles were the same. For marching and manosuvring the ranks stood at open order, that is, 6 feet apart ; for attack at close order, or 3 feet apart ; and for defence at locked order, or H feet apart. The number of men in each phalanx, and the number of phalanxes into which the battle-array was divided, varied according to circumstances ; but from 2000 to 4000 seems to have been the usual strength of a phalanx. The peltastai and light troops and the cavalry formed round or in rear of the phalanx ; the light troops remaining in front and harassing the enemy till the actual moment of collision, and then falling back to the flanks or rear. In counting the forces engaged in a battle, it was usual to reckon only the hoplitai, who answered to the knights and men-at-arms of the Middle Ages ; but the peltastai and light troops generally equalled, and often considerably exceeded, the former in numbers. The Athenian phalanx was less com pact than that of Sparta, but more formidable in its attack, the offensive being best suited to the national character of the former, while the passive courage and endurance of the latter shone especially in the defensive. At Marathon and in subsequent battles the Athenians advanced to the attack at a run, while the advance of the Spartans was always deliberate and slow. The Thebans, under the direc tion of Epaminondas, modified the phalanx, forming it on a narrower front, with greater depth, and the soldiers standing so close in the ranks that they could not turn. This gave more weight at the point of impact, and the Theban column of attack, fifty deep, crushed the Lacede monian phalanx, only eight deep, when opposed to it at Leuctra and Mantinsea. Xenophon compares the effect to that of a heavy vessel striking a light one amidships with her bow, and dashing her to pieces by the collision. The Macedonian phalanx was a combination and adaptation of the various earlier Greek forms.
The Greek armies were essentially militia. A few guards and garrisons were maintained, but no standing armies like those of Persia; and the troops by whom such perfection in tactics was attained, and such brilliant victories were won, were only called under arms when occasion required, and returned to their civil life when the danger was over. By constant wars, however, this militia had acquired all the character of a regular army; and the Spartan forces especially differed only in not receiving pay for their ser vices. Beyond their own country the warlike reputation and soldierly qualities of the Greeks made them highly prized as mercenaries, and large numbers adopted that profession. Thus we hear of Greek troops in the pay of the Egyptian kings in the time of Cambyses, and later the garrisons of the Persian towns in Asia Minor were mainly furnished by them; while Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks who engaged under Cyrus the Younger did more to spread the fame of the arms of Greece than even the great victories of Marathon and Plataea, and, by exposing the weakness of the Persian empire, paved the way for the future conquests of Alexander.
throne. But this monarch, who combined the highest military qualities with a far-seeing shrewdne ss which was fettered by no strict principles of honour, had no sooner established himself than he devoted all his energies to raising the military power of his country and extending his authority. The experience of his wars with the Athenians and other nations of Greece taught him that he could only overcome them by a discipline and training superior to their own, and he early saw that such was not to be given to a mere militia force. He set himself, therefore, to form a standing army, to which he gave an organisation, copied, but improved, from that of his adver saries. By force of arms, by treachery, or by policy, he increased his power and influence till it embraced all Greece; and he was about to make war on Persia at the head of her united armies when his death put an end to his ambitious projects. But his son Alexander had all his father s military genius and ambition, and at the same time inherited the instrument he required in the highly- trained army so carefully prepared. Within a year he had chastised the Thracians in the north, stamped out the Greek revolt by the storming and destruction of Thebes, and received at Corinth from the representatives of the southern states the chief command over their united forces; and in the following year crossed the Hellespont at the head of an army of 35,000 men, and commenced that career of conquest which was not to cease till he had carried his victorious arms over India, and founded the largest empire the world had yet known. The army with which these astonishing campaigns were won was composed of native-born Macedonians, of their allies, and of mer cenaries. The infantry was divided into heavy and light armed, the peltastai now forming a most important part of the force, besides auxiliaries or irregular troops. None but native Greeks were admitted into the phalanx or the cavalry. The cavalry, which was more numerous than that of the Spartans or Athenians, was also divided into heavy and light ; the former carrying horse armour as well as body armour. The actual force with which Alex ander crossed the Granicus, the frontier line, was 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry, of whom about 12,000 were Macedonians, 5000 foreign mercenaries, and the remainder Greeks and allies. Special attention was paid to recruit ing, generals being left behind to attend to it, and numerous reinforcements were sent to Alexander during his expeditions, so that at the battle of Arbela his army amounted to at least 00,000 men. The tactical organisa tion of his army was adopted from the Greeks. The Mace donian grand phalanx, as finally formed by Alexander, numbered 16,384 heavy-armed infantry: it was formed 16 deep, each file of 16 men forming a lochos under a lochagos, who led the file, and thus became the front rank man. These files were variously grouped. Thus two files formed a dilochie, four a tetrarchie, two tetrarchies a taxiarchie, under a taxiarch or centurion, <fec. ; and 32 taxiarchies, or 256 files, formed a simple phalanx of 4096 men. Four of these, with a due proportion of peltastai, light troops, and cavalry, formed the grand phalanx. The depth of 16 was chosen as giving greater solidity than the Spartan phalanx, while admitting of more subdivision. To form a solid column the phalanx was doubled, giving a depth of 32; to extend its front, its depth could be reduced to one-half, still offering a firm line. The principal weapon was the sarissa or pike, 24 feet long, of which 18 feet extended
beyond the grasp. Thus the pike heads of six ranks