if weak, then the two elements are said to be movable, and they may flow over from one to another of the already formed psychical products. Any formed faculty does not cease to exist on the re moval of its stimulus ; in virtue of its fundamental property, ten acity, it sinks back as a trace (Spur) into unconsciousness, whence it may be recalled by the application to it of another stimulus, or by the attraction towards it of some of the movable elements or newly-formed original powers. These traces and the flowing over of the movable elements are the most important conceptions in Beneke s psychology ; by means of them he gives a rationale of re production and association, and strives to show that all the formed faculties are simply developments from traces of earlier processes. Lastly, similar forms, according to the degree of their similarity, attract one another or tend to form closer combinations.
All psychical phenomena are explicable by the relation of impres sion and power, and by the flow of movable elements ; the whole process of mental development is nothing but the result of the action and interaction of the above simple laws. In general this growth may be said to take the direction of rendering more and more definite by repetition and attraction of like to like the originally indefinite activities of the primary faculties. Thus the sensations of the special senses are gradually formed from the primary sensuous feel ings (Sinnliche Empfindungeri) ; concepts are formed from intui tions of individuals by the attraction of the common elements, and the consequent How towards them of movable forms. Judgment is the springing into consciousness of a concept alongside of an intui tion, or of a higher concept alongside of a lower. Reasoning is merely a more complex judgment. Xor are there special faculties of judging or reasoning. The understanding is simply the mass of concepts lying in the background of unconsciousness, ready to be called up and to How with force towards anything closely connected with them. Even memory is not a special faculty ; it is simply the fundamental property of tenacity possessed by the original faculties. The very distinction between the great classes, Knowledge, Feeling, and Will, may be referred to elementary differences in the original relations of faculty and impression.
To follow Beneke into the details of any one of his psychological developments would be impossible within moderate compass. It mav be sufficient to say, that on nearly all questions concerning the psychical mechanism, his works contain a mass of unusually rich and instructive material. They are particularly deserving of care ful comparison with the association psychology of modern British thinkers, most of whose results and processes will be found there thoroughly handled and worked into a comprehensive system.
In logic, metaphysics, and ethics, Beueke s speculations are completely dependent on the results of the psychological analysis. Thus thinking has been by him separated into analytical and synthetical. The first, which consists essentially in the subsump- tion of one concept under another, is the subject of elementary, pure, or formal logic, which, as an art, has to lay down the universal rules according to which such subsumption takes place. Logical reasoning, which adds nothing to our knowledge, but merely clears it up, is at bottom a substitution of one notion for another. In the elaborate theory of syllogism, founded on this principle, Beneke to some extent anticipates Hamilton s New Analytic. (It cannot, however, be thought that Hamilton borrowed his principle from Beneke, as the latter seems to have suspected ; see Dressler s re mark, LehrbucJi der Psy., 299. The two approached the matter from quite different sides, and the peculiarity of Hamilton s system, the definite, explicit, quantification of the predicate, is by no means necessarily implied in anything said by Beneke.) Synthetical thinking, on the other hand, leads to new knowledge, but in its progress it makes use of principles involving the relation of thought to existence, and which, therefore, find justification in metaphysics. In that science Beneke s fundamental proposition is that in inner experience we cognize things as they are, whereas in outer experience we only know their effects. Real being is given in our intuitions, from which we gradually form a notion of self, and then of other conscious beings like ourselves. The inference to the real existence of external things is an unconscious reasoning, involving the same elements as the inference to the existence of other conscious beings. The relations which give defiuiteness and universality to experience, such as substance and cause, are known directly in inner experience, in the systematic relations of the several psychical elements, and are transferred by us to outer beings. In this part of his meta physical theory Beneke owes much to Schleiermacher.
In his ethical theory, which is worked out with great fulness, and which was, in his own opinion, his most valuable contribution to philosophy, Beneke is thoroughly empirical. The worth of an object is defined to be the degree of pleasurable feeling with which it affects us, and ethical judgments are founded on the relations of worth among the feelings with which we regard objects. There is a gradation of moral worth, because there are higher and lower faculties ; and, as the mental constitutions of all men are funda mentally alike, this gradation of worth becomes a norm or general rule for estimating moral qualities. An estimate founded on this normal scale appears as morally necessary, or as duty.
