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subsequent answer, are constitutional. This Mr. Bearcroft said, in one sense, though in another he applied it as libellous.
Such contradictions, such warpings, such jargon and confusion, which such legal sophists are guilty of, may well embarrass a Jury of honest, well-intentioned men, and deprive them of their right. But when truth is separated and disentangled from them it must appear, 1st. That the Dialogue in question is no libel. 2d, That a Jury have a right to judge of libel or no libel. And lastly, that it only requires a knowledge of the subject itself, independent of Star Chamber prejudices, to say a libel is indefinable, and that nothing tending to a breach of the peace is criminal, but what, is either criminal in itself, or malum prohibitum.
In short, so vague, indefinite and arbitrary is the whole doctrine of libels, as drawn from the slavish principles of the civil law, that its defenders are involved in the grossest contradictions and prevarications in spite of themselves, and every effort to avoid it.
Yet
