Page:Encyclopædia Britannica, Ninth Edition, v. 3.djvu/177

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AXIOM
161

and last, an act of conscious production or construction. It is manifestly so, as movement actual or imaginary, in the case of magnitude or continuous quantity ; nor is it otherwise in the case of number or discrete quantity, when the units are objects (points or anything else) standing apart from each other in space. When the units are not objects presented to the senses or represented as coexistent in space, but are mere subjective occurrences succeeding each other in time, the numerical synthesis, doubtless, proceeds differently, but it is still an act of construction, dependent on the power we have of voluntarily determining the flow of subjective consciousness. Thus acting constructively in our experience both of number and form, we, in a manner, make the ultimate relations of both to be what for us they must be in all circumstances, and such relations when expressed are truly axiomatic in every sense that has been ascribed to the name. Beyond the mathematical principles which may be thus accounted for, there are, as was before remarked, no other principles of special science to which the name of axiom is uniformly applied. It may now be understood why the name should be withheld from such a fundamental generalisation as the atomic theory in chemistry, even when we have become so familiar with the facts as to seem to see clearly that the various kinds of matter must combine with each other regularly in definite proportions : the proposition answers to no intuition or direct apprehen sion. At most could it be called axiomatic in the sense, of course applicable to mathematical principles also, that it is assumed as true in the body of science compacted by means of it. The laws of motion, however, formulated by Newton as principles of general physics, not only were called by him axiomatic in this latter sense, but have been given out by others since his time as propositions intuitively certain ; and, though it cannot seriously be pretended that there is the same case for ascribing to them the character of a priori truths, there must be some reason why the name of axiom in the full sense has been claimed for them alone by the side of the mathematical principles. The a priori character, it is clear, can only in a peculiar sense be claimed for truths which all the genius of the ancients failed to grasp, and which were established in far later times as inductions from actual experiments ; Newton, certainly, in calling them axioms, by no means claimed for them aught but an experiential origin. On the other hand, it must be conceded that motion as an experience has in it a character of simplicity, like that belonging to number and form, consisting mainly in a clear apprehension of the circumstances under which the phenomenon varies, while, again, such apprehension is conditioned by the psychological nature of the experience, namely, that it is one depending on activity of our own which we can control, and does not corne to us as bare passive affection which we must take as we find it. "We do in truth make or constitute motion, as we construct number and space ; moving, as we please, without external occasion, and, when apprehending objective movements, following these with conscious motions of our members. Notwithstanding, our proper motions far less adequately correspond to the reality of external motions than do our subjective constructions of space and number answer to the reality of things figured and numbered. With limited store of nervous energy and muscles of con fined sweep, we cannot execute at all such continued unvarying movements as occur, at least approximately, in nature ; we cannot, by any such combinations of movements as we are able to make, determine beforehand the result of such complex motions as nature in endless variety exhibits ; nor, again, can we with any accuracy appreciate the relation between action and reaction by opposing our muscular organs to one another. We must wait long upon experience that comes to us, or rather, in face of the objective complexity presented by nature, sally forth to make varied experiments with moving things, and there upon generalise, before anything can be determined posi tively respecting motion. This is precisely what inquirers, until about the time of Galileo, were by no means content to do, and they had accordingly laws of motion which were, indeed, devised a priori, but which were not objectively true. Since the time of Galileo true, or at least effective, laws of motion have been established inductively, like all other physical laws ; only it is more easy than in the case of the others, which are less simple, to come near to an adequate subjective construction of them, and hence the claim sometimes set up for them to be in fact a priori and in the full sense axiomatic. It remains to inquire in what sense the general principles of all knowledge or principles of certitude may be called, as they often are called, axioms. The laws of Contradiction and of Excluded Middle, noted though not named by Aristotle, together with that formulated as the law of Identity, presupposed as they are in all consistent thinking, have, with a character of widest generality, also a character of extreme simplicity, and may fitly be denominated axioms in the sense of immediate principles. They stand, however, as pure logical principles, apart from all others, being wholly formal, without a shade of material content. There can be no question, therefore, of their certainty being- guaranteed by a direct intuition, valid for all cases because fully representative of all ; as little does there appear valid ground for calling them, in the proper sense, inductive generalisations from experience. They may rather be held to admit only of the kind of proof that Aristotle calls dialectical : whoever denies them will find that he cannot argue at all or be argued with ; he cuts himself off from all part in rational discourse, and is no better, as Aristotle forcibly expresses it, than a plant. The like position of being postulated as the condition of making progress belongs to the very different principle or principles (which may, however, be called logical, in the wider sense) implied in the establishment of truth of fact, more particularly the inductive investigation of nature. Whether expressed in the form of a principle of Sufficient Reason, as by Leibnitz, or, as is now more common, in the form of a principle of Uniformity of Nature, with or without a pendant principle of Causality for the special class of uniformities of succession, some assumption is indispensable for knitting together into general truths the discrete and particular elements of experience. Such postulates must be declared to have an experiential origin rather than to be a priori principles, but experience may more truly be said to suggest them than to be their ground or foundation, since they are themselves the ground, express or implied, of all ordered experience. Their case is perhaps best met by pronouncing them hypothetical principles, and as there are no axioms not even those of mathematics that are thought of without reference to their proved efficiency as principles leading to definite conclusions, they may be called axiomatic on account of their extreme generality, however little they possess the character of immediacy. The name axiom, at the end of the inquiry, is thus left undeniably equivocal, and it clearly behoves those whe- employ it, whether in philosophy or science, always to make plain in what sense it is meant to be taken. Before closing, it is, perhaps, necessary to add why, in dealing with the question of origin, no account has been taken of the doctrine of evolution which has become so promi nent in the latest scientific and philosophical speculation. From the point of view of the present article, that doc trine has only an indirect bearing on the inquiry. If

the conditions of experience as they are found in the