mechanically, and though by reflex action he may repel attack unconsciously, still the first affirmation of the system was that man was essentially a thinking being ; and, while we retain this original dictum, it must not be supposed that the mind is a mere spectator, or like the boatman in the boat. Of course a unity of nature is impossible between mind and body so described. And yet there is a unity of composition, a unity so close that the compound is " really one and in a sense indivisible." You cannot in the actual man cut soul and body asunder ; they interpenetrate in every member. But there is one point in the human frame a point midway in the brain, single and free, which may in a special sense be called the seat of the mind. This is the so-called conarion, or pineal gland, where in a minimized point the mind on one hand and the vital spirits on the othsr meet and communicate. In that gland the mystery of creation is concentrated ; thought meets exten sion and directs it; extension moves towards thought and is perceived. Two clear and distinct ideas, it seems, pro duce an absolute mystery. Mind, driven from the field of extension, erects its last fortress in the pineal gland. In such a state of despair and destitution there is no hope for spiritualism, save in God; and Clauberg, Geulincx, and Malebranche all take refuge under the shadow of His wings to escape the tyranny of extended matter. In the psychology of Descartes there are two fundamental modes of thought, perception and volition. " It seems to me," he says, " that in receiving such and such an idea the mind is passive, and that it is active only in volition ; that its ideas are put in it partly by the objects which touch the senses, partly by the impressions in the brain, and partly also by the dispositions which have preceded in the mind itself and by the movements of its will." 1 The wiL therefore, as being more originative, has more to do with true or false judgments than the understanding. Unfortu nately, Descartes is too lordly a philosopher to explain distinctly what either understanding or will may mean. But we gather that in two directions our reason is bound up with bodily conditions, which make or mar it, according as the will, or central energy of thought, is true to itself or not. In the range of perception, intellect is subjected to the material conditions of sense, memory, and imagination ; and in infancy, when the will has allowed itself to assent pre cipitately to the conjunctions presented to it by these material processes, thought has become filled with obscure ideas. In the moral sphere the passions or emotions (which Descartes reduces to the six primitive forms of admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness) are the perceptions or sentiments of the mind, caused and maintained by some movement of the vital spirits, but specially referring to the mind only. The presentation of some object of dread, for example, to the eye has or may have a double effect. On one hand the animal spirits " reflected" 2 from the image formed on the pineal gland proceed through the nervous tubes to make the muscles turn the back and lift the feet, BO as to escape the cause of the terror. Such is the reflex and mechanical movement independent of the mind. But, on the other hand, the vital spirits cause a movement in the gland by which the mind perceives the affection of the organs, learns that something is to be loved or hated, admired or shunned. Such perceptions dispose the mind to pursue what nature dictates as useful. But the estimate of goods and evils which they give is indistinct and unsatis factory. The office of reason is to give a true and distinct appreciation of the values of goods and evils ; or firm and determinate judgments touching the knowledge of good and evil are our proper arms against the influence of the passions. 3 We are free, therefore, through knowledge : ex (Euvres, ix. 166. 2 Passions de I Ame, 36. 3 Passions de 1 Ame, 48. magna luce in intdlectu sequitur magna propensio in volun- tate, and omnis peccans est ignorans. " If we clearly sea that what we are doing is wrong, it would be impossible for us to sin, so long as we saw it in that light." 4 Thus the highest liberty, as distinguished from mere indifference, proceeds from clear and distinct knowledge, and such knowledge can only be attained by firmness and resolution, i.e., by the continued exercise of the will. Thus in the perfection of man, as in the nature of God, will and intellect must be united. For thought, will is as necessary as understanding. And innate ideas therefore are mere capacities or tendencies, possibilities which apart from the will to think may be regarded as nothing at all. The philosophy of Descartes fought its first battles and gained its first triumphs in the country of his adoption. In his lifetime his views had been taught in Utrecht and Leyden. In the universities of the Netherlands and of Lower Germany, as yet free from the conservatism of the old-established seats of learning, the new system gained an easy victory ever Aristotelianism, and, as it was adapted for lectures and examinations, soon became almost as scholastic as the doctrines it had supplanted. At Leyden, taught by De Raey, Heerebord, Heidan, and Voider ; at Utrecht, by De Bruyn and P. Burmann, and Lambert AVelthuysen (the last a private student); at Groningen, by Maresius, Gousset, and Tobias Andre ; at Franeker, by Kuardus Andala ; at Breda, Nimeguen, Harderwyk, Duisburg, and Herborn, and at the Catholic university of Louvain, Cartesianism was warmly expounded and defended in seats of learning, of which many are now left desolate, and by adherents whose lucubrations have for the most part long lost interest for any but the antiquary. The Cartesianism of Holland was a child of the uni versities, and its literature is mainly composed of com mentaries upon the original texts, of theses discussed in ihe schools, and of systematic expositions of Cartesian philosophy for the benefit of the student. Three names stand out in this Cartesian professoriate, Wittich, Clauberg, and Geulincx. Wittich (1625-1688), professor at Duisburg and Leyden, is a representative of the moderate followers, who professed to reconcile the doctrines of their school with the faith of Christendom, and to refute the theology of Spinoza. Clauberg (like Wittich, a German), professor of philosophy at Herborn and Duisburg, died while still young in 1665. Like a schoolman on Aristotle, he has, clause by clause, commented upon the Meditations of Descartes ; but he specially claims notice for his work De corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, where he main tains that the bodily movements are merely procatarctic causes (i.e., antecedents, but not strictly causes) of the mental action, and sacrifices the independence of man to the omnipotence of God. The same tendency to absorb all particular causes and movements in God is still more pronounced in Geulincx (1625-1669), who for the last six years of his life taught privately at Leyden. With Geuliiicx the reciprocal action of mind and body is altogether denied ; they resemble two clocks, so made by the artificer as to strike the same hour together. The mind can only act upon itself; beyond that limit, the power of God must intervene to make any seeming interaction possible between body and soul. Such are the half-hearted attempts at consistency in Cartesian thought, which eventually culminate in the pantheism of Spinoza. Descartes occasionally had not scrupled to interpret the Scriptures according to his own tenets, while still main taining, when their letter contradicted him, that the Bible was not meant to teach the sciences. Similar tendencies are found amongst his followers. Whilst Protestant
- Uiuvres, ix. 170.
