and finally culminates in rational cognition. So religious belief, which is primarily little more than a vague feeling of something over and beyond the present state of exist ence, combined with the dim sense of our own finite and dependent condition, gradually rises to a higher stage, and in its efforts to attain some cognizance of the supersensible, begins even to attach itself to natural objects. But as it can find in these no satisfaction, it is compelled to con struct some representations of the supernatural which shall harmonize with our spiritual wants. In the formation of these religious ideas we are not left without help, nor are they to be looked upon as mere figments of the mind. The revelation which has been given in nature, both physical and moral, and in the special experience to which the name is more frequently applied, furnishes matter which is laid hold of and pressed into the service. Religious belief or faith always attaches itself to representa tions, intuitions, or facts ; it gives what Newman has called Real as opposed to Notional Assent. But it is not the less necessary that faith should be raised to insight, and that we should construe in terms of thought what religious experience brings before us as direct intuition. There must be theology as well as religion. Nothing is believed which is not held to be so connected with the rational nature of man as irretrievably to injure that nature should its truth be overthrown. This is not to put know ledge in place of faith, if knowledge be understood to apply only to the logically necessary ; nor is it to assert that what have been called truths of revelation could have been discovered by natural reason. Knowledge, however, can not be confined to the abstract understanding ; and nothing is more delusive than the total opposition of revelation and reason. " What is there in the nature of things," says Augustine, " that God has done unreasonably 1 " To affirm that reason does not of itself discover the truths of reve lation, is simply to bring against it the reproach it may well bear, that it does not create experience. Reason has not to make new facts, but to accept given experience, and evolve from it the pure elements of thought which it con tains, and in which its truth consists. Faith, therefore, precedes knowledge, as Anselm used to say ; but its
priority is that of time, not of authority.[1]
4. There remains to be taken into account the interesting question of the grounds and motives for belief. It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between these two ; the cause of a belief may not be exactly a reason for it. Belief, though natural, is not always rational, but frequently rests with happy unconsciousness on foundations utterly inade quate to its support. But if we disregard this distinction and include both causes and reasons under the title principles of belief, these may be divided into three classes (1), Testimony; (2), Feelings, Desires, or Wishes ; (3), Evidence of Reason. These are rarely dissevered in actual practice. Testimony, to the reception of which the name belief is frequently restricted, is familiar enough to require no extended notice. Our natural tendency is to accept all testimony as true ; it is experience alone that teaches caution. Where from the nature of the case no such experience is to be had, credulity settles down into firm and ineradicable conviction. The majority of men would be astonished to find how much their belief depends upon the society into which they have been born and in which they live. Dogmas at first forced upon a people gradually become ingrained in the minds of those brought up in habitual contact with them. There is hardly a limit to the possibility of instilling beliefs through continued custom, and no resistance to analysis is so strong as that offered by mere customary opinion, which has imperceptibly introduced itself into the very life s blood of those who share it.
The feelings, though not so directly a source of convic tions as testimony, exercise an extensive and complex influence on belief. It has always been a popular saying that a man believes what he wishes that " the wish is father to the thought; " and there can be no doubt that the superior force given to an idea by the concentration on it of desire or affection, causes it to bulk so largely in consciousness as to exclude the thought of its non-realiza tion. The very idea of a result opposed to what we earnestly desire is unpleasant enough to make us resolutely shut it out of sight. This, however, is but a partial and limited effect. We know very well that our belief is only occasionally swayed by our wishes, and that necessity too often constrains us to believe what we willingly would not. Our volition cannot directly compel belief. But the feelings play a more important part; for it is by their means primarily that we stretch beyond the field of direct knowledge and complete our limited experience with what we feel to be necessary for the harmony of our moral and religious nature. We believe that without which our nature would be dissatisfied, and this belief takes its rise in the feelings, the blind expressions of intellectual want, which form the first stage towards completed insight.
It is hardly necessary to do more than refer to the rational grounds for belief. Wherever our knowledge of any object or law is incomplete, belief is ready to step in and fill up the gap by some hypothesis, which is in conformity with our experience, is rationally connected with the facts to be explained, and is not yet known to be true. Great portions of our so-called scientific knowledge are nothing but rational belief, hypotheses unverified, perhaps even unverifiable, and the settlement of the conditions or legitimacy of such presumptions forms the principal part of inductive logic.
Besides the works already referred to, the following treat of belief in general : Fechner, Drei Motive und Grunde des Glaubens, 1863; Ulrici, Glauben und Wissen, Spekulation und exacte Wissenschaft, 1858 ; of religious belief in particular, in addition to works on dogmatic theology or philosophy of religion : Schwarz, Das Wescn dcr Religion, 1847; Asher, Der religiose Glaiibe, 1860; J. Kostlin, Der Glaube, 1860 ; Venn, Hulsean Lectures for 1869.
(r. ad.)
the greatest general of the Byzantine empire, was born about 505 A.D., at Germania, on the borders of Illyria. As a youth he served in the body-guard of Justinian, who appointed him commander of the Eastern army. He won a signal victory over the Persians in 530, and success fully conducted a campaign against them, until forced, by the rashness of his soldiers, to join battle and suffer defeat in the following year. Recalled to Constantinople, he married Antonina, a profligate, daring woman. During- the sedition of the " green" and " blue " parties of the circus he did Justinian good service, effectually crushing the rebels who had proclaimed Hypatius emperor. In 533 the command of the expedition against the Vandal kingdom in Africa, a perilous office, which the rest of the imperial generals shunned, was conferred on Belisarius. With 15,000 mercenaries, whom he had to train into Roman discipline, he took Carthage, defeated Gelimer the Vandal king, and carried him captive, in 534, to grace the first triumph witnessed in Constantinople. In reward for these services Belisarius was invested with the consular dignity, and medals were struck in his honour. At this time the Ostrogothic kingdom, founded in Italy by Theodoric the Great, was shaken by internal dissensions, of which Justinian resolved to avail himself. Accordingly, Belisarius invaded Sicily ; and, after storming Naples and defending Rome for a year against almost the entire strength of the
Goths in Italy, he concluded the war by the capture of- ↑ See Scotus Erigena, De Divis. Naiur., i. 69.