The special value of Beueke s works, as has been already said, consists in the many specimens of acute psychological analysis scattered throughout them. As a complete explanation of psychical facts, the theory seems singularly defective. The original hypo theses, peculiar to Beneke and on which the whole depends, are hastily assumed, are never subjected to critical examination, and after all, like Locke s earlier theory, rest on a clumsy mechanical metaphor. As is the case with all empirical theories of mental development, the higher categories or notions, which are apparently shown to result from the simple elements, are really presupposed at every step. Particularly unsatisfactory is the account of conscious ness, which is said to arise from the union of impression and faculty. The necessity of consciousness for any mental action whatsoever is apparently granted, but the conditions involved in it are never discussed or referred to. So too the explanation of the origin of the notions, substance and cause, always a crucial test for an em pirical theory, is completely irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of the system. The same defect appears in the account of ethical judgment ; no amount of empirical fact can ever yield the notion of absolute duty. It is not, perhaps, to be altogether attri buted to the ideal character of German speculation, that Beneke has been almost entirely neglected, and that his results have found acceptance mainly with practical teachers. Undoubtedly, for the science of education his minute analysis of temperament and care ful exposition of the means whereby the young, unformed mind may be trained are of infinite value ; but the truth of many of his doc trines on these points lends no support to the fundamental hypo theses, from which indeed they might be almost entirely severed.
Among German writers, not professed followers of Beneke, but who have been largely influenced by him, may be mentioned Ueberweg (particularly in the first part of his Logic) and Fortlage. In England, perhaps the only writer who shows traces of acquaint ance with his works is Morell (Introd. to Mental Philosophy}. The most eminent members of the school are Dressier (whose Beneke, oder Seelenlehre als Nolurwissenschaft is an admirable exposition), Dittes, and Raue. The compendium by the last-named author has passed through four editions in Germany, and has been translated into French, Flemish, and English. The English translation, Ele ments of Psychology, 1871, gives a lucid and succinct view of the whole system.
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BENEVENTO, a city of Italy, the capital of a province, situated on a hill near the confluence of the Galore and the Sabato, 32 miles N.E. of Naples. The town is surrounded by walls, and was formerly defended by a castle of the 12th century, which now contains Government offices and a prison. It occupies the site of the ancient Beneventum, and is largely built of its ruins. Except Rome, few cities can boast of so many remains of antiquity. Of these the most beautiful and perfect is the arch of Trajan, erected in 114 A.D., 53 feet in height, and consisting of a single arch of Parian marble of the Corinthian order, highly orna mented with basso and alto rilievos, which represent various events in the reign of that emperor. It now forms one of the gates of the city (Porta Aurea). Of the amphitheatre the remains, now known as Grottoni di Mappa, are in a very ruinous condition, and the arena is occupied by houses of a mean description. Benevento is the see of a bishop, and has a cathedral of the 12th century in the Lombardo-Saracenic style, in front of which is an Egyptian obelisk of granite covered with hiero glyphics. Among its other buildings may be mentioned the town-hall, the diocesan seminary, the lyceurn, which was formerly a Jesuit college, and several hospitals. The principal manufactures are leather, parchment, and plated goods. A considerable trade is carried on in grain.
Beneventum, or, as it was originally called, Maloeis or Maleven- tum, seems to have been of Samnite foundation. In 268 B.C. it was colonized by the Romans, who had probably been in possession of it for some time. During the second Punic war two of the most important battles were fought in the neighbourhood. It con tinued to be a very flourishing city till the close of the empire, and from its position on the Via Appia, it often comes into notice. About 545 A.D. it was sacked by Totila, but before long had re. covered its prosperity. Being raised to the rank of a duchy by Alboin, king of the Lombards, it continued in possession of its own dukes till 1053, when the emperor, Henry III., who had rendered himself master of the city, exchanged it with Leo IX. for the bishopric of Bamberg. From that time it continued in Papal pos session till 1806, when the Emperor Napoleon I. bestowed it, with the title of prince, on Talleyrand.
